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Abstract 
 
Through a theoretically informed examination of two cases fundamental to the growth of 
the aviation industry in the UK, this thesis aims to illuminate the mechanisms behind the 
industry’s oft-claimed position of privilege in environmental policymaking. It is claimed that 
historically the aviation industry has occupied such a position, manifest in tax breaks for 
fuel, delayed entry into the emissions trading scheme and continuing ability to secure 
permission for new airport development, all in the face of fierce opposition. However, the 
existing literature fails to adequately empiricise or explain the precise mechanisms behind 
its alleged position of privilege. 
This thesis focuses on the role of the UK state in arbitrating between rival interests in the 
historical development of the aviation industry in the UK. Two case studies are explored: 
the development of the third London airport at Stansted, and a new runway at Manchester. 
The former was characterised by delays and reviews, becoming a cause célèbre; the latter 
occurred more rapidly. Archival analysis and elite interviewing uncover fresh details of the 
two cases. Two contrasting theories of policy are employed to understand and explain the 
industry’s role: the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) (which maintains that policy 
change arises primarily from an open competition between policy coalitions in adjusting to 
external events) and the Strategic-Relational Approach (SRA) (that acknowledges the 
importance of structural imperatives on the state to consistently privilege some actors over 
others).  
This research finds that both the ACF and SRA offer convincing accounts of the 
policymaking process, however, singularly, neither is able fully to explore all the 
mechanisms that underpin the industry’s privileged position. By paying close attention to 
the beliefs of actors, the ACF uncovers the mechanisms behind how and why actors work 
together to achieve their policy goals and draws attention to the important role played by 
external events and policy learning play in creating policy change. Complementing these 
insights, the SRA draws attention to the strategies actors use to achieve their policy goals 
and explores the structural factors that continuously privilege the aviation industry. In 
initiating the first theoretical dialogue between these two contrasting perspectives, this 
research has found that there is no need for theoretical synthesis in a quest to find the 
‘best’ single theory, rather, that combining their insights to in a complementary manner 
offers the most valuable exploration of policy and the policymaking process. 
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Introduction  
 
“[T]he demands of the aviation industry are insatiable [and] successive governments have 
usually given way to them” Chris Mullin (2003), Aviation Minister July 1999 – February 2001  
 
The aviation industry provokes fierce controversy whether it is about the development of 
airports, the social acceptability of night flying or the global carbon impact of flights (Daley, 
2010: 1). Comments like the above from Chris Mullin are not uncommon, with many 
politicians and commentators suggesting that the aviation industry occupies a position of 
continuing privilege in the policymaking process. With the ability to dominate the process 
to serve its own ends, it has been described as a structurally powerful industry whose 
interests are inextricably tied up with those of the state (Gossling and Upham, 2009: 13; 
May and Hill, 2006; Paterson, 2000; Upham, 2001a; Whitelegg and Williams, 2000). 
Historically, conflict has often been framed as a straight trade-off between national need 
and local amenity: “it too easily assumed that the national interest and that of the aviation 
industry is synonymous” (Mullin, 2003). However, as Owens (2002: 951) identifies, there is 
at least one deep fault in this storyline: “the ‘national interest’, as a singular conception is 
problematic. But so too is ‘local amenity’, not least because the effects of major 
infrastructure projects invariably transcend the local”. Further complicating matters, “the 
worldview in which certain kinds of development are seen as ‘essential’ is not one that is 
universally shared” (Owens, 2002: 951). 
This thesis does not set out to dispute the role of the aviation industry as one of the world’s 
most influential industries, nor does it debate the (de)merits of air travel or of airport 
expansion. Rather, it seeks to analyse the aviation industry’s position in environmental 
policymaking and to explore questions well rehearsed in political science since the 1950s, 
namely: who gets what, where, and how (Lasswell, 1986), to investigate how and why the 
aviation industry is able to occupy a claimed position of privilege in this process. 
This chapter begins by discussing why this is an area worth studying, detailing the positive 
and negative impacts associated with the aviation industry and how the policymaking 
process attempts to strike a balance between them. This discussion highlights the gap in 
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the in existing academic research, which this research seeks to fill. This chapter then details 
how this will be achieved, first, by setting out its aims and objectives. It then details the 
research approach, specifying the philosophy that underpins the research, details of the 
political theories that are used to explore long-term changes in policy and the aviation 
industry’s position in policymaking, and the methodological framework. It concludes by 
introducing and signposting the rest of the thesis. 
The aviation industry 
Since the Wright Brothers took the first powered flight in 1903, the growth of the aviation 
industry has been phenomenal. Globally, it has experienced growth rates in air passenger 
traffic (in terms of revenue-passenger-kilometres) of approximately nine percent per 
annum, outstripping the growth rate of global average gross domestic product by 2.4 (Bows 
et al., 2009: 10). In terms of terminal and transfer passengers, the UK is the largest in 
Europe. Its airports operate as key hubs for transatlantic routes or as central nodes of the 
low-cost market. Despite being considered a relatively mature market, between 1990 and 
2005 its growth rates, in terms of passenger numbers, have averaged at 5.5 percent per 
annum (Bows et al., 2009: 16; 17). 
The positive impacts of the aviation industry 
The aviation industry generates huge private and social benefits, associated with 
employment, leisure, recreation, education and access to family and friends, and are self 
explanatory when it comes to disaster relief, medical assistance and law enforcement 
(Bishop and Grayling, 2003; Caves, 2003; Shaw and Thomas, 2006). Tourism in particular 
has helped to create the increase in demand for air travel and is dependent on the 
availability of long-distance services (Bieger and Wittmer, 2006; Daley et al., 2008; 
Debbage, 1994; Goetz and Graham, 2004; Gossling and Peeters, 2007; May, 2002). An 
important economic sector in its own right, globally, the tourism industry is expected to 
expand at approximately four percent per annum until 2020 (Daley, 2010: 3). In the UK 
however, there is a £17 billion tourism deficit from UK residents spending more money 
abroad than what visitors bring in (Cairns and Newson, 2006: 5). 
In the UK, and increasingly elsewhere, an air dependent culture is developing with lifestyles 
adapting to this expectation (Cairns and Newson, 2006: 5). It conjures positive images of 
leisure, recreation, connectiveness, business, social contact and cultural exchange which no 
other mode of transport can offer, and increasingly, cultural assumptions connecting 
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transport and development (Daley, 2010: 1; Paterson, 2000: 261; 263). What used to be 
considered a luxury good is now seen as a commodity with air travel now embedded in 
peoples’ lives (Gossling and Upham 2009: 9-10). However, it is not an industry that is 
universally seen as socially inclusive. For example, in the UK, while growth rates have 
steadily increased and flight prices dropped, there is little evidence to suggest that a wider 
range of income groups is accessing air travel (Cairns and Newson, 2006: 4; Caves, 2003: 
39). 
The economic contribution that the aviation industry makes to local, regional and national 
economies is well-documented and debated (Bailey, 2007; Friends of the Earth, 2006; 
Graham, 2003: 198; Humphreys, 2003; Oxford Economic Forecasting, 1999; 2006). An 
important economic sector itself, it simultaneously facilitates and supports growth in many 
other sectors with many parts of national economies now relying on the industry (Daley, 
2010: 2).  
In its quest to maintain high and stable levels of economic growth, the UK Government has 
been, historically, continually supportive of the expansion of the aviation industry. Indeed, 
regarded it as a bellwether of the entire economy (Button, 1996: 289; Daley, 2010: 2). This 
support has been demonstrated through a range of policies, from the supply of land during 
the UK’s post-war development, to the current tax breaks the industry enjoys (e.g. there is 
no VAT on air tickets while kerosene (aviation fuel) is exempt from fuel tax), to the delayed 
inclusion from climate change targets at the national, European and international scales. 
The negative impacts of the aviation industry 
A dynamic industry, with important economic and social benefits, the aviation industry, 
nationally and globally, faces a growing and unprecedented concern over its environmental 
impact and increasing attention from both the private and public spheres (Bows et al., 
2009: 1; Cairns and Newson, 2006: 12). At the local level, noise is considered to be the most 
serious environmental problem with local air pollution, land-take and waste generation all 
having serious negative impacts on the quality of life of nearby communities (Graham, 
2003: 200; Hume and Watson, 2003; Janic, 1999: 160; May and Hill, 2006; Upham, 2003). 
Air quality legislation and local agreements to limit noise illustrate the ability, and potential, 
of local concerns to constrain the development of the industry and as public tolerance of 
these impacts falls, environmental regulations will become tougher and affect the 
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industry’s ability to expand (Daley, 2010: 4; Graham and Guyer, 1999; Upham, 2001a; 
Upham et al., 2003). 
At the global level, the aviation industry’s main environmental impact is its contribution to 
climate change through the emission of greenhouse gases, primarily carbon dioxide (CO₂). 
Fuelled by a combination of high growth rates and limited technological improvements, the 
aviation industry’s emissions continue to rise (Bows et al., 2009: 1; IPCC, 1999; Sustainable 
Aviation, 2005). In the UK, between 1990 and 2000, CO₂ emissions from aviation doubled 
while combined emissions from all other UK activities fell by approximately nine percent. 
Using predicted growth trends, it is estimated that emissions from the industry are set to 
more than double again between 2000 and 2030, and by 2050 could consume all the 
emissions savings achieved by other sectors (Cairns and Newson, 2006: 4; Daley and 
Preston, 2009: 367). In the absence of international legislation, the assumption is that this 
environmental impact will be internalised in the UK’s commitments to tackle climate 
change (Cairns and Newson, 2006: 4). With dangerous climate change an imminent threat, 
the aviation industry has become a potent symbol of fossil fuel consumption, greenhouse 
gas emissions and climate change (Anderson et al., 2006; Daley, 2010: 1).  
Positive and negative impacts: a political balancing act? 
Balancing the economic, environmental and social impacts of aviation is a difficult task, 
especially when agreements are made multi-nationally; when the industry is seen as central 
to economic growth; within a culture that is becoming increasingly dependent on air travel 
(Bishop, 2003; Daley, 2010). The concept of sustainable development, which sets out to 
balance these demands, has clear policy implications for the aviation industry and there is a 
growing body of literature examining the relationship between the two (e.g. Bishop and 
Grayling, 2003; Boons et al., 2010; Bows et al., 2009; Daley, 2008; 2010; Dimitriu, 2003; 
Gossling and Upham, 2009; Kaszewski and Sheate, 2004; Upham, 2001a; b; 2003; Upham et 
al., 2003; Walker and Cook, 2009). However, while there is a long history of the industry 
talking about sustainability, in practice they have done very little (Upham, 2001a: 247). 
This lack of action results from a field of tension existing between economic interests and 
environmental concerns. The strong links between air transport and economic growth have 
created an understandable reluctance, at all a level of governance, to mitigate its 
environmental impact (Aviation Environment Federation, 2008; Bleijenberg, 1995; Daley 
and Preston, 2009: 347; Gossling and Upham, 2009: 9; Upham, 2001a). Regardless of this 
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overwhelming, and increasing, environmental impact, the dominant social paradigm of 
economic growth is difficult to challenge (May and Hill, 2006; Paterson, 2000; 2007).  
At the national level, society looks to the state to co-ordinate a balance between the 
economic, social and environmental. Responsible for the overarching policy that sets the 
framework for the development of aviation industry in the UK, it must ensure this is 
conducted in respect to environmental limits and impacts.  
At the local level, the planning system is the venue where many of these conflicts are 
exposed. However, there is a, “tendency to treat ‘subjective’ environmental values as a less 
basis for decisions” (Owens, 1997: 571). In theory, the planning system should be the 
mechanism whereby the economic, environmental and social can be balanced in the quest 
for sustainable development. However, the problem with this remit is that the balance is 
weighted in a presumption of development, reflected explicitly in policy guidance but also 
through the, often subtle, prioritisation of certain demands and values over others (Owens, 
1997: 574). 
Planning inquiries are routinely charged with, “exploiting the mutual compatibility of 
economic development and environmental protection as far as possible and thereafter with 
performing a delicate balance of social, economic and environmental considerations” 
(Owens, 1997: 574). It is not intended to examine the policy upon which the proposal is 
based (Rough, 2011: 30), rather, in theory, it provides a relatively open forum where policy 
assumptions to be questioned by interested parties (Cowell and Owens, 2006: 405; Rough, 
2011: 24; 29). 
Aim and objectives 
As identified, there is a significant, and growing, body of academic research that examines 
the positive and negative impacts of the aviation industry and increasingly, what the 
rhetoric of sustainable development means for its continuing growth (e.g. Bishop and 
Grayling, 2003; Boons et al., 2010; Bows et al., 2009; Daley, 2008; 2010; Dimitriu, 2003; 
Gossling and Upham, 2009; Graham, 1998; Graham and Guyer, 1999; Graham and Shaw, 
2008; Kaszewski and Sheate, 2004; Upham, 2001a; b; 2003; Upham et al., 2003). 
Furthermore, there is a significant literature that explores the role of the state, at both the 
national and local levels, to balance and reconcile economic, social and environmental 
concerns (Cowell and Owens, 2006; Owens, 1994; 1997; 2004; Owens and Cowell, 2002) 
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and the inability of these systems to do so (May and Hill, 2006; Paterson, 2000; 2007). 
However, the existing research does not engage in a theoretically informed analysis of how 
and why certain actors (i.e. the aviation industry) are able to occupy a privileged position in 
these processes (i.e. in environmental policymaking). This thesis seeks to address this gap, 
and contribute to these areas of existing research, by providing fresh empirics; fresh 
theoretical interpretation of those empirics; and new insights into broader theoretical 
debates about the state. 
By conducting a theoretically informed examination of policy change in two decisions 
fundamental in the historical development of the aviation industry in the UK, the aim of this 
thesis is to illuminate the mechanisms behind the industry’s oft-claimed position of 
privilege and to explore the obstacles to balance in long-term environmental policymaking. 
More specifically, its objectives are threefold: 
1. To generate a systematic empirical account of the main actors and events involved 
in the historical development of aviation policy in the UK 
2. Analyse two in-depth case studies of policy decisions that have been crucial in the 
sectors long-term development: the development of Stansted as the third London 
airport and the extension of Manchester Airport 
3. Apply two modern theories of policy (namely the Advocacy Coalition Framework 
and the Strategic-Relational Approach) to understand and explain the modes and 
modalities of the aviation industry’s position in policymaking 
It seeks to advance existing research in a number of important ways. Aside from pieces 
examining its military function, the development of the aviation industry in the UK is a 
‘strangely thin field’ comprising either company histories or heavily theoretical pieces 
(Staniland, 2009). Bar notable pieces by Lawton (1999), Staniland (2003; 2008) and Kassim 
and Stevens (2010), there are few systematic accounts that analyse of the development of 
aviation policy since World War Two, particularly at the UK level. This is surprising given its 
position as an engine of growth in UK and global economies, its increasingly recognised 
environmental impact, and its role as a continual source of conflict. The empirical findings 
will also contribute to the body of academic research that examines business influence in 
policymaking (see for example, Hacker and Pierson, 2002; Kamieniecki and Kraft, 2007; 
Salamon and Siegfried, 1977). In addition, the application of political theory will provide a 
fresh interpretation of historical events and new insights into broader theoretical debates 
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on the state as well as creating a valuable dialogue between two, yet to be compared, 
modern theories of policy. 
Research approach  
The thesis will take a comparative research approach that will allow for an exploration of 
the conditions under which decisions are made and policies developed (Burnham et al., 
2004; Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2003). This section will detail the political theories used 
to explore the processes of policy change under study, the philosophy that underpins the 
research, the case studies chosen for investigation and the methodological framework. It 
begins, however, by defining what policy and policy change mean in the context of this 
study. 
Policy and policymaking: core definitions  
Describing government policy would be a simple if we only had to look at the final policy 
decision, which for Lasswell (1986) would correspond to the who got what and when. 
However, understanding the how part is far more complex (Howlett et al., 2009: 7). Dye 
provides a very simple definition of policy (“anything a government chooses to do or not to 
do”), with government regarded as the primary actor who occupies a unique position, 
making authoritative decisions on behalf of citizens and responsible for balancing 
competing demands (Dye, 1972). Dye’s definition emphasises that policy constitutes a 
deliberative and conscious choice on the part of government to, or not to, act on a 
problem, which will result in both positive and negative intentional and unintentional 
consequences (Howlett et al., 2009: 5). Heclo takes these ideas a step further, by viewing 
policymaking as, “a course of action or inaction rather than specific decisions or actions” 
(Heclo, 1972) (i.e. it’s a process of allocative decisions, not a single outcome). Jenkins (1978) 
clarifies some of the implicit parts of Dye’s definition, specifying the content of a policy and 
defining policymaking as a dynamic process and the result of a series of interrelated 
decisions. However, what remains absent is a consideration of the mechanisms that lead to 
certain courses of action, or inaction. 
Hall (1993: 278) starts to unpack this, identifying policymaking as a process involving three 
dimensions: overarching policy goals that guide policy; the instruments and/or techniques 
that are used to attain these goals; and the precise setting of instruments. From this, 
Howlett and Cashore (2009: 38) produce a more nuanced understanding, where, “every 
‘policy’ is in fact a more complex regime of ends and means, related goals (more abstract), 
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objectives (less abstract) and settings (least abstract)”. By viewing policymaking as a process 
(i.e. a series of linked ideas, debates, actions, analysis and evaluation resulting in a formal 
decision and implementation), studying it focuses attention on understanding how it 
changes and whose interests these changes promote, rather than the result and its impact 
(Heywood, 2007: 426; Howlett et al., 2009). 
Drawing on these ideas, the why and how behind policy change, this research will therefore 
view aviation policy and policymaking as a process (John, 1998). The historical development 
of the aviation industry in the UK is characterised by overarching goals informing the series 
of events that led to certain decisions becoming enshrined in policies (i.e. to develop 
Stansted as the third London airport and to approve a second runway at Manchester). 
Examining this process, a series of decisions resulting in a cumulative outcome, is the first 
step in exploring the position of privilege the aviation industry occupies in environmental 
policymaking. The second step is to connect the events that occur and to explore the 
mechanisms behind this process (John, 1998), which will be achieved through the 
application of two contrasting theories of the policymaking process. However, before the 
theories are detailed, it is crucial to consider the research philosophy that underpins the 
research design. 
Research philosophy 
Acknowledging that, “political research cannot be properly conducted in a moral vacuum” 
(Burnham et al., 2004: 250), implies a recognition that certain philosophical perspectives 
guide research, perspectives that need to be consistent with the research design a 
researcher employs (Guba and Lincoln, 1994; Kuhn, 1970). Drawing on Corbetta (2003), 
there are three questions that should be addressed when considering the philosophical 
approach behind a research design.  
First, the ontological question, which examines how we perceive reality and the nature of 
what we know (Bryman, 2001): is there a real world out there that exists independently of 
our knowledge of it, or is it purely ‘constructed’ by the interpretations we put upon it? 
Second, the epistemological question, which reflects a researcher’s view of the world: what 
should be/can be considered knowledge and can real or objective relations between social 
phenomena be identified, and if so, how (Marsh and Furlong, 2002: 19)? While there is a 
relationship between the first two, they are not mutually exclusive, for example, ones 
ontological stance may reflect their epistemological stance but it does not necessarily 
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determine it. However, these philosophical assumptions impact upon the process of 
research, from how research questions are formulated to the way conclusions are drawn 
(Bryman, 2001: 19; Marsh and Smith, 2001: 529). Crucially, they are linked to the research 
methods that are used (Hughes, 1990; Trigg, 2001). Hence, third, is the methodological 
question.  
There are three main epistemologies of social science: positivism, critical realism and 
interpretivism (Marsh and Furlong, 2002). Positivism stems from the natural sciences and 
while it has been a major influence on social science research, its hold is weakening 
(Hughes, 1990; Trigg, 2001) and its assumptions increasingly challenged (e.g. the criticisms 
detailed by Marsh and Furlong, 2002: 22-24). It considers the social world as existing 
independently of our knowledge of it and is premised on a functionalist or objectivist 
ontology. Positivists believe that causal relationships can be discovered in an objective 
manner, being observed, measured and explained through the development of predictive 
and explanatory models and experimentation (Marsh and Furlong, 2002: 20; Marsh and 
Smith, 2001: 529). Theory is considered a tool for generating falsifiable hypotheses, which 
can then be tested through observation, and explained and assessed in a deductive way 
and by using quantitative research methods (Bryman, 2001: 20; Marsh and Furlong, 2002: 
12).  
At the opposing end of the epistemological spectrum is interpretivism, which views the 
subject matter of social science as totally different from that of natural science and 
maintains that social phenomena cannot be explored using the methods promoted by 
positivism (Bryman, 2001: 12). It derives from a constructivist ontology that challenges the 
idea that categories and social phenomena are pre-given, believing that they are produced 
through social interaction and are in a constant state of revision (i.e. the world is socially 
constructed) (Marsh and Furlong, 2002: 26). Interpretivists reject the idea that the social 
world exists independently of our knowledge of it; reality only exists in terms of the 
meanings attached to it and hence, there is no notion of an objective world (Bryman, 2001; 
Marsh and Furlong, 2002). An inductive approach, it seeks to build theory from empirical 
data, and hence, is at odds with the aim and objectives of this research, which seeks to 
empirically test theory.  
Critical realism sits between positivism and interpretivism, drawing on many elements of 
the latter while maintaining a belief in the causal explanations of the former. By taking a 
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critical realist epistemological position, this research will view the social world as existing 
independently of our knowledge of it and will believe that causal relationships can, and 
should, be observed, but will reject the positivist notion that social science should be value-
free, acknowledging the important role of the normative and empirical questioning in social 
science research. Taking a critical realist position means holding a belief that there are deep 
underlying structural relationships between social phenomena that are essential to 
understanding behaviour and that social process themselves are shaped by social structures 
(Marsh and Smith, 2001: 530). However, this does not mean believing that structures 
determine outcomes, rather, that they have the ability to constrain and facilitate the 
behaviour of actors (Marsh and Furlong, 2002: 31). In contrast to a positivist position, the 
facts should not be accepted as what they appear to be, or what actors claim them to be 
(Marsh and Furlong, 2002: 30) and therefore, while it is acknowledged that phenomena in 
the social world exist independently of our interpretation, interpretations do affect 
behaviour and hence, outcomes. Ergo, it is important to understand the external reality and 
its social construction in order to sufficiently explain and understand the relationships in 
social interactions (Benton and Craib, 2001: 120). 
Applying policy theory 
As previously mentioned, this thesis will apply two contrasting theories of policymaking to 
help understand how and why the aviation industry has obtained and exercised a position 
of privilege in the policymaking process. By providing generalised explanations of political 
behaviour, theory, or in this case theories, can be used to help explain power in 
policymaking and the events and decisions that go into its creation (Bryman, 2001: 13; 
Cairney, 2012; Hill, 2005; John, 1998; Marsh and Furlong, 2002: 21; Marsh and Stoker, 
2002).  
This research employs two contemporary, comprehensive, policy theories that adopt 
contrasting perspectives on how policy changes and the distribution of power and 
influence: Sabatier’s Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) and Jessop’s Strategic-Relational 
Approach (SRA), and will compare the insights they offer (Cairney, 2012). A multi-
theoretical approach will force the clarification of assumptions, minimise any theory testing 
bias, provide alternative explanations of the policy process and potentially uncover 
different mechanisms behind the patterns of power demonstrated (Allison, 1971: 249; 
Blatter and Haverland, 2012; Sabatier, 1999; 2007a: 330). In line with the critical realist 
approach being taken, neither is being employed to explain all the mechanisms; rather, 
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they are both employed as lenses through which to view events, investigate complex 
phenomena and to capture different constructions of reality (Bryman, 2001: 13; Harré, 
1986; Marsh and Smith, 2001: 531) 
While there are a range of theories that explain the policymaking process, the ACF and SRA 
attempt to consolidate existing theories of the policymaking process and are modern 
exemplars of established traditions (namely pluralism and Marxism). Appropriate for the 
analysis of complex policy problems such as that examined in this research, they offer 
contrasting explanations of the distribution of power and influence in the policymaking 
process and the role of the state in balancing competing interests, which will illuminate 
different aspects and mechanisms behind the processes of policy change under study.  
Agency-centred and a step on from traditional pluralist theories of policymaking, the ACF 
maintains that power is broadly shared across a range of interest groups, who compete for 
hegemony and adjust to external shocks (Sabatier and Weible, 2007). By contrast, the SRA 
focuses on the recursive nature of the relationship between structure and agency. It 
maintains that the terrain on which policymaking takes place is uneven, favouring certain 
actions and hence certain actors (i.e. those aligned with the reproduction of capital) (Hay, 
2002b; Jessop, 2001; 2005).  
The ACF and SRA are obvious rivals, but they are yet to be compared or brought together in 
an empirical study. While the ACF has been applied and compared with a number of other 
theories (Weible et al., 2009: 133), it is yet to be compared with a Marxist theory of the 
policymaking process. The ACF has been applied alongside the multiple streams framework 
(Compston and Madsen, 2001; Dudley and Richardson, 1999); cultural theory (Eberg, 1997); 
punctuated equilibrium theory (Meijerink, 2005); actor-centred institutionalism (Parrish, 
2003); narrative theory (Radaelli, 1999); the policy entrepreneur model (Mintrom and 
Vergari, 1996); institutional analysis and development framework model (Lubell, 2003); and 
policy narratives (Shanahan et al., 2011). By comparison, with limited application to date, 
the sole comparative study the SRA has been employed in was in conjunction with policy-
network analysis (James, 2009). This research will address the mutual disregard that 
appears to exist between the two, initiating a worthwhile dialogue between them in 
relation to their ability to explore and explain both the privileged position of certain actors 
in the policymaking process and how the state attempts to balance competing interests. 
Furthermore, independently of one another, this thesis will add to their empirical and 
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theoretical testing and development. The ACF, though vastly tested in the United States, 
will benefit from application to the UK system of policymaking while the SRA, an emerging 
theory of the policymaking process, will benefit from systematic empirical and theoretical 
testing. 
Case selection 
This research will examine two cases of social processes to research and compare specific 
phenomena in an in-depth way (Yin, 2009). The emphasis is not about achieving statistical 
generalisability in order to make generalised inferences about a population; rather, it is on 
achieving a sufficiently in-depth empirical investigation, with the criteria for choosing case 
studies based upon the research aim and objectives. The insights gained from the case 
studies will be used to debate the relevance of the ACF and SRA in explaining how and why 
the aviation industry occupies a privileged position in the environmental policymaking 
process with a view to contribute to their future theoretical and empirical development 
(Blatter and Haverland, 2012: 32). While a UK focus may sacrifice breadth, it allows for 
coherence across chapters and the grounding of the developed argument. 
The two case studies chosen for empirical investigation have been fundamental in the 
development of the aviation industry in the UK: the decision to develop Stansted as the 
third London airport, and the approval of a second runway at Manchester airport. Both of 
these case studies were crucial infrastructure projects for the development of the aviation 
industry in the UK, and as such, are of priority in any examination of the aviation industry in 
the UK and hence, can be used as focal points for wider discussion. Crucially, with an 
objective to develop a comprehensive overview of events, both can be studied empirically 
and within the time and financial constraints of this research (Blatter and Haverland, 2012: 
25; 102).1 
The first case study,  the decision to develop Stansted as the third London airport, is 
characterised by a series of committees, commissions, consultations, recommendations, 
opposition movements, political stalemates and policy u-turns; balance in the policymaking 
process was a struggle to achieve and even harder to deliver. Initially suggested for 
development in 1960, approval for the development of Stansted as the chosen site for the 
third London airport did not come until 1984, with the airport opening its doors in 1991. 
                                                             
1 The decision to approve a fifth terminal at Heathrow airport was considered as a possible case study but was 
withdrawn due to financial and time constraints inhibiting potential data collection. 
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The second, the decision to approve a second runway at Manchester Airport, was a far 
quicker decision, with the debate lasting just over ten years. However, with the 
development of airports in the UK rare, and runways even rarer, the decision to approve a 
second runway was equally as controversial. At the time national level policy demonstrated 
a commitment to both the development of regional airports as a means to increasing the 
UK’s air capacity and the economic regeneration of the regions, the development of a 
second runway at Manchester Airport was a means to fulfil both of these policy goals.  
Methodological approach 
The common research methods in political science are documentary analysis, interviewing 
and direct/participant observation (Burnham et al., 2004). However, due to the historical 
nature of the case studies, the latter is not appropriate; therefore, documentary analysis 
and interviewing will be applied extensively alongside an in-depth review of existing 
literature. Illustrating their suitability, these are methods of data collection that have been 
used in existing studies that have employed the ACF (e.g. Albright, 2011; Elliott and 
Schlaepfer, 2001a; b; Jordan and Greenaway, 1998; Litfin, 2000; Smith, 2000) and the SRA 
(e.g. Chettiparamb, 2007; Heigl, 2010; 2011; Theil, 2010). Furthermore, aligned with the 
critical realist philosophy that underpins the research, the methodological approach will 
provide insights in to both the observable and unobservable processes at work and will 
uncover the perspectives of key actors. 
Documentary analysis 
The aim is to work with as many primary documents as possible, not written for political 
scientists or historians these are written as part of the process under study (Burnham et al., 
2004: 166). Public records provide the widest range of information on which policy is based, 
policy implementation can be traced, motivations of actors can be identified, and a 
departmental view that transcends ministers and officials can be identified (Burnham et al., 
2004: 177).  
Used correctly, documentary analysis is a reliable data source that can facilitate the 
development of novel accounts of significant events and the formulation of new 
interpretations (Burnham et al., 2004). Crucially, the use of documentary sources will 
enable a timeline of events to emerge for both case studies with the nature of the case 
studies (focused around public inquiries and/or official reviews) meaning that a wealth of 
‘official’ primary sources are available. Secondary and tertiary documents will also be called 
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upon (Burnham et al., 2004: 168; Finnegan, 1996: 142). The National Archives at Kew, the 
Essex Records Office in Chelmsford and the John Rylands Library in Manchester will be the 
repositories used to consult primary sources (the first two for the Stansted decision and the 
latter the Manchester case). 
While Webb and Webb (1932: 100) view primary documents as the facts themselves, not 
merely as the representation of facts, perhaps the most serious issue when dealing with 
documentary sources is the question of their representativeness and meaning (May, 2001: 
197; Scott, 1990: 24). Assessing documents is a subjective process, with the potential for 
bias to emerge from how they are read, recorded and interpreted. This risk can be 
minimised by consulting the widest range of documents possible and by becoming 
completely engrossed in the social, political and economic context that the document was 
made in (Burnham et al., 2004; Finnegan, 1996: 146; May, 2001: 197).  
The authenticity of a document concerns its genuineness, that is to say, is it what it claims 
to be (Scott, 1990: 186)? It is crucial to consider how sound it is (i.e. is it an original 
copy/has it been corrupted in any way) and its authorship (i.e. can you authenticate those 
responsible for producing the document) (Finnegan, 1996: 144). Although there is often no 
completely robust way to establish beyond doubt the authenticity of a document, again, by 
situating the document in what is known about the wider context in which it originates and 
by consulting a wide range of sources this risk can be minimised (Burnham et al., 2004: 
186). To establish the credibility of a document it is crucial to consider how distorted the 
contents potentially are and the sincerity and accuracy of the author, which can be done by 
paying attention to the conditions under which the document was produced and the 
interests that drove the author to write it (Burnham et al., 2004: 186; Finnegan, 1996: 144). 
While bias can emerge in documentary analysis, with their authenticity, credibility, 
representativeness, and meaning all open to scrutiny, documentary analysis offers one of 
the most reliable methods available to the political scientist (Burnham et al., 2004: 188). In 
order to ensure success, and to facilitate triangulation (cross-checking data using a variety 
of methods), the methodological approach will combine documentary analysis with elite 
interviewing (Burnham et al., 2004; Davies, 2001; Devine, 2002; Moran-Ellis et al., 2006; 
Scott, 1990: 22). 
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Elite interviews 
Elite interviews offer the potential to achieve a deeper understanding of events than 
documentary analysis alone could provide, with some information only obtainable using 
this technique, for example, finding out what people think, how events have been 
interpreted and what people have or are planning to do in the future (Richards, 1996). With 
their focus on empirically detecting actors’ beliefs and intentions, this type of data is crucial 
when applying the ACF and SRA.  
Interviewees, selected on the basis of what they may know, can help fill in the gaps or 
confirm pre-existing information, whereas more rigid methods, such as questionnaires, 
would struggle to uncover such information (Aberbach and Rockman, 2002). While the 
notion of what defines an ‘elite’ is debatable, they are likely to have had significant 
influence on the policymaking process (Burnham et al., 2004; Morris, 2009: 209; Richards, 
1996: 199; Smith, 2006: 644). The interview sample will emerge from a combination of 
documentary analysis (primary, secondary and tertiary) and a snowballing technique 
(asking interviewees to recommended others), ceasing when saturation point is reached 
and/or through financial constraints (Burnham et al., 2004: 207; Goldstein, 2002; Richards, 
1996).2  
The interviews will take the form of semi-structured exploratory conversations loosely 
following the model put forward by Rubin and Rubin (1995). They advocate an informal 
conversation to put respondent at ease (rapport building); a brief discussion of the aim and 
purposes of research; introductory questions; central questioning; probing including 
clarification on specific points; and finally, an opportunity for interviewee to provide 
additional information. A balance will be struck between what the research design 
considers important and allowing the interviewee to open it up to areas perhaps not 
considered, with certain topics prioritised over others (Aberbach and Rockman, 2002; 
Burnham et al., 2004: 213-214; Richards, 1996; Rubin and Rubin, 1995: 5). While all types of 
interview (semi-structured, structured and unstructured) are socially constructed and offer 
insights from different perspectives, semi-structured elite interviews will account for the 
status of interviewees and the aim and objectives of the research (Aberbach and Rockman, 
                                                             
2 Appendices A and B provide the details of those interviewed, whose participation had a direct impact on the 
policymaking processes under study. Appendix C provides an example of an interview access letter. 
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2002: 675). Wherever possible, interviews will be recorded and complemented with written 
notes.3 
Different from standard interviews, in elite interviews the power is with the interviewee 
and there are practical and philosophical issues with this, for example, bias in questioning 
and interviewees ignoring or deflecting specific questioning (Leech, 2002; Seldon, 1988: 
201; Smith, 2006). Issues of access may also arise (Cochrane, 1998; England, 2002; Richards, 
1996; Sabot, 1999) while reliability may be questionable due to memory loss, 
oversimplifications, biased perceptions, or even deliberate misleading (Berry, 2002; 
Richards, 1996). There is also the problem of remaining objective, avoiding the risk of 
finding one interviewee more persuasive than another (Berry, 2002: 680). However, by 
reflecting on these potential hurdles, and by triangulating the data that emerges, these 
issues will be minimised (Berry, 2002: 680). A strength of the elite interview is that they 
allow for the perceptions of key actors to be uncovered, and although they present 
problems, combined with other sources of data they can be part of a powerful 
methodological package (Richards, 1996: 204). 
Ethical considerations 
When elite interviewing, it is crucial to consider the ethical issues such as confidentiality, 
deception and consent (Woliver, 2002: 677). The researcher must be honest and open 
throughout the process, ensuring it is clear who they are, what their affiliation is, and the 
purpose of their research. In this research, the interviewee access letter will initially convey 
this information (Appendix C), then reiterated, in person, at the start of the interview.  
Informed consent will be sought and formalised via the completion of an interviewee 
consent form (Appendix E). The interviewee will receive a copy of the form in advance of 
the interview and given many opportunities to raise any concerns before the start of the 
interview. The consent form will also seek permission for the recording of the interview and 
for the future use of data. Throughout the process, there will be the opportunity for the 
interviewee to raise any concerns, and it will be emphasised that they have the right to 
withdraw at any time.  
Beyond data collection, ethical considerations will remain important throughout the 
analysis and any subsequent publications that emerge from the research (the interview 
                                                             
3
 Appendix D provides an example interview crib sheet.  
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consent form will explicitly seek consent to the processing of interview data) (Burnham et 
al., 2004: 262; Burton, 2000: 299). If requested, interviewees will be provided with 
interview transcripts and copies of any subsequent publications disseminated to those 
involved. As Woliver (2002: 678) highlights, this is more than just a courtesy; it is an 
acknowledgement that their participation was important.  
Abiding by the key principles of data protection in the UK, interview data will be classified 
as ‘sensitive personal data’ and treated accordingly. It will be: processed fairly and lawfully; 
processed for limited purposes; adequate, relevant and not excessive; accurate; kept no 
longer than necessary; processed in accordance with the data subject’s rights; securely 
stored; and not transferred to countries without adequate protection (Burnham et al., 
2004: 262). Furthermore, in accordance with ESRC guidelines, a record will be submitted to 
the ESRC data store.  
Triangulating sources 
The principle of triangulation entails the use of multiple methods or sources of data in the 
study of social phenomena (Bryman, 2001: 274) and is the process of cross-checking a 
variety of research methods to minimise uncertainty and misinterpretation and to enrich 
the findings (Burnham et al. 2004: 31; Read and Marsh: 2002: 238; Moran-Ellis et al. 2006: 
48). It is often recommended that to ensure success a researcher should triangulate the 
data from documentary analysis (primary and secondary) and elite interviewing (Devine 
2002; Burnham, Gillard et al. 2004). This minimises any uncertainty, for example, that may 
arise from the former being potentially a more reliable source (a result of being less volatile 
over time) and the latter being more valid (that is, has been collected for the specific 
research project) (Davies, 2001: 77). Not an easy task, the approach of this research will 
follow the recommendations of Davis (2001: 79): information will be cross-referenced 
between and within the data types and if there are any divergence, written records will be 
taken as the final authority.  
Conclusions 
The epigram at the start of this chapter suggested that the demands of the aviation 
industry are insatiable and successive governments have usually given way to them. An 
industry with vast positive and negative, economic, social and environmental impacts that 
has seemingly developed unconstrained at a time when the consequences of 
environmental change are becoming ever-more dire, needs to be scrutinised, questioned 
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and examined, alongside an analysis of the state’s ability to balance these competing 
interests. This thesis seeks to do this. 
By providing an analysis of these economic, social and environmental impacts, as well as 
the role of the state in balancing these interests, this chapter has outlined the motivations 
and rationale behind this research and set it in the broader context. This will be further 
explored in Chapter Two, which examines the historical development of aviation policy in 
the UK, identifying the key actors and events at the UK, European and international levels 
that have shaped its development. 
This chapter has also identified the research gap this work seeks to fill. It will contribute 
fresh empirics via a systematic analysis of the historical development of the aviation 
industry in the UK by drawing on a number of academic disciplines. From this, it will provide 
a fresh theoretically informed analysis of those empirics, using political theory to 
understand the how and why behind the aviation industry’s position of privilege in the 
policymaking process and provide new insights into broader theoretical debates about the 
state. 
In addition, it aims to fill an important theoretical gap, by empirically testing two highly 
contrasting contemporary theories of the policymaking process and creating the first 
theoretical dialogue between the two. Chapter Three will examine these two theories in 
further detail, considering, under comparable terms, their origins, units of analysis and how 
they explain policy change, before exploring existing applications and the critical reactions 
and refinements they have provoked. This chapter concludes by highlighting their key 
similarities and differences relevant to the objectives of this research, notably, their 
attempt to consolidate existing theories of the policymaking process; how they 
conceptualise the distribution of power among actors; the mechanisms behind policy 
change; and their view of the state in balancing competing interests.   
Chapter Four is the first of two case study chapters. Taking the same structure as Chapter 
Two, it begins by identifying the key actors involved in the decision to develop Stansted as 
the third London airport, before a chronological discussion of the events that led to this 
decision. Chapter Five then applies the ACF and SRA to these events to help understand the 
series of complex interactions and relationships detailed, to assist in explaining the process 
of policy change, and in particular, to explore how and why the aviation industry is able to 
occupy, an oft-claimed, privileged position. Chapter Six is the second case study chapter, 
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detailing the process that led to the approval of a second runway at Manchester Airport. 
Following the same structure as Chapter Four, it identifies the key actors involved before 
providing an in-depth chronological discussion of events. Chapter Seven then applies the 
ACF and SRA to these events in the same manner as Chapter Five. 
Chapter Eight brings together the main findings of Chapters Five and Seven. First, it will 
assess the theories independently, considering questions such as whether they are logically 
coherent and whether their scope is clear and broad. Using the same structure as employed 
in Chapter Three, it will compare and contrast the ability of the ACF and SRA to explain the 
mechanisms behind the aviation industry’s position of privilege in the policymaking process 
and will offer insights into the ACF and SRA’s future theoretical development. Furthermore, 
it will initiate the first theoretical dialogue between the two theories, analysing and 
evaluating the extent to which they are complementary or contradictory. The final chapter 
(Nine) presents the main conclusions of the thesis, briefly addresses the main aims and 
objectives detailed above and outlines future research directions. 
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The Historical Development of Aviation Policy in the UK 
 
In order to illuminate the mechanisms behind the industry’s oft-claimed position of 
privilege and to explore the obstacles to balance in long-term environmental policymaking, 
it is crucial to have familiarity with the key actors involved in this area of policymaking and 
to understand how the policy in this area has evolved. This chapter will build upon the 
motivations and rationale behind the aim and objectives of this thesis and explore the 
broader context that has shaped the development of aviation policy in the UK. 
This chapter begins by considering the main actors that have been involved in the 
development of UK aviation policy (case-specific actors will be introduced, where 
appropriate, in Chapters Four and Six). For ease of analysis, these actors are grouped by 
geographical scale and within this, broadly discussed in three groups (industry, the state 
and environmental). The chapter then provides a chronological overview of the 
development of aviation policy in the UK, drawing on international influences and again, 
examined by geographical scale.4 To conclude, the key events are briefly summarised, the 
environmental implications of how aviation policy has developed touched upon and the 
links to the aim and objectives of the thesis highlighted. 
Key actors  
International 
At the international level, there are three key actors involved in shaping the development 
of aviation policy: the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO),  the International Air 
Transport Association (IATA), and the Air Transport Action Group (ATAG). 
ICAO is a specialised organisation of the United Nations that is primarily concerned with 
government interests in aviation (Doganis, 2002). Set up in 1944, under Article 44 of the 
Chicago Convention, its aim is to cultivate the planning and development of international 
air transport in order to ensure safe and orderly growth, and to formally codify the 
principles and techniques of international air navigation (Kassim and Stevens, 2010: 24). 
The common view is that ICAO has, to date, done little to confront the aviation industry’s 
                                                             
4 A fast evolving area of policy, this chapter analyses the development of UK aviation policy until roughly 2010. 
Current debates will be touched upon in Chapter Nine. 
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rapidly growing environmental impact (AirportWatch, 2009; Bows et al., 2009: 76; 
European Federation for Transport and Environment, 2007; Gossling and Upham, 2009) 
IATA operates as a counterweight to ICAO. Its mission is to represent, lead and serve the 
airline industry’s interests in aviation (Doganis, 2002; International Air Transport 
Association, 2009). Formed in 1945, and a key pillar of the post-war regime, virtually all 
aspects of airline activities are co-ordinated and standardised by IATA, through a number of 
committees and sub-committees that periodically bring airline experts together (Doganis, 
2002; Kassim and Stevens, 2010: 28). It represents airlines in negotiations with airport 
authorities, governments and ICAO, as well as working as a forum to facilitate inter-airline 
discussion and as a pressure group representing their interests (Brancker, 1977; Doganis, 
2002).  
Industry lobby groups first appeared in the 1990s, with the ATAG the singular international 
association that represents all sectors of the air transport industry. Their mission is to, 
“promote aviation's sustainable growth for the benefit of our global society” (Air Transport 
Action Group, 2011a) and they describe themselves as, “an independent coalition of 
organisations and companies throughout the air transport industry that have united to 
drive aviation infrastructure improvements in an environmentally-responsible manner” (Air 
Transport Action Group, 2011b). Based in Geneva, Switzerland, its members include 
airlines, airports, aircraft manufacturers, airline pilot and traffic controller unions, chambers 
of commerce, air navigation service providers and travel and tourism operators (Upham, 
2003).  
European  
At the European scale, the key actors involved in shaping the development of aviation 
policy are the European Union (EU), the European Commission (EC) and the European 
Federation for Transport and the Environment (T&E).  
The essence of the EU’s approach to aviation policy has been, and remains, centrally guided 
growth to maximise the economic benefit and environmental performance of the aviation 
system as a whole (as opposed to a reliance on airport-initiated growth) (Upham, 2001a). 
However, while making continual reference to the need for sustainable development, their 
commitment has been to environmental efficiency in aviation, not to zero growth (Upham, 
2001a: 241).  
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The emergence of the EC as a regulatory authority had notable, but initially unexpected, 
consequences for the aviation industry, particularly its effect on interest intermediation for 
airlines (Kassim, 1996). Its decision to create a single internal market altered the protected 
status and monopoly the flag carriers enjoyed, forcing them to restructure for survival 
(Kangis and O'Reilly, 2003). From the perspective of airlines, the creation of EC changed the 
role of the state; whereas previously airlines would lobby national governments, they now 
direct their lobbying activities to institutions at the European level.5  
Established in 1990, T&E has grown to be the primary environmental non-governmental 
organisation (NGO) campaigning for sustainable transport at the European level. Around 50 
members, including those from the UK – the Aviation Environment Federation (AEF), 
Friends of the Earth (FoE) and the Campaign for Better Transport, support it and it co-
ordinates the International Coalition for Sustainable Aviation, an observer at ICAO. T&E’s 
mission is to:  
“promote a policy of transport and accessibility, based on the principles of 
sustainable development, which minimises negative impacts on the environment 
and health, use of energy and land and all economic and social costs, maximises 
safety, and guarantees sufficient access for all” (European Federation for Transport 
and Environment, 2009).  
National 
At the national level, key actors include: from the aviation industry, airport operators and 
airlines; the UK Government; and environmental NGOs.  
Since the end of the World War Two, the UK has experienced a dynamic pattern of airport 
ownership. In 1947 the Ministry of Civil Aviation owned and managed 44 airports in the UK, 
with airports viewed as facilities that should be publicly owned, operated and subsidised 
(Bailey, 2007; Humphreys, 1999). The British Airports Authority (BAA) was set up in 1965 to 
take over these responsibilities, however, after its privatisation in 1986 airport ownership 
patterns across the UK diversified. Today, three main groups dominate the UK’s airport 
ownership: BAA plc, Manchester Airport plc and TBI Limited and there has been a recent 
                                                             
5 Airlines are also now increasingly represented at this level through three Euro-level groups; the Association of 
European Airlines ,which represents major European airlines, the Association des Compagnies Aériennes de la 
Communaté Européenne, which is the European section of the International Air Carriers Association 
representing non-scheduled carriers, and the European Regional Association , which represents regional airlines 
(Kassim, 1996). 
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increase in the foreign ownership of UK airports, with BAA plc and TBI Limited, recent 
acquisitions of Spanish firms, Ferrovial and Airport Concessions and Development Limited 
(Humphreys and Francis, 2002; Humphreys et al., 2007). 
Experiencing ownership patterns that mirror those of airports, in the aftermath of World 
War Two airlines in the UK (and in Europe) were dominated by state-owned flag carriers 
whose survival was often based upon periodical injections of state capital (Barrett, 2006; 
Kangis and O'Reilly, 2003). Seen as a symbol of national pride, airlines were supported by 
public finances and benefitted from a number of subsidies, cheap loans and tax exemptions 
and compared to their commercial counterparts, were typically granted monopolies, given 
favourable positions at airports, and granted privileged access to runway slots (Barrett, 
2006; Kassim, 1996). They were considered, and viewed themselves as, fulfillers of public 
goods and combined with their contribution to economic growth, the preservation of their 
existence was seen to be in the ‘national interest’ (Barrett, 2006; Kangis and O'Reilly, 2003). 
However, akin to airports, airlines went through a similar round of privatisation. 
The previous decade has also seen a marked rise in the number of pro-aviation lobby 
groups, such as Flying Matters, Future Heathrow and the Freedom to Fly campaign, 
designed to promote the interests of the aviation industry (Future Heathrow, 2009; HACAN 
ClearSkies, 2003).  
When airports and airlines were public assets, the UK government played a crucial role in 
facilitating the political and financial conditions for their development and survival (Kassim, 
1996). However, after privatisation, their direct control over the aviation industry reduced 
(Yarrow, 1995: 52). Despite the increasing role played by actors at European and 
international levels, the role of national governments in aviation policy has not been 
abandoned (Kassim, 1996). Today, the state is removed from the direct operations of 
airports and airlines, however, remains in control of setting the broad direction of national 
policy and strategy, and to lead in international negotiations (Department for Transport, 
2011a). Airport operators have an interest in maintaining a good relationship with the UK 
Government as in terms of expansion and development they are the entity that has the 
final say, exercising power and control in planning law. 
Analysing the historical development of the aviation industry in the UK uncovers how the 
aviation issue reached the agenda of environmental NGO’s. In the mid-1960s, when the 
environmental movement really began, there were the first signs that the environmental 
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impact, albeit at a local level, was gaining recognition. However, as the environmental 
movement has grown, and expanded out of this local remit, the environmental impact of 
aviation has transcended the local and been pushed up environmental agendas, with 
diverse national level NGOs such as Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the Campaign to 
Protect Rural England campaigning on the issue.  
Furthermore, there has been a marked increase in NGOs focused solely on the issue, for 
example, the Aviation Environment Federation (AEF) and HACAN Clearskies. AEF works 
closely with local, national and international policymakers, has representation on both UK 
Government and EC working groups and occupies observer status to the environmental 
committee of ICAO. HACAN Clearskies, based in London, is the biggest voluntary 
organisation in Europe dedicated to campaigning on behalf of those whose quality of life is 
affected by aircraft flight paths (HACAN ClearSkies, 2006). In addition, AirportWatch formed 
in 2000 to operate as a umbrella body to unite local level site-specific community groups 
opposed to the development of aviation with national NGOs opposed to airport expansion 
(Stewart, 2010: 5). 
Phases of development  
This section will now situate these key actors within context, providing a chronological 
overview of the development of the aviation policy in the UK, drawing on international 
influences and again, examined by geographical scale. 
1940s: setting an international regime and a commitment to post-war regeneration 
 In the aftermath of World War Two, 52 states met to consider a form of multilateral 
agreement for the development of the aviation industry. This resulted in the establishment 
of the ICAO and the signing of the Chicago Convention in 1944, which laid the foundations 
of the international air transport regime that remained largely unchanged until 1978 
(Doganis, 2002: 30; Glaister et al., 2006; Jenkins, 1959: 159; Nilsson, 2009: 114).6 A bilateral 
regime whereby national governments exercised power emerged with agreement on two 
fronts: the right to fly over another state when on an agreed service and the right to land in 
another country. This imposed an international regulatory framework, where each state 
retained sovereignty over its own airspace, price levels were controlled and national 
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 The Chicago Convention now has over 150 signatories (Kassim and Hadley 2010: 24). 
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governments and airlines regulated capacity (Barrett, 2000; Doganis, 2002: 31; Kassim, 
1995: 191; 1996; Kassim and Stevens, 2010: 24; Nilsson, 2009).  
During the 1940s, the dominant attitude of international aviation was one of global 
idealism (Lawton, 1999: 92). However, this was not a view that lasted long and even with 
the establishment of international organisations such as ICAO and IATA, the international 
regime for aviation quickly became very state-centric (Kassim, 1996: 109; Lawton, 1999).  
As national governments began to realise the political and economic significance of the 
aviation industry, exacerbated by fears of US hegemony over air transport, a protectionist, 
nationalist, mentality developed (Kassim and Stevens, 2010: 23; Lawton, 1999: 92). Both a 
heavily regulated and subsidised industry, national governments extensively intervened to 
protect their national aviation market, and for reasons of national security, wanted to 
assert sovereignty over their airspace (Jenkins, 1959: 155; Kassim, 1996: 107; Nilsson, 
2009).  
The post-war period opened up a realm of possibilities for Europe, with a central aim of the 
European plan the free and increased movement of people; an aim which hinged on the 
development of the transport sector. Fast and affordable modes of transport were 
becoming available to the masses and, in theory, Europe was to become a much smaller 
and harmonised place. With the aviation industry rapidly developing, it had the potential to 
play an important role, however, through its nationalist persona it also had the potential to 
be the biggest hurdle (Lawton, 1999: 91).  
At the UK level, the end of World War Two saw the publication of the 1945 White Paper 
British Air Services, which committed appropriate financing to the development of UK 
airports (Ministry of Civil Aviation, 1945). The industry was unable to develop unaided: 
finances were needed for infrastructure, demand had to be created, and the costs and risks 
were high (Jenkins, 1959: 155). Due to the political and international significance of the 
aviation industry, and the economic problems associated with its initial development, its 
development became a prime responsibility of the UK Government. The White Paper 
advocated a national approach to airport planning, with state ownership the means to 
achieving this (Barnes, 1983: 53; Humphreys, 1999; McKie, 1973: 41). As a result, in 1947, 
the Ministry of Civil Aviation became responsible for the ownership and management of 44 
airports in the UK and it was they who acted on behalf of the industry on the international 
stage (Edwards Committee, 1969; Humphreys, 1999: 122; Jenkins, 1959: 161).  
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Not only did UK airport operators need government assistance. Both airlines and aircraft 
manufacturers needed financial help to recover from the war (Jenkins, 1959: 164). Two 
airlines became the chosen policy instruments of UK’s civil aviation policy: the British 
Overseas Airways Corporation (BOAC), established in 1939, and British European Airways 
(BEA), established in 1946. Publicly owned, they had a close relationship with the Ministry 
of Civil Aviation (Jenkins, 1959: 162; Kassim and Stevens, 2010: 53).7  
1950s: a decade of indecision 
At all geographical scales little changed during the 1950s. While efforts to create a 
European air policy had begun in the 1940s, they had limited success, with progress in the 
1950s equally limited. A Common Transport Policy did emerge from the 1957 Treaty of 
Rome, however, aviation was initially excluded, while progress to develop a full aviation 
transport policy at the European level was constantly blocked by national governments, 
who were committed to protecting their own aviation markets (Button, 1996: 280; Lawton, 
1999: 93).  
The UK Government’s commitment, in the 1945 White Paper, to a centralised approach to 
airport planning failed to materialise (Ministry of Civil Aviation, 1945). By the mid 1950s, 
“the airport pattern had been determined by not by a central plan but by the route policies 
of the Air Corporations and the private airline companies and by the initiative and drive of 
different local authorities” (Barnes, 1983).  
The 1953 White Paper London Airports proposed the rationalisation of London’s airports, 
concluding that for the near future Heathrow could cope with the predicted air traffic 
demand of the UK, except for in the peak summer when the overspill would be handled at 
Gatwick (Bailey, 2007; McKie, 1973; Ministry of Civil Aviation, 1953). The White Paper 
recommended that Gatwick should be developed as London’s second airport, which, after a 
public inquiry, was approved and it opened in 1958 (Helsey and Codd, 2010: 33; McKie, 
1973: 44).  
1960s: beginning to relax state control over civil aviation 
Akin to the 1940s and 1950s, there was little progress in the 1960s on any form of 
European aviation policy. In 1964, the European Commission tried to extend the application 
                                                             
7 From 1939 until 1946, BOAC was the British state airline and from 1946 until 1974, the long-haul British state 
airline. BEA was a British domestic airline in operation from 1946 to 1974 (Kassim and Stevens, 2010). 
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of the Common Transport Policy to include aviation, however, as before, national 
governments had no desire to change the status quo and the plan failed to secure the 
support of the Council Ministers (Lawton, 1999: 93). The traditional picture of European 
aviation remained one of, “institutionalised cartelisation and collusion” (Button, 1996: 279). 
In the UK however, the 1960s saw the first steps towards the gradual relaxation of state 
control over civil aviation (Glaister et al., 2006: 19). At the start of the decade, central 
government controlled all commercial aviation, but the combined pressure of significant 
financial losses, technological advances and the increasing popularity of air travel, meant 
that the management of airports was becoming too complex for them. Plans were outlined 
to transfer the ownership of loss-making airports to local authorities; the notion of central 
control and planning was beginning to be sidelined to reduce financial pressure on the 
Treasury (Humphreys, 1999). 
In 1965, Roy Jenkins, then Minister of Aviation, introduced the Airports Authority Act. This 
set out to make airports more flexible and potentially profit earning,while still remaining 
the Government’s responsibility (BAA, 2009). The passing of the Act saw the creation of the 
British Airways Authority (BAA), a government department created to be self-supporting. In 
1966, BAA took control of Heathrow, Gatwick, Stansted and Prestwick airports, later 
acquiring responsibility for Edinburgh (in 1971) and Glasgow and Aberdeen (in 1975) (BAA, 
2009; Butcher, 2010a; Higham, 1995: 21; Humphreys, 1999). 
By 1967, bar Southampton, central or local government owned all of the UK’s main 
airports; however, there still was no effective national policy framework to guide airport 
development in the UK (Humphreys, 1999). Local authorities developed their airports in 
isolation and consequently the main regional airports in the UK were (and still are) located 
in pairs about 70km apart, for example Manchester-Liverpool and Bristol-Cardiff. BAA-
controlled airports however, did develop in a co-ordinated manner, with Heathrow, already 
designated the UK’s main international scheduled service airport, and Gatwick London’s 
second (Humphreys, 1999). 
At the same time, the Government set up the Edwards Committee to examine the structure 
of the UK aviation industry and its prospects for the coming decade. Its report British Air 
Transport in the Seventies was designed to define UK commercial aviation policy (Edwards 
Committee, 1969; Thomson, 1990). It argued that while the UK aviation industry needed to 
operate as a commercial enterprise, this did not require the denationalization of its airlines 
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(BEA and BOAC). However, it maintained that a more competitive environment was 
needed, with the development of a second-force UK airline the way to achieve this 
(Staniland, 2003: 193; Yarrow, 1995: 55). 
The Edwards Committee also reviewed the regulatory structure of the aviation industry in 
the UK. They recommended that the Air Transport Licensing Board (that the Conservative 
Government had set up in 1961) should be replaced by an authority to work as an, 
“independent specialist aviation regulator and provider of air traffic services” (Civil Aviation 
Authority, 2009; Department for Transport, 2011a; Kassim and Stevens, 2010: 53). With 
greater powers, the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) was set up to be, “an advisor of 
government and an initiator of policy” (Staniland, 2003: 193). Significantly, the UK was the 
only country in Europe to establish an independent regulatory authority for aviation 
(Kassim, 1995: 194; 1996).8  
In was during the 1960s that the negative environmental impact of the aviation industry 
began to be recognised, notably, the issue of noise. Mentioned in Sealy’s (1966) Geography 
of Air Transport, and discussed at a conference in London in the same year, where 
representatives of 26 nations and 11 international aeronautical organisations were present, 
the problem of noise posed a serious threat to an industry wanting to grow. A year later, a 
special edition of the Journal of Sound and Vibration (1967) was published that contained 
several studies on the impacts, and management of, aircraft noise. This recognition that 
noise was becoming a serious environmental problem was reflected at the international 
level in 1969, when ICAO established its Committee on Aircraft Noise, set up to develop 
international standards and to encourage technological development (Daley, 2010: 11). 
1970s: recognising the environmental impact 
The 1970s saw environmental impacts other than noise begin to be discussed at all 
geographical scales. The dark plumes from the exhausts of early turbojet-powered aircraft 
were very visible and people began to worry about local air pollution as well as the 
pollution from the run-off of de-greasing agents and de-icing fluid (Daley, 2010: 12).  
At the international level, in 1971, ICAO adopted Annex 16, Environmental Protection, into 
the Chicago Convention, which covered both emissions and noise (Freer, 1994: 30). 
                                                             
8 The activities of the CAA include economic regulation, safety regulation, consumer protection and airspace 
policy. Unlike the equivalent in many other countries, the CAA receives no direct funding from the UK 
government – all its costs are met from charges on those who it regulates (CAA 2009). 
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Furthermore, at the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in 
Stockholm, ICAO adopted a resolution to investigate the impacts of aviation on the quality 
of the human environment. This resulted in the publication of ICAO’s Control of Aircraft-
Engine Emissions (1977), which proposed measures to limit pollutants from engine designs 
and the establishment of the Committee on Aircraft Engine Emissions (Daley, 2010: 12).  
In the UK, as had been recommended by the Edwards Committee, the 1970s saw BEA and 
BOAC merge to form a single public airline, British Airways (BA), and the creation of a 
‘second force’ airline, British Caledonian Airways (BCAL) (Kassim and Stevens, 2010: 53). 
BCAL, and other existing independent carriers, now had to work out how to survive in a 
market dominated by state airlines and defined by intergovernmental agreements (Kassim 
and Stevens, 2010: 44; Staniland, 2003: 194-195).9 As detailed previously, the motivation 
for the merger was to reduce the inefficient service, low productivity and poor labour 
productivity that had characterised both airlines (Yarrow, 1995: 53). While both the Labour 
and Conservative parties were accepting of the merger, they were less supportive of the 
creation of a second force independent airline as it would mean taking routes from BA, the 
public airline (Staniland, 2003: 193-194). A French-style ‘spheres of interest’ solution was 
imposed that stopped BCAL competing with BA on trans-Atlantic routes, justified on the 
grounds that it would protect the jobs of the UK airline industry (Staniland, 2003: 196). 
In 1976, the UK Government published a two-volume study Airport Strategy for Great 
Britain, where the first volume dealt with London’s airports and the second with regional 
airports (Greater London Council, 1976; Higham, 1995: 32). It emphasised the role of air 
transport in the national economy, the more effective use of existing infrastructure and 
detailed environmental and land-use implications (Higham, 1995: 32).  
A result of the oil crisis and subsequent recession, reflecting global trends, the 1978 White 
Paper Airports and Policy concluded that rates of growth had slowed, which subsequently 
altered the options for heavy public investment into airport infrastructure (Department of 
Trade, 1978; Higham, 1995: 33). However, the newly elected Conservative Government, 
who gained power in 1979, were not bound by the recommendations of this White Paper, 
instead, reviewing national airports policy themselves, publishing their conclusions in The 
Report of the Advisory Committee on Airports Policy (Department of Trade, 1979a). The tide 
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 For further analysis of the unfavourable conditions facing BCAL, see Staniland 2003: 194. 
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was to turn dramatically when in July 1979, just weeks after the election of the Thatcher 
administration, the first plans for BA’s privatisation were announced.  
1980s: the transformation of the aviation regime 
The international regulatory framework that emerged in the late 1940s remained largely 
unchanged until the late 1970s (Doganis, 2002: 26). Led by the United States and the UK, 
the first half of the 1980s saw the emergence of a global trend towards greater economic 
liberalisation and rapid deregulation of airlines (Kassim, 1996: 110; Lawton, 1999: 96; 
Nilsson, 2009: 114).  
The environmental impact of aviation continued to rise up international political agendas. 
In 1981, ICAO established standards for three pollutants emitted by aircraft (carbon 
monoxide, unburned hydrocarbons and nitrogen oxides), limits on emissions of smoke, and 
the prohibition of the venting of fuel from engines (Daley, 2010: 12). Concerns over local air 
pollution prompted the United States Environmental Protection Agency to regulate aircraft 
emissions, which set the conditions for the ICAO engine standards that are still in use today 
(International Civil Aviation Organisation, 1993; 2005). In 1983, ICAO established its 
Committee on Aviation Environmental Protection to undertake most of their environmental 
activities (and which remains in operation today) (Daley, 2010: 13). 
At the European level, largely stimulated by the move towards liberalisation and 
deregulation, and mounting pressure from consumer groups, the European Parliament and 
the European Commission began to develop a Common Air Transport policy (Doganis, 2002: 
55; 2004: 46; Lawton, 1999: 93; Nilsson, 2009: 114). Its aim was to liberalise European air 
transport and promote fair and open competition (Doganis, 2002: 66). 
However, liberalisation and deregulation unnerved national governments who were very 
against losing control of their aviation market. Even though their obligations under the 
Treaty of Rome were to promote and enforce competition, their position as major 
stakeholders in their aviation industry did not make them at ease with actively promoting 
increased competition against their flag carrier (Lawton, 1999: 98). With only the UK and 
the Netherlands supporting European action in air transport, initially, little progress was 
made until the mid-1980s when the European Court of Justice ruled (in the ‘Nouvelles 
Frontieres’ case), that competition rules outlined in the Treaty of Rome did apply to air 
transport (Button, 1996: 281; Kassim, 1996: 114). 
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Changes to the European regulatory environment were introduced in two ways: bilaterally 
through the renegotiation of air service agreements between pairs of countries, and 
through actions initiated by the EC or the European Court of Justice (Doganis, 2004: 46). In 
1984, the UK and the Netherlands renegotiated their bilateral agreements, with the 
complete deregulation of air services between the two occurring the following year. This 
was a significant break with tradition and marked a major step towards European-wide 
deregulation and a clear move away from the traditional and protectionist European 
bilateral agreements that had been in place (Doganis, 2004: 46; Lawton, 1999: 97).  
At the national level, the 1980s saw the aviation industry of the UK transformed. The 
privatisation and commercialisation of airports resulted in a variety of continually evolving 
ownership patterns, ranging from wholly private to local authority consortiums, while 
liberalisation and deregulation dramatically altered the operations of airlines (Heath, 1988: 
173; Humphreys et al., 2007). Transport and aviation in particular, was an attractive target 
for the ideology of radical reform advocated by Thatcher (Caruana and Simmons, 2001: 
279). 
The ideologically driven, laissez-faire 1985 White Paper Airports Policy established general 
UK aviation policy objectives: approving the development of Stansted as the third London 
airport and rejecting both a second runway at Stansted and the planning application for a 
fifth terminal at Heathrow (Bailey, 2007; Department of Transport, 1985; Graham, 2003: 
207; Graham and Guyer, 2000).10 It was largely concerned with addressing airport capacity 
problems in the South East and setting the conditions for privatisation and 
commercialisation (Graham and Guyer, 2000: 249). 
The 1986 Airports Act signalled a dramatic change in the ownership pattern of British 
airports, the first part, mandating the privatisation of BAA (and hence, the seven airports it 
controlled), and the second, commercialising local authority owned airports (Butcher, 
2010a: 2; Caruana and Simmons, 2001: 279; Humphreys, 1999: 124).1112 A wholly private 
                                                             
10
 Both the 1985 Airports White Paper and the subsequent 1986 Airports Act were primarily concerned with 
addressing capacity shortfalls in the South East, the development of regional airports was largely put on the 
backburner.  
11
 Prior to this the CAA ran airports on the northern periphery of Britain, BAA ran those in lowland Scotland and 
London while throughout the rest of England and Wales a municipal ownership structure prevailed (Humphreys 
1999; Humphreys, Ison et al. 2007).  
12 Privatisation is defined as, “the transfer by Governments to private investors of the assets of publicly owned 
enterprises, so that the new entity gains a legal status that enables it to act as a private company”. In contrast, 
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company, BAA was no longer an arm of the state, with its privatisation generated £1.2 
billion for the Treasury (Humphreys, 1999: 124; Humphreys and Francis, 2002: 250). 
However, what this policy lacked was competition, with the selling of BAA as a bloc 
meaning that competition was limited (Caruana and Simmons, 2001: 279). 
The second part of the Act required all airports whose turnover was over £1million per 
annum in at least two of the past three years to be set up as commercial companies 
(Francis and Humphreys, 2001; Humphreys and Francis, 2002; Humphreys et al., 2007). For 
the first time, airports had to become financially self-sufficient. Initially, 16 municipally 
owned airports were commercialised, a figure that had risen to 45 by 2000 (Humphreys and 
Francis, 2002). The 1986 Act also saw the introduction of the economic regulation of airport 
charges in the UK (Humphreys et al., 2001; Humphreys et al., 2007).  
Driven by the need to become commercially solvent, and because of economic regulation, 
privatisation and commercialisation has meant that there is an incentive for airport 
operators to expand non-aeronautical activities. As a result, airport management has (and 
continues to be) turned towards the generation of commercial revenue from, for example, 
retail and car parking charges (Humphreys and Francis, 2002; Humphreys et al., 2007). 
Since privatisation and commercialisation, there has been a surge in the speed and 
magnitude at which airport development has taken place, owing to the ability of private 
investors to provides funds (Humphreys, 2003; Humphreys and Francis, 2002; Humphreys 
et al., 2001: 13). Consequently, this has placed increasing pressure on the planning system 
and has raised policy issues regarding the compatibility of development with long-term 
capacity growth (Humphreys, 2003).  
Furthermore, and a knock-on effect of privatisation and commercialisation, the global 
financial community has discovered that airports can be very profitable investments. Of 
concern however, is that the rise of these global airport companies will make it difficult for 
governments to regulate and guide in regards to national and regional social, economic and 
environmental objectives, objectives which are unlikely to coincide with the those of the 
airport operator (Humphreys and Francis, 2002).  
                                                                                                                                                                            
commercialisation refers “to the introduction of commercial objectives to a publicly owned enterprise” 
(Humphreys, 1991: 121; Humphreys et al. 2001: 10). 
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During the 1980s, UK airlines went through a similarly revolutionary phase. The intention of 
airline privatisation was to promote competition. The 1979 Conservative manifesto was 
explicit, stating that, “the principles of competition which govern other industries in the 
community should also be applied to air travel”, asserting that these principles would apply 
in the transfer of public companies to the private sector (Staniland, 2003: 199). Their 1983 
manifesto was clear about the need to protect competition and it being a priority of 
privatisation, “merely to replace state monopolies by private ones would be to waste an 
historic opportunity. So we will take steps to ensure that these new firms do not exploit 
their powerful positions to the detriment of consumers or their competitors” (Staniland, 
2003: 199). 
However, the Government, and in particular the Treasury, were keen however to obtain as 
high price as possible for BA (Staniland, 2003: 199). This implicitly suggested a need to 
protect the airline’s (already extensive) control of domestic and international air traffic 
routes in order to make it as attractive purchase as possible. Guaranteeing that BA was an 
attractive proposition for shareholders was potentially at odds with ensuring a competitive 
UK air transport market (Baldwin, 1990: 97, 101; Rickard, 1988: 204; Staniland, 2003: 198, 
272). 
The 1985 White Paper reiterated the Government’s commitment to a competitive, multi-
airline industry, promising to promote the liberalisation of the European air transport 
market and to deregulate domestic air fares and service (Department of Transport, 1985). 
However, it gave very little to independent airlines. Nicholas Ridley, then Secretary of State 
for Transport, admitted that, “practical politics” had taken priority over the government’s 
commitment to competition (Staniland, 2003: 208). BA’s actual privatisation, though 
repeatedly postponed and not helped by the recession of the early 1980s, finally went 
through in February 1987 and redefined the relationship between flag carriers and the 
state (Glaister et al., 2006; Kassim, 1996: 106; Staniland, 2003: 201).  
1990s: open skies for Europe 
At the international level, noise remained an important issue throughout the 1980s and 
1990s, however, the emergence of concerns over climate change renewed the interest in 
the environmental impacts of aviation and brought a wave of new actors into this area of 
policymaking (Daley, 2010: 13). However, it was not enough to infiltrate international 
legislation, with the Kyoto Protocol (that set international targets for the reduction of 
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greenhouse gas emissions) excluding emissions from aviation due to a lack of agreement on 
how emissions should be allocated to individual countries (AirportWatch, 2009).  
In June 1990, the second liberalisation package at the European level was agreed. Making 
minor improvements to the 1987 liberalisation package, bilateral air service agreements 
between states were renegotiated (Doganis, 2004: 47). In 1992 the final package came, 
addressing the relationship between flag carriers and the state (Kassim, 1995: 197). It was 
broader and more radical than its predecessors and represented a milestone in the 
development of an EU Common Air Transport policy, transforming the EU into a domestic 
market for aviation, an ‘open skies’ regime for air services in the EU was created (Doganis, 
2002: 66; Humphreys, 2003; Kassim, 1995: 198; 1996: 115; Lawton, 1999: 100; Nilsson, 
2009). This meant there was free market access for all European airlines, with no 
restrictions on capacity and pricing, and for the first time, the relationship between 
governments and their airlines was under the eye of European regulation (Kassim, 1995: 
198; Nilsson, 2009: 114).  
European level liberalisation and deregulation successfully deprived states of the 
mechanisms they had traditionally used for patriotic interventionism and flag carriers lost 
their commercial advantages, such as regulatory protection and financial support (Kassim, 
1995: 198; 1996: 121; Lawton, 1999: 100). The era of monopolies was drawing to an end 
and the balance of power was shifting (Kassim, 1996: 124; Lawton, 1999: 100).  
Liberalisation and deregulation revolutionised the aviation industry (Mander and Randles, 
2009: 274). Those advocating it believed that it should be treated like any other industry 
and not benefit from the protectionist mentality that had characterised it since World War 
Two. However, whether it really is treated like any other industry is open to discussion. For 
example, one of the restrictions remaining from the Chicago Convention is an agreement 
not to put taxes on aviation fuel (a restriction that the EU unsuccessfully tried to change in 
2007) (International Civil Aviation Organisation, 2006; Nilsson, 2009). Unlike other modes of 
transport where (in general) fuel is heavily taxed, through this agreement, states have 
agreed that aviation will not be treated like any other industry and will have substantial 
indirect subsidies (Meijers, 2005; Nilsson, 2009: 115). 
An effect of airline liberalisation and deregulation, the UK and Ireland led the low-cost 
revolution within Europe (Francis et al., 2006). In 1995, easyJet began operations between 
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Luton and Glasgow, while Ryanair began a service between Stansted and Prestwick.13 Since, 
these two have led the development of low-cost aviation across Europe, and bar these two 
airlines, the low-cost market has been very volatile with many new competitors failing or 
being bought by competitors (Creaton, 2007; Francis et al., 2006; Jones, 2007; Nilsson, 
2009: 116). 
In terms of airport development, the UK witnessed a lot of policy reviews and 
recommendation, but very little action in practice. The environmental impact of an ever-
expanding industry was also increasingly a factor. In 1993, the Department of Transport 
published the results of their Study into Runway Capacity in South East England (RUCATSE). 
It concluded that there may be an economic justification for at least one further runway to 
be developed and in operation by 2010, recommending that a runway at Heathrow would 
be the most beneficial to both the aviation industry and passengers, but would also create 
the largest number of negative effects (Bailey, 2007). 
In 1998, in the Transport White Paper A New Deal for Transport, the newly elected Labour 
Government committed themselves to preparing a UK airports policy that would look 
ahead 30 years (Bailey, 2007; Department of the Environment Transport and the Regions, 
1998). This White Paper set a framework for future transport policy as well as expressing a 
commitment to a sustainable transport policy, with the potential conflict between the goal 
of sustainability and the economic welfare of individual firms permeating the entire report 
(Bows et al., 2009: 70; Graham, 2003: 199; Graham and Guyer, 2000; Upham, 2001a: 
238).14  
2000s: the low-cost revolution 
At the European level, a consequence of liberalisation and deregulation was an explosion of 
the number of low-cost airlines in operation, radically changing travel patterns (Graham 
and Shaw, 2008; Nilsson, 2009: 115). Following a strategy based on high efficiency, large 
cost reductions and price levels radically lower than their competitors, low-cost airlines 
opened up new markets focusing on short haul routes, using secondary airports and 
offering very basic services (Nilsson, 2009: 115). In 2000, low-cost airlines in Europe carried 
                                                             
13 easyJet started life as a low-cost carrier whereas Ryanair had been running a London to Dublin route for a 
number of years and gradually transformed itself into one. 
14 The Department for the Environment, Transport and Regions defined a sustainable transport system as one 
which supported employment and a strong economy, increases prosperity, addresses social exclusion, protects 
human life and provides a better quality of life for all now and in the future (Bows et al., 2009: 70). 
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approximately 20 million passengers, by 2007 this figure had increased to 150 million. With 
growth rates showing little sign of slowing down and this trend looks set to continue, 
however, “from a global, environmental perspective, the development of low-cost aviation 
is nothing less than disastrous” (Nilsson, 2009: 126). 
Also initiated at the EU level, in 2012 aviation finally, after delayed exclusion, entered the 
EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) (Department for Transport, 2011b). The EU ETS applies 
to all airlines that fly in and out of the EU. However, it is expected that the majority of 
airlines cuts will be made by purchasing international credits (that were created by the 
Kyoto Protocol) rather than the purchase of EU ETS credits or by reductions in emissions. 
International aviation organisations and countries outside of the EU have expressed strong 
opposition to the scheme, which in theory, could lead to non-compliant airlines being 
banned from flying to countries in the EU (Ares, 2012). It has also faced criticism from 
environmentalists, with claims that it will fail to create any real cuts in emissions, offers no 
incentive for technological improvements, and essentially allows the aviation industry to 
buy its way out (EU Commission, 2006).  
At the UK level, in March 2003, the Department for Transport, in collaboration with the 
Treasury, published Aviation and the Environment: Using Economic Instruments 
(Department for Transport, 2003a). A consultative policy document, its aim was to support 
discussion with stakeholders regarding the use of economic instruments to encourage the 
industry to take account of, and reduce, its environmental impact both locally and globally 
(Bows et al., 2009: 70).  
In the same year, the Department for Transport published the White Paper The Future of 
Air Transport, setting out the UK Government’s vision for the aviation industry up until 
2030. Its aim was to create a balance between the increasing demand for air travel and 
environmental protection (Department for Transport, 2003b; Glaister et al., 2006: 36-37; 
Mander and Randles, 2009: 276). However, generally forwarding the broad policies of its 
predecessors, it set out a clear view on expansion based upon economic arguments, 
emphasising how crucial airport expansion was to the UK economy and how it should be 
focused at certain airports (Bows et al., 2009: 70; Department for Transport, 2003b).  
The White Paper gave approval for UK passenger numbers to grow from approximately 200 
million passengers per annum (mppa) in 2003, to 480 mppa in 2030, and supported new 
runways at a number of airports (including those at Heathrow and Stansted) as well as new 
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terminals and runway extensions at others (Bows et al., 2009: 70; Department for 
Transport, 2003a). However, it did state that this would be carried out with respect to 
environmental limits, though how was not specified (Bailey, 2007; Humphreys et al., 2007; 
Mander and Randles, 2009: 275, 286).  
Also in 2003, the Department of Trade and Industry published the Energy White Paper Our 
Energy Future – Creating a Low Carbon Economy (Department of Trade and Industry, 2003). 
This accepted the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution’s 
report Energy – The Changing Climate and was consistent with the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change that a carbon dioxide (CO₂) emission reduction 
of 60 percent was needed by 2050 (Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, 2000; 
UNFCCC, 1997). Though it failed to explicitly include aviation in this target, in order to 
achieve this reduction the Department for Trade and Industry implicitly acknowledged that 
all sectors should be included (Bows et al., 2009: 71).  
In 2003, the position of the UK Government was one that supported the growth of the 
aviation industry, while at the same time committing to massive reductions in UK CO₂ 
emissions (Anderson et al., 2006; Cairns and Newson, 2006: 4). Their strategy was to 
achieve these reductions in the most cost-effective manner, across the whole economy 
rather than in specific industries. At the time, critics argued this approach was inefficient; 
with the technological and efficiency gains possible in the aviation sector limited and not 
necessarily the scope in other sectors to absorb growing emissions from the aviation 
industry (Cairns and Newson, 2006: 8).  
In December 2006, the Department for Transport published The Future of Air Transport 
Progress Report (Department for Transport, 2006). It was not intended to review the 
conclusions and recommendations of the 2003 White Paper but rather, to report on the 
progress that had been made and update forecasts based on new assumptions 
(Department for Transport, 2006). The report refuted the claim that the 2003 White Paper 
had a ‘predict and provide’ approach to UK airport policy, maintaining that the approach 
was one in which the aviation industry pays its environmental costs while simultaneously 
bringing economic and social benefits to the UK. However, new attitudes were implicit in 
the text, with stronger support made for the aviation industry and its importance to the UK 
economy (Bailey, 2007). 
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In 2009 the Committee on Climate Change published Meeting the UK Aviation Target 
(Committee on Climate Change, 2009), which exposed the fact that the expansion outlined 
in the 2003 White Paper could not be carried out in line with the 2050 target for UK CO₂ 
emission reductions, implying that UK aviation policy was incompatible with the 2008 
Climate Change Act. In the same year, the UK Government confirmed their support for a 
third runway at Heathrow Airport (Lockley, 2011: 10). However, in 2010, the new Coalition 
Government committed themselves to ruling out a third runway at Heathrow (and second 
runways at Stansted and Gatwick) (Butcher, 2010a: 4).  
Conclusions 
In the aftermath of World War Two, the state was placed firmly at the centre of the 
international aviation system. Though there was little progress at the European level, the 
1960s saw the start of the gradual relaxation of state control over aviation in the UK via the 
creation of BAA and the development of a more competitive aviation market. At the same 
time, noise was gaining attention for being a major environmental impact, which posed a 
serious threat to an industry wanting to grow. 
The recognition of the industry’s environmental impact beyond noise continued throughout 
the 1970s, reflected in international commitments to environmental protection. At the 
global level, liberalisation and deregulation began to create a paradigm shift, which saw the 
aviation industry move away from being a highly regulated, government-owned industry 
and subsidised mode of transport run as a public service, towards an industry that was 
increasingly privatised and commercialised. Europe’s transnational authorities began to 
increase their policymaking mandate at the expense of national governments. 
The 1980s saw the aviation industry in the UK transformed. The UK Government promoted 
the liberalisation of the European air transport market, at a time when most of the EC were 
committed to the public service ethic. The UK Government allowed (and arguably 
facilitated) its flag carrier to move into the private sector, a move which other European 
governments could not even imagine (Kassim, 1995: 196). Airport ownership underwent a 
similarly revolutionary transition. Driven by a desire to remove the financial burden of 
airport ownership, the UK Government took the decision to take a hands-off approach to 
airport development, promoting the privatisation and commercialisation of UK airports 
(Humphreys et al., 2001: 9). 
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In the 1990s, liberalisation and deregulation further revolutionised the aviation industry, 
opening the skies across Europe and paving the way for the low-cost revolution that was to 
explode in the following decade. The UK saw little progress on aviation policy in the 1990s, 
however, in 2003 the UK Government’s position was one committed to the industry’s 
continued growth but also to massive reductions in CO₂ emissions, a position that the in 
2009 the Committee on Climate Change highlighted was incompatible.  
At the UK level, whether it has been protecting and promoting their national airlines, to 
providing favourable conditions for airport privatisation, throughout the post-war period 
the UK Government, of whatever political colour, has been broadly supportive of the 
development of the UK aviation industry. Many of the policy reforms have been a 
combined result of general ideological shifts regarding the role of government and the 
failure of existing regulatory structures to provide the desired social objectives. However, 
with this changing landscape, there has been an increase in both the numbers of actors 
behind its expansion, but also opposed to its expansion. 
Environmentally, privatisation and commercialisation, and liberalisation and deregulation, 
have created major problems, facilitating the conditions that encourage the aviation 
industry’s expansion and its position as an engine of growth. Over time, the aviation 
industry has become increasingly motivated by short-term profits with little regard for long-
term sustainability goals. Fundamentally, the protection of the environment is not one of 
the primary motivations of the private sector.  
There is, however, a growing social, political and environmental opposition to airport 
expansion. In the past the feeling of opposition was a NIMBY (Not In My Backyard) attitude, 
however, we are now seeing a shift towards BANANAs (Build Absolutely Nothing Anywhere 
Near Anyone) (Humphreys and Francis, 2002). This trend has been reflected in a marked 
rise in the number of NGO’s with aviation on their agenda and those committed solely to 
the aviation issue (e.g. T&E, AEF and AirportWatch). Furthermore, the recognition and 
acceptance of climate change is increasing, particularly at the European level. Globally and 
nationally, the pressure to accommodate growth is intense, but the provision of further 
infrastructure to increase capacity is facing increased scrutiny due to the negative 
environmental impacts.  
As this chapter has shown, throughout history, the development of aviation policy in the UK 
has been rooted in supporting its growth, with conflicts increasingly framed in terms of the 
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economy versus the environment. The challenge for the state is to create policies that 
ensure a sustainable balance of interests to a variety of stakeholders at local, national and 
international levels from economic, environmental and social perspectives. However, with 
the claim that the aviation industry is able to occupy a privileged position in this process, 
does the state face an impossible task?  
To conclude, this chapter has begun to unpick the complex relations that so evidently exist 
between the actors and debates that have shaped, and will continue to shape, the 
development of the aviation policy in the UK. This thesis will employ two contemporary 
theories of policy in order to comprehend these power debates and relationships, to 
explore the mechanisms behind the aviation industry’s oft-claimed position of privilege and 
to uncover the obstacles to balance in long-term environmental policymaking. This is where 
the next chapter turns, to an in-depth examination of the Advocacy Coalition Framework 
and the Strategic-Relational Approach.  
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Theorising Policy Change 
 
The previous chapter uncovered the array of actors involved in the development of the 
aviation industry in the UK including, but by no means limited to, airport operators, airlines, 
local community groups, local authorities and environmental non-governmental 
organisations. It also revealed the dynamic political landscape upon which this area of 
policymaking has taken, and continues to take, place on. In exploring two decisions 
fundamental in the aviation industry’s development, the use of theory, or in this case, 
theories, and the ideas and hypotheses they advocate, will help guide the empirical work 
and subsequent analysis. Crucially, they will assist in determining whether, and if so how 
and why, the aviation industry occupies a privileged position in environmental policymaking 
(Harrison, 2001; Marsh and Stoker, 1995).  
A theory can be described as, “an explanatory proposition, an idea or a set of ideas that in 
some way seeks to impose order or meaning upon phenomena” (Heywood, 2007: 98). An 
integral element of any political study, its purpose is to explain, comprehend, and interpret 
the real world and to help make sense of empirical data (Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987; 
Harrison, 2001; Hoffman, 2007; Marsh and Stoker, 1995). As introduced in Chapter One, 
this thesis employs two contemporary political theories to help comprehend and explain 
policy change and to guide data collection: the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) and 
the Strategic-Relational Approach (SRA). Useful analytically, multiple perspectives force the 
researcher to clarify varying assumptions and facilitates the building and testing of 
hypotheses (Sabatier, 1999). Neither theory has been applied to this area of policymaking, 
nor have they been compared in an empirical, or theoretical, study. Highlighting the novelty 
in this research, this thesis will contribute to their empirical and theoretical development 
and initiate a valuable dialogue between the two. 
As discussed in Chapter One, the ACF and SRA have been selected as they are modern 
exemplars of well established political theories (pluralism and Marxism) that provide very 
differing accounts of how and why particular groups dominate the policymaking process 
and thus occupy a position of continuing privilege. An agency-centred theory, the ACF 
studies the policy process over a decade or more, maintaining that political power is 
broadly shared among a range of interest groups who compete for control over the broad 
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direction of policy (Smith, 2000). Advantageous over other pluralist/neo-pluralist theories 
of policy, it is particularly appropriate for the analysis of ‘wicked problems’ such as those 
presented here. By contrast, the SRA focuses on the recursive relationship between 
structure and agency, maintaining that certain actors are structurally privileged over others 
in the policymaking process (Hay, 2002a). A step forward for Marxist thinking on the state, 
it is praised for being in-touch with the modern era of politics and hence, offering an 
opposing view of the role of the state in balancing competing interests and the distribution 
of power, ripe for application here.  
This chapter provides an in-depth exploration of the ACF and SRA. First, the details of each 
theory are revealed under comparable terms: origins; main units of analysis; explaining 
policy change; applications; and critical reactions and refinements. Second, their key 
similarities and differences relevant to the objectives of this research are highlighted, 
notably, their attempt to consolidate existing theories of the policymaking process; how 
they see power shared between actors; the role of information in creating policy change; 
and their view of the state in balancing competing interests.  
The Advocacy Coalition Framework 
Developed by Paul Sabatier and Hank C. Jenkins-Smith the Advocacy Coalition Framework 
(ACF) is a theory of the policy process that was developed to deal with ‘wicked’ problems, 
that is to say, those involving substantial conflict, technical dispute and multiple actors from 
various levels of government (Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 189). A departure from pluralist 
theories that view the policy process as a conflict between institutions, the ACF focuses 
attention on the interactions that occur between coalitions of state and non-state actors 
within a policy subsystem, where beliefs are the causal driver of policy change (Weible et 
al., 2009: 122).  
Origins 
Emerging from a desire to find an alternative to the stages-based model that dominated 
policy studies, Sabatier set out to synthesise the best features of top-down and bottom-up 
approaches to policy implementation and to give technical information (that which 
concerns the causes, magnitude and solutions of a problem) a more prominent role in the 
understanding of the policymaking process. His aim was to create a more systems-based 
approach (Sabatier, 1986; 1998; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999: 118; Weible et al., 2009: 
122). In the mid-1980s, he joined forces with Jenkins-Smith who had been developing a 
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similar way of conceptualising the role of scientific information within public policy. They 
encouraged other scholars to apply and critically evaluate their emerging framework 
(Figure 3.1), the results of which were published in a special issue of Policy Sciences in 1988 
(Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1988: 189; Weible et al., 2009: 121).  
Sabatier believed a problem with the existing policy implementation literature was that the 
four to five year time span it used for analysing the policy process, was too short to draw 
solid conclusions regarding policy change and consequently omitted important features of 
the policy process (Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1983; Sabatier, 1986). To solve this, a key 
facet of the ACF is that it advocates analysing policy change over a period of a decade or 
more, assuming that actors are relatively stable over this time, which makes policy change 
difficult (Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 192).  
Taking these applications and evaluations on, in 1993 Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith co-edited 
Policy Change and Learning: an Advocacy Coalition Approach, which outlined the ACF and 
included a set of hypotheses concerning the role of science in learning, policy and belief 
change (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993; Weible et al., 2009: 121). Their book included six 
case studies and finished with a critique and a revised framework (Figure 3.2). In response 
 
 
Figure 3.1 The Advocacy Coalition Framework in 1988 
Source: Sabatier (1988: 132) 
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to increasing application and feedback, further theoretical revisions were made by Sabatier 
in 1998 (Figure 3.3) and Sabatier and Weible in 2007 (Figure 3.4).  
 
Figure 3.2 The Advocacy Coalition Framework in 1993 
Source: Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993: 224) 
 
Figure 3.3 The Advocacy Coalition Framework in 1998 
Source: Sabatier (1998: 102) 
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The ACF begins with three ‘foundation stones’: a macro-level assumption that the majority 
of policymaking takes place within a policy subsystem among specialists whose behaviour is 
affected by broader political and socioeconomic influences; a micro-level model of 
individual behaviour that draws heavily on social psychology; and a meso-level conviction 
that advocacy coalitions are the best way to deal with the multitude of actors in a policy 
subsystem (Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 191). These affect the dependent variables: actors’ 
beliefs and policy change, through two mechanisms: policy-oriented learning and 
exogenous perturbations (Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 191-192).  
Main units of analysis 
Deemed more useful than a single or specific governmental institution, the main unit of 
analysis in the ACF is the policy subsystem within which actors are grouped by their beliefs 
into advocacy coalitions (Hann, 1995).  
Policy subsystems 
The ACF assumes that policymaking is so complex that actors must specialise to be 
influential (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993: 23; 1999: 119; Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 
192-193). The policy subsystem defines this specialisation and is composed of actors that 
 
 
Figure 3.4 The Advocacy Coalition Framework in 2007 
Source: Weible et al. (2011: 352) 
 
Chapter Three 
58 
 
have been, “interacting regularly over periods of a decade or more to influence policy 
formulation and implementation within a given policy area/domain” (Sabatier, 1988: 131; 
Sabatier, 1998: 111). The important temporal dimension of the ACF creates a distinction 
between mature subsystems (those that have been in existence for at least a decade) and 
nascent subsystems (those that are in the process of forming), the former containing actors 
who share expertise and see themselves as a semiautonomous community (Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith, 1999: 136; Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 192). 
Actors involved in policy subsystems are not constrained to the traditional ‘iron triangle’ of 
participants such as legislators, interest group leaders and officials, rather, they encompass 
all of those who want to influence policy in a specific area (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 
1999: 119; Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 192; Zafonte and Sabatier, 1998). The eminent role 
the ACF gives to technical information means the subsystem also includes researchers such 
as university scientists and policy analysts as well as journalists who play an important role 
in the dissemination of information (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999: 119; Weible, 2005; 
Zafonte and Sabatier, 2004).  
In applying the ACF, it is deemed crucial to define the scope of a policy subsystem, focusing, 
“on the substantive and geographic scope of the institutions that structure interaction” 
(Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 193). However, the existence of overlapping and nested policy 
subsystems can make this problematic (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999; Sabatier and 
Weible, 2007: 193). For example, Zafonte and Sabatier (2004) wanted to determine 
whether an automotive pollution control subsystem existed independently of the broader 
air pollution control subsystem in the United States. They found that it had its own title in 
the Clean Air Act, a large sub-bureau in the Environmental Protection Agency, a large sub-
unit within the California Air Resources Board, interest groups on both industry and 
environmental sides and a distinct research community. They concluded that a separate 
automotive pollution control subsystem did exist but was nested within the wider air 
pollution control subsystem (Zafonte and Sabatier, 2004).  
The sometimes-sporadic nature of actor participation in the policymaking process further 
complicates policy subsystem definition. There are those that are involved in virtually all 
issues (regular participants) while some, often from overlapping subsystems, are involved in 
only a distinct set of issues (periodic participants) (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999: 137). 
Chapter Three 
59 
 
Two sets of exogenous variables affect the behaviour of actors within the policy subsystem: 
relatively stable parameters and dynamic external factors. The former refer to the basic 
constitutional structure, sociocultural values and the natural resources available to a 
political system. Difficult to change, they rarely provide the stimulus for behavioural or 
policy change but affect the actors’ behaviour (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993: 20; 1999: 
120; Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 193). The latter also have the ability to alter the behaviour 
of actors but more importantly, they can change substantially over a decade or more 
making them crucial in creating policy change. They include major socioeconomic changes 
such as the rise of social movements, policy decisions from other policy subsystems and 
changes in the governing coalition (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993: 19; 1999: 120; 
Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 193).  
Actors and their belief systems 
Unlike rational choice frameworks, which assume that self-interested actors rationally 
pursue their material interests, the ACF, “assumes that normative beliefs must be 
empirically ascertained and does not a priori preclude the possibility of altruistic behaviour” 
(Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 194). The way that a coalition understands the connections 
between institutional structures and policies and their effectiveness for realising their goals 
is contained within an actor’s belief system (Schlager and Blomquist, 1996: 657). 
Belief systems are of a threefold, hierarchal nature (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999; 
Weible et al., 2009: 122). Deep core beliefs are the broadest and most stable. They are the 
basic ontological and normative beliefs that operate throughout all policy subsystems and 
are what defines ones personal philosophy, for example, liberal and conservative beliefs 
(Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993: 31). An actor’s fundamental moral or philosophical 
principles, they are largely the product of childhood socialisation with any change akin to 
religious conversion (Weible et al., 2009: 122). 
Actors’ policy goals and preferences are held in their policy core beliefs, subsystem wide 
basic strategies and policy positions for the achievement of deep core beliefs (Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith, 1993: 31). These include value priorities such as the relative importance of 
economic development versus environmental protection, and the seriousness of a policy 
problem. They are considered the ‘glue’ of coalitions, remain relatively stable over time, 
and are considered ideal for coalition formation (Weible et al., 2009: 122).  
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Secondary aspects are where an actor’s instrumental beliefs are held (their views on policy 
application and implementation) (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993: 31). Less than 
subsystem wide, they are a set of beliefs that are easily altered in light of new information 
and/or for strategic purposes and are the most likely to change over time (Weible et al., 
2009: 123). They are relatively narrow in scope and concern beliefs such as the seriousness 
of a problem in a specific locality and the evaluation of actors’ performance (Sabatier and 
Weible, 2007: 196).  
The ACF considers beliefs held in the policy core as the most important. They are more 
salient to the individual than deep core beliefs and illustrate behaviour more efficiently 
than secondary aspects (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999). As the ACF assumes 
instrumental rationality (the most efficient or cost-effective means to achieve a specific 
end) it presumes that actors hold their ultimate goals in a position higher than the 
contingent means of achieving said goals, predicting that actors will make concessions to 
their secondary aspects prior to changing their policy core beliefs (Zafonte and Sabatier, 
2004).  
In some policy subsystems, debate among coalitions is around opposing preferences 
regarding system-wide policy proposals. To describe this type of belief, Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith introduced the concept of policy core policy preferences (Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith, 1999: 134; Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 195). Although policy preferences 
usually fall within the secondary aspects of the belief system they can fall within the policy 
core if they are, “(i) subsystem wide in scope, (ii) are highly salient, and (iii) have been a 
major source of cleavage for some time” (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999: 134). Policy 
preferences become policy preferences through translation into secondary aspects policy 
core, “related to specific instruments or proposals dealing with only a territorial or 
substantive component of a policy subsystem” and may in fact be, “the stickiest glue that 
binds coalitions together” (Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 195).  
Adding further difficulty to the alteration of deep core beliefs, the ACF stresses that actors 
relate to the world through perceptual filters based upon pre-existing beliefs. Actors from 
differing coalitions are likely to perceive the same piece of information in different ways 
and will resist information that suggests their deep core or policy core beliefs are invalid or 
unachievable (Sabatier, 1998; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999: 131; Sabatier and Weible, 
2007: 194). Screening out dissonant information, perceptual filters make the changing of 
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beliefs difficult and compounds distrust between coalitions but strengthens in-group 
cohesion (Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 194). 
Taking a proposition from prospect theory, the ACF maintains that actors have a propensity 
to value losses more heavily than gains and consequently remember defeats more than 
victories, particularly in high conflict situations (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).15 This 
creates a tendency for actors to view opponents as more powerful than they really are, 
which when interacting with perceptual filters, creates ‘the devil shift’ (Sabatier et al., 1987; 
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999: 131; Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 194). The resolution of 
conflict between coalitions becomes more difficult than classic rational actor models 
predict with coalitions viewing each other as more evil, less trustworthy and more 
influential than they really are, again, exacerbating conflict between coalitions but 
strengthening in-group cohesion (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999: 132; Sabatier and 
Weible, 2007).  
Advocacy coalitions 
Within a given policy subsystem the ACF assumes that actors who share a belief system will 
unite in advocacy coalitions, holding distinct viewpoints and co-operating over time to 
achieve their policy aims (Jenkins-Smith et al., 1991; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999: 120; 
Sabatier and Weible, 2007). There will always be a dominant coalition whose ideas and 
beliefs shape policymaking with changes in the core aspects of policy requiring the 
replacement of this coalition (Greenaway, 1998; Sabatier, 1991: 153; Schlager and 
Blomquist, 1996).  
The conflicting strategies of coalitions are mediated by policy brokers who are more 
concerned with achieving stability in the policy subsystem than policy change (Sabatier, 
1991: 153). A third group of actors, their role is to mediate conflict and find a suitable 
compromise (Freudenburg and Gramling, 2002; Ingold and Varone, 2011: 1; Sabatier, 1998; 
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999: 122). Once (and if) a compromise is reached, coalitions 
may revise their beliefs (primarily their secondary aspects) and/or alter their strategies 
(Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999: 122). However, shaped by the policy broker’s own bias, 
this compromise has the capacity to fuel further conflict (Smith, 2000: 99). For example, 
                                                             
15
 Developed in 1979 by Daniel Kahneman, a psychologist at Princeton University (see Kahneman and Tversky, 
1979), a descriptive model, prospect theory describes decisions that involve alternatives with uncertain 
outcomes. 
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while high level civil servants may be in the position of policy broker they are also policy 
advocates, particularly when their particular department has a clear goal (Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith, 1993: 27). 
The 2007 revision of the ACF (Figure 3.4) makes two additions to the conditions within 
which advocacy coalitions operate. The inclusion of coalition opportunity structures was a 
response to the frequent criticism that the ACF was too rooted in American pluralism and 
hence inapplicable to other regimes (Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 199). Borrowing heavily 
from the (mainly European) literature on political opportunity structures, they, “refer to the 
relatively enduing features of a polity that affect the resources and constraints of 
subsystem actors”, notably the degree of consensus that is needed for major policy change 
and the openness of the political system (Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 200).16 
While belief systems determine the direction of policy a coalition wants to pursue, its 
resources critically affect its ability to do so. A typology of resources was created to aid the 
understanding of these resources (Figure 3.5) (Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 201). 
Formal legal 
authority 
Actors in positions of legal authority are seen as potential 
members of coalitions and when this occurs it is a major coup for 
the coalition 
 
Public opinion A supportive public is far more likely to elect coalition supporters 
into key decision-making positions 
 
Information  A resource utilised to win political battles against the opposition, 
often used strategically 
 
Mobile troops Particularly important to coalitions with few financial resources, 
policy elites often utilise engaged members of the public in 
campaigns, an inexpensive resource they are often used to garner 
public support 
 
Financial resources Money can be used to purchase other resources, for example, 
research, media campaigns and advertising as well as bankrolling 
potential candidates 
 
Skilful leadership Leaders can create an attractive vision for a coalition to aim for, 
strategically and efficiently use resources and attract new 
resources 
 
Figure 3.5 The Advocacy Coalition Framework’s typology of resources 
Source: Sabatier and Weible (2007: 201) 
                                                             
16
 In general, the higher the degree of consensus that change needs, the higher the incentive coalitions have to 
be inclusive, to seek compromise, to share information with opposing coalitions and to minimise the devil shift 
(Sabatier and Weible, 2007). 
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Explaining policy change 
To the ACF policy change is the result of a shift in the balance of forces within a policy 
subsystem through a change in the dominant coalition. Beliefs are the causal driver for 
political behaviour and while the provision of information and subsequent learning may 
stimulate changes in secondary aspects, it is unlikely that an actor’s policy core beliefs will 
change voluntarily. Therefore, as it is near impossible that major policy change will come 
from within the policy subsystem, outside sources must play a role (Sabatier and Weible, 
2007). Making the distinction between major policy change created by changes in policy 
core beliefs and minor policy change generated by changes in the secondary aspects, the 
ACF identifies two main sources of belief and policy change; policy-oriented learning and 
external events (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999: 147). In addition, the ACF’s 2007 revision 
incorporated two further sources of policy and belief change: internal events and 
negotiated agreements (Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 199).  
Policy-oriented learning 
Placing emphasis on the role that information and learning can have as a motivating factor 
in creating policy change, the ACF assumes that policy changes, “as people ‘learn’ or get 
more and better information which they can then use constructively” (Hann, 1995: 20; 
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999: 123). A result of the specialisation that occurs within a 
policy subsystem, conflict between coalitions drives policy-oriented learning; coalitions 
strive to outlearn one another and use knowledge in their quest to become the dominant 
coalition and hence, control the direction of policy (Greenaway, 1998; Hann, 1995). Policy-
oriented learning is crucial in the development of policy over time, not because of reduced 
conflict between groups and the attainment of consensus but because policy becomes 
better informed. By becoming better informed, the closer policymakers get to identifying 
the ‘real answer’ to a particular policy problem (Hann, 1995). 
Referring to changes in thought or behaviour that result from experience and/or new 
information, policy-oriented learning is concerned with the attainment, or revision, of 
policy objectives resulting from an increased knowledge of the parameters of the problem 
under question and the factors that affect said problem (Sabatier, 1998; Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith, 1999: 123). Learning is instrumental - actors have a desire to better 
understand the world in order to further their policy objectives (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 
1993: 19). Perceptual filters play a role, with learning within a coalition tending to confirm 
pre-existing beliefs and coalitions resisting information that questions their deep and policy 
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core beliefs (Hann, 1995; Litfin, 2000; Mawhinney, 1993; Meijerink, 2005; Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith, 1999: 123). 
External events 
While policy-oriented learning can alter the secondary aspects of a coalition’s belief system, 
the ACF maintains that changes in policy core beliefs require a shock external to the 
subsystem (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999: 123). External events, such as changes in 
socioeconomic conditions; changes in government; disasters; and changes in other policy 
subsystems, are a necessary but not sufficient condition for major policy change and have 
the ability to alter the behaviour of actors (Sabatier, 1999; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 
1999; Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 198). These events can shift agendas, create media and 
public attention and capture the eye of decision-makers, creating change in the subsystem 
by shifting resources, changing the balance of between coalitions and altering beliefs 
(Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 198; Schlager and Blomquist, 1996; Weible et al., 2009: 124). 
Offering the opportunity for a redistribution of resources among coalitions, the most 
important effect of an external event is that it opens up the possibility of the dominant 
coalition being replaced (Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 199). External events provide a 
window of opportunity for major policy change (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999: 148). A 
minority coalition will have to skilfully exploit such a window to become dominant 
however, the dominant coalition will have a range of delaying strategies to try to ‘ride it 
out’ (Zafonte and Sabatier, 2004).  
Internal events 
Drawing on the rationales developed in the focusing events literature (events that attract 
public attention), internal events highlight policy vulnerabilities and failures in the policy 
subsystem, allow new information to enter and have the potential to change the balance of 
power between coalitions, stimulating major policy change (Birkland, 1996; 1997; 2004; 
Kingdon, 1984; Weible et al., 2009: 124). However, unlike the focusing events literature, the 
ACF maintains a distinction between internal and external events. Internal events have the 
ability to directly question policy core beliefs whereas the effect of external events on these 
beliefs is less clear (Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 204).  
Negotiated agreements 
In developing the concept of negotiated agreements, Sabatier and Weible (2007: 205) 
combined the hypotheses from the ACF concerning policy-oriented learning across 
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coalitions with the literature on alternative dispute resolution (Bingham, 1986; Carpenter 
and Kennedy, 1988; O'Leary and Bingham, 2003; Susskind et al., 1999; Ury, 1993). 
Situations exist where longstanding opposition coalitions come to an agreement that is a 
change from the status quo. In the absence of either an internal or external shock, the 
negotiating of an agreement between opposing coalitions can be a path to policy change 
(Sabatier and Pelkey, 1990). 
Applications of the ACF 
The majority of early applications of the ACF were in the United States. However, this has 
gradually spread across the globe with applications in Africa (Beverwijk, 2005; Tewari, 
2001); South America (Arnold, 2003; Carvalho, 2001); Australia (Chen, 2003; Swaffield, 
1998); Asia (Hsu, 2005; Kim, 2003; Sato, 1999) and, increasingly, on a global scale (Elliott 
and Schlaepfer, 2001a; b; Farquharson, 2003; Green and Houlihan, 2004; Litfin, 2000; 
Lowry, 1998; Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 190; Sewell, 2005) though applications in the 
United States and Europe still dominate (Weible et al., 2009: 125). 
The framework is increasingly being applied to a variety of policy areas including domestic 
violence (Abrar et al., 2000); sports policy (Green and Houlihan, 2004; Parrish, 2003); 
disaster policy (Olson et al., 1999); tobacco policy (Farquharson, 2003); alcohol policy 
(Greenaway, 1998); intelligence policy (Nohrstedt, 2011) and foreign policy (Hirschi and 
Widmer, 2010; Pierce, 2011). However, the majority of applications have built on the 
frameworks legacy, applying it in the area of energy or environmental policy (Litfin, 2000; 
Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 190, 217-219; Sotirov and Memmler, 2011; Weible et al., 2009: 
125).  
In most of the applications by Sabatier, Jenkins-Smith and their students (former and 
current) quantitative research methods have been employed (Jenkins-Smith et al., 1991; 
Jenkins-Smith and St. Clair, 1993; Sabatier and Brasher, 1993; Weible et al., 2004; Zafonte 
and Sabatier, 2004) as well as by others external to this group (Chen, 2003; Henry, 2011; 
Matti and Sandström, 2011; Pierce, 2011). However, importantly to this research, 
qualitative methods have been successfully employed in the area of environmental 
policymaking (Albright, 2011; Elliott and Schlaepfer, 2001a; b; Jordan and Greenaway, 1998; 
Litfin, 2000; Smith, 2000) and in other policy domains (Green and Houlihan, 2004; Larsen et 
al., 2006a; Nohrstedt, 2011).  
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Critical reactions and refinements 
The capacity of the ACF to deal with complex situations and its model of the individual 
derived from social psychology, make it attractive for those looking for an alternative to 
rational choice models. Moving away from the idea that policy sectors are composed of 
integrated networks and viewing them as a political terrain upon which coalitions compete 
is far closer to reality and as John (2003) highlights, provides a grounded way of 
understanding the important role of discourse in the policy process, integrating ideological 
aspects of policymaking into the operation of coalitions. Providing a relatively sophisticated 
explanation of the role that beliefs, knowledge and learning play in the policymaking 
process, the ACF challenges the implicit assumption of many political scientists that an 
actor’s organisational affiliation is primordial (Schlager, 1995).  
Scholars have questioned the ACF’s outright rejection of coalitions of convenience (Sabatier 
and Jenkins-Smith, 1993: 27) where actors motivated by short-term interests work together 
to achieve said interests (Hann, 1995; Kim and Roh, 2008). The hierarchal belief system 
suggests that no coalition could exist between actors who do not share core beliefs; 
however, in reality it is not unusual to find actors with differing beliefs working together. 
Hann (1995) cites the example of fascists and liberals who may find themselves in the same 
coalition on the issue of free speech but who certainly do not share deep core beliefs.  
The framework has been criticised for its failure to account for how actors within a coalition 
overcome (or do not overcome) issues of collective action or how they co-operate in 
pursuit of common goals and strategies. It assumes that there will be highly coordinated 
behaviour between actors who share policy core beliefs (Fenger and Klok, 2001; Kim and 
Roh, 2008; Schlager, 1995; Schlager and Blomquist, 1996). However, many have 
commented that it is inevitable, for example, that distributional issues will arise when 
coalitions have to decide between policies as in any decision actors will benefit to varying 
degrees (Kim and Roh, 2008; Schlager and Blomquist, 1996).  
Schlager and Blomquist (1996: 666) believe that the ACF could be strengthened by 
incorporating theories of collective action, for example, acknowledging that a coalition is 
likely to be more stable and effective the more they resolve issues associated with 
collective action. In response, Sabatier and Weible (2007: 208) have stated that they hope 
the continuing integration of network analysis into the identification of coalitions will help 
to address this issue (Fenger and Klok, 2001; Smith, 2000; Weible, 2005; Weible and 
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Sabatier, 2005; Zafonte and Sabatier, 1998). Furthermore, in a recent special issue of Policy 
Studies, Weible et al. (2011) point to an increasing number of applications that identify 
coalitions that share co-ordination patterns (Henry et al., 2011; Weible and Sabatier, 2005). 
Scholars have explored the conditions that do, or do not, create coalition stability. Some 
empirical studies have illustrated stability (Jenkins-Smith et al., 1991; Jenkins-Smith and St. 
Clair, 1993; Sabatier and Brasher, 1993; Zafonte and Sabatier, 2004) whereas others have 
sought to explain instances of instability (Andersson, 1999; Munro, 1993). Applications of 
the ACF have shown that external events can create coalition defection with both relatively 
stable parameters and opportunity structures affecting the stability of coalitions (Elliott and 
Schlaepfer, 2001a; Jenkins-Smith et al., 1991; Zafonte and Sabatier, 2004). For example, an 
actor considered on the periphery of a coalition may switch coalitions over short time 
periods in order to increase their political influence (Larsen et al., 2006b). The 
diversification of members within a coalition may also affect its stability. Coalitions, glued 
together by a certain set of policy core beliefs and a common enemy, may be internally 
divided on other policy core beliefs and/or secondary aspects (Olson et al., 1999; Weible 
and Sabatier, 2005). In response Weible et al. (2009: 130) emphasise the need to not 
assume that coalition membership assumes homogeneity among members and to look for 
core and peripheral members and sub-coalitions to help explain instability and defection. 
Questions have been asked over the ability of the ACF to explain periods of dynamic change 
with suggestions that the framework is incapable of predicting exactly when change takes 
place, failing to, “explain what kinds of environmental changes are critical for a specific 
policy change or how those changes influence policy outcomes” (Kim and Roh, 2008: 675). 
As a result, many scholars refer to the core mechanisms of policy change in the ACF as a 
‘black box’ (Cairney, 1997; John, 1998; Kim and Roh, 2008; Sato, 1999; Sotirov and 
Memmler, 2011). Sabatier (1998) claims that one of the ACF’s major strengths is in its 
capability to provide a clear way to distinguish between major and minor policy change. 
Mintrom and Vergari (1996) argue the opposite, stating that a strength of the ACF is its 
ability to explain policy stability with the long-term focus of the framework smoothing out 
short-term fluctuations, extending the evidence base and meaning it has the capacity to 
understand the many short-term events that lead to incremental policy change (Szarka, 
2010: 849).  
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Some scholars have argued that the ACF relies too extensively on external events as the 
main driver of policy change (John, 1998; Mintrom and Vergari, 1996). While there have 
been applications which illustrate the link (Dudley and Richardson, 1999; Kubler, 2001) 
there are also those which maintain that shocks external to the subsystem do not 
themselves create policy change. Jordan and Greenaway (1998) and Ameringer (2002) 
conclude that after an external shock, skilful coalition members are needed in order to 
exploit the opportunity to create policy change while others discuss the impact of external 
events in changing coalition structure and in creating minor policy change (Burnett and 
Davis, 2002; Carvalho, 2001; Davis and Davis, 1988). Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999) 
maintain that major policy changes are infrequent and largely unpredictable with the vast 
majority of policy change occurring in secondary aspects. External events are deemed, “a 
necessary, but not sufficient, cause of change in policy core attributes of a governmental 
program [emphasis in the original]” (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999: 147). Notably, the 
authors have acknowledged that questions remain about the link between exogenous 
shocks and policy change (Weible et al., 2011; Weible et al., 2009: 128).  
Applications of the ACF support the expectations the framework has about the role of 
science in the policymaking process (Weible et al., 2009: 131) both as coalition members 
(Litfin, 2000; Meijerink, 2005; Weible and Sabatier, 2005) and in reaffirming pre-existing 
beliefs and legitimising arguments (Eberg, 1997; Litfin, 2000; Sato, 1999). Similar to the 
arguments put forward by Heintz and Jenkins-Smith (1988) and Jenkins-Smith (1990) 
(reversing the causal direction with controversy creating scientific uncertainty), Montpetit 
(2011) challenges the ACF’s depiction of the role of science in policy subsystems. He argues 
that the level of conflict in a subsystem affects actors’ perception of credibility in science 
and that scientists may in fact be more divided than other actors in the subsystem. 
The role that policy-oriented learning has in creating policy change divides scholars. Some 
find a strong connection (Lester and Hamilton, 1987; McBeth et al., 2007) and others a 
weak, if any, connection (Eberg, 1997; Nohrstedt, 2005). While empirical studies have 
shown that learning often occurs within the secondary aspects of belief systems, questions 
remain on what facilitates cross-coalition learning and how it links to policy change 
(Albright, 2011; Weible et al., 2009: 130). Greenaway (1998), for example, found that policy 
learning is more likely to take place when coalitions share technical or professional 
expertise. The ACF theorises that cross-coalition learning is more likely to occur when 
discussions focus on secondary aspects, when conflict levels are intermediate and when a 
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professional forum exists. However, Larsen et al. (2006b) have shown that learning can 
occur in policy core beliefs and a number of studies have shown that the existence of a 
professional forum does not always facilitate cross-coalition learning (Litfin, 2000; Munro, 
1993).  
The ACF assumes that actors beliefs are complex and should be ascertained empirically 
(Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999: 131). Methodologically, questions have been asked 
about whether it is realistically possible to confirm belief systems empirically, particularly 
retrospectively (Hann, 1995; Jenkins-Smith, 1991). Sabatier (1988: 142) states that the 
preferred method is to allow actors to indicate their belief systems via questionnaires and 
content analysis of documents and then examine how they change over time. Critics 
believe that this is a naive approach to discovering beliefs (Hann, 1995). Even if actors are 
willing to answer questionnaires, they themselves may not be fully aware of their deep core 
beliefs or very good at articulating them. It is not design that is the problem, rather that 
actors may just not know the answer, leaving responses to inference on the part of the 
researcher with assumptions made as a result (Hann, 1995: 24). It is also important to bear 
in mind the neutrality of the researcher who may themselves be members of a coalition. 
While Jenkins-Smith (1991) recommends the use of public documents such as transcripts of 
public hearings in gaining retrospective data, he acknowledges their pitfalls. Notably that 
even when these documents are available key data is missing, particularly data that which 
relates to more abstract core beliefs and the possibility that public documents may 
represent strategic positioning rather than beliefs (Jenkins-Smith, 1991).  
A strength of the ACF is the extensive empirical testing it has been subjected to with 
continuous development and revisions taking place as a result (Schlager, 1995; Schlager and 
Blomquist, 1996). It is a theory that is very much still alive with scholars still engaged in the 
refinement and development of the theory (Weible et al., 2011).17 However, there is a 
growing criticism that through this, the ACF is becoming too stretched and losing its 
parsimony. For example, the recent inclusion of internal events and negotiated agreements 
as possible routes to policy change, suggest that the ACF may be trying to cover all paths to 
policy change (apart from what cannot be included because of its pluralist roots i.e. 
structure). Unsurprisingly, Sabatier refutes this suggestion seeing the ACF’s constant 
                                                             
17 Most recently, a special issue of Policy Studies Journal contained seven empirical applications and one 
application dedicated to theoretical development, six of which emerged from an international workshop on the 
ACF at the University of California-Davis in September (Weible et al. 2011). 
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development and revisions as a strength and part of the, “productive path of science” 
(Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 208). 
The Strategic-Relational Approach 
Developed by Bob Jessop (Jessop, 1990; 2001) and promoted by his former PhD student 
Colin Hay (Hay, 2002b), the Strategic-Relational Approach (SRA) focuses attention on the 
recursive relationship between structure and agency to understand the policymaking 
process. Agency referring to the ability of individuals to act independently and make their 
own free choices and structure to the recurring pattern of arrangements that influence or 
constrain the choices and opportunities available to agents (Hay, 2002b; 2005; Valler and 
Wood, 2004).  
Akin to Giddens’ theory of structuration (1984), the SRA attempts to transcend the dualism 
that has been created between structure and agency, asserting that they need to be 
analysed alongside one another with the aim of understanding the recursive nature of their 
relationship (Hay, 2005; Kelly, 1999; Valler and Wood, 2004: 1835).18 It maintains that 
certain structures privilege some forms of agency over others and that actors reflect on the 
nature of structures when selecting their courses of action (Hay, 2005; Kelly, 1999; Valler 
and Wood, 2004: 1835).  
Origins 
In his early work, Karl Marx developed two distinct approaches to understanding the 
relationship between the state and particular classes: the first where the state is relatively 
autonomous from the dominant class, and the second where the state operates as an 
instrument of it (a perspective associated with the Communist Manifesto) (Hay, 2005; 
Taylor, 1995: 249). Though complicated and interpreted in different ways at different times, 
Marx’s work embodied a theory of history where the means of production was the 
dominant and determining force (historical materialism) (Hill, 2005: 40). He maintained that 
the economic ‘base’ (the mode of production or economic system) conditioned and/or 
determined the ideological and political ‘superstructure’, suggesting that both historical 
and social development could be explained in terms of class and economic factors (Hill, 
2005: 56).  
                                                             
18 Giddens’ theory of structuration maintains that all human action is to an extent predetermined by the 
contextual rules under which it occurs, however, the rules are not permanent and external but modified 
through a process of reflexive feedback (Giddens, 1984).  
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In classical Marxist theory, the social structure of a capitalist society is in essence one of 
class where the bourgeoisie (the owners of the means of production) are in confrontation 
with the proletariat (who work for the bourgeoisie) (Hill, 2005: 40). This confrontation 
intensifies as competitive production forces the bourgeoisie to systematically reduce the 
rewards going to the proletariat, eventually to the point where the latter rebels, 
overthrowing the former and replacing capitalism with socialism, an essentially determinist 
argument where your position in the means of production determines your political 
interests (Hill, 2005: 40). The role of the state is to assist capital accumulation, creating 
conditions that encourage the production of profit and keeps order and control in society 
(Hill, 2005: 41). However, there are examples where Marx (and Engels) move away from 
this instrumentalist view of the state and take a slightly more structuralist position (Hay, 
2005: 67). In both The Eighteenth Brumaire and The Civil War in France the state is given a 
much more independent role where its structure and function is to guarantee (or at least 
powerfully select for) the reproduction of capitalist social relations (Marx, 1852 [1979]; 
1871 [1986] quoted in Hay, 2005: 67). 
Building on the work of Marx, in the early 1990s Lenin developed a conceptualisation of the 
state as, “an organ of class rule, an organ for the oppression of one class by another” (Hay, 
2005: 68). Somewhat one-dimensionally, Lenin (and to some extent Engels) viewed the 
state as the repressive arm of the bourgeoisie, unable to advance social transformation as 
this would require the destruction of the state (Lenin, 1917 [1968] quoted in Hay, 2005: 60, 
68). At a similar time, Plekhanov and Kautsky were developing theories on the relationship 
between the state and class struggle. Driven by a desire to establish a scientific Marxism 
grounded in a scientific prescription of the inevitable downfall of capitalism, they 
emphasised the role of productive forces at the expense of the relations of production 
(economism) (Taylor, 1995: 252).19  
Gramsci began in his attempt to reformulate the Marxist theory of the state through a 
rejection of this scientific way of thinking. He argued that economism failed to comprehend 
class struggle and wanted to develop a more inclusive definition that incorporated human 
subjectivity as a dynamic agent (Hay, 2005: 69; Marsh, 1995: 274; Taylor, 1995: 252). He 
believed that reducing everything to its economic base ignored the most crucial feature of a 
                                                             
19 Economism overemphasises the determination of social life by the economic base, underestimating the 
importance of the political and ideological (Taylor, 1995: 252). 
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dialectical approach; the interplay between the objective and the subjective in the 
development of history, that is to say, what provides capital with the capacity to reproduce 
and reassert its dominance over time despite its inherent contradictions (Hay, 2005: 69; 
Taylor, 1995: 252). 
In redefining the concept of hegemony, Gramsci made a significant move away from the 
view of Marx and Engels that the ruling material class were also the ruling intellectual force. 
By extending the definition of the state to include the institutions and practices by which 
the ruling class maintain consensual dominance over the sub-class Gramsci attributed, “a 
greater degree of importance to the struggle taking place at the ideological, political and 
cultural levels” (Gramsci, 1971; Hay, 2005: 69; Taylor, 1995: 254). Gramsci believed that 
hegemony was not solely reliant on coercion by the dominant class (structure) but also 
upon the social and political acceptance of the subordinate classes (agency). A dominant 
class needed to succeed in presenting its own values as societal norms and in constructing 
an ideological common sense to be hegemonic, illustrating the struggle between constantly 
shifting ideological positions and the struggle between structure and agency (Hay, 2005: 69; 
Taylor, 1995: 252).  
To Gramsci the state assumes a broader definition that constitutes, “the entire complex of 
political and theoretical activities with which the ruling class not only justifies and maintains 
its dominance, but manages to win the active consent over whom it rules” (Taylor, 1995: 
254). Power is inclusive, encompassing all the operations that make up the apparatus of the 
political and cultural hegemony of the ruling class, for example, the inclusion of institutions 
through which power is mediated in modern society, such as the media and the educational 
system (Taylor, 1995: 254). The struggle over public consciousness is considered to be 
equally as important as the struggle over the ownership of production with the power of 
the state residing it in its ability to influence and shape the perceptions of the subordinate 
classes by either convincing them of its legitimacy or that resistance is futile (Hay, 2005: 70; 
Taylor, 1995: 254). 
The French tradition of structuralism that emerged in the 1960s/70s was diametrically 
opposed to the central thrust of Gramsci’s work to re-establish the role of the subject 
within Marxist theory. Bereft of a subjective core, this field of thinking maintained that 
there were no subjects in history, only individuals that occupied objective structures 
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(Taylor, 1995: 255). These ideas of French structuralism, and in particular the work of Louis 
Althusser, influenced the next Marxist theorist: Nicolas Poulantzas. 
Drawing on Althusser’s concept of relative autonomy, where all levels and practices are 
dependent on one another, Poulantzas argued that if the state was to operate as a 
successful class state that acted in the long-term interests of the bourgeoisie then it needed 
to maintain a degree of autonomy from the dominant class; presenting itself not as a class 
state but as a state operating in the interests of the people (Taylor, 1995: 255). While 
accepting Althusser’s view that the political and ideological are relatively autonomous, 
Poulantzas believed that the role of the state was not limited to the reproduction of the 
external conditions where production takes place but they themselves crucial components 
in the social relations of production (Taylor, 1995: 256). Adapting Gramsci’s focus on 
hegemony, Poulantzas (1968) held that state power needed the consent of the oppressed 
via class alliances.  
Poulantzas disagreed with instrumentalist accounts of the state, viewing the capitalist class 
as too focused on its own short-term gain to be concerned about maintaining class power 
as a whole; considering the function of the state to ensure the smooth operation of the 
capitalist society. His work focused on how an inherently divisive system such as capitalism 
could co-exist with the social stability required for its reproduction, attempting to theorise 
the relative autonomy of the state and the idea of structural selectivity (Marsh, 1995).  
During the 1960s/70s Poulantzas became involved in an intense theoretical exchange with 
Ralph Miliband regarding the source of power in contemporary capitalist societies and the 
relationship between the ruling class and state apparatus in determining state policy (Hay, 
2005: 71). Hay (2005: 71) notes that the importance of this debate lies not in the quality of 
the exchange or its historical significance, but in the problems it reveals in Marxist 
conceptions of the state.  
Poulantzas began by critiquing Miliband’s The State in Capitalist Society (1969), highlighting 
the absence (bar Gramsci) of any attempt to create a Marxist theory of the state and 
praising Miliband for his attempt to do so. However, he criticised Miliband for remaining 
tarnished by bourgeoisie assumptions about the state, notably that power is held by the 
personnel of the state not the apparatus and failing to grasp what he considered the, 
“objective structural reality of social classes and the state” (Hay, 2005: 71). Dismissing what 
he saw as a sociological approach taken by Miliband, Poulantzas emphasised that economic 
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structures and social power constrain state autonomy, suggesting that the state cannot do 
anything but act to propagate the social system in which it operates (Hay, 2005; Heywood, 
2007).  
The debate became a crude and polarised struggle between instrumentalism (Poulantzas’ 
caricature of Miliband) and structuralism (Miliband’s caricature of Poulantzas) (Hay, 2005: 
71; Heywood, 2007; Hill, 2005: 39). Miliband viewed the state as a neutral instrument that 
was there to be manipulated by the ruling class, stressing the way in which the state elite 
was disproportionally drawn from the privileged (Heywood, 2007). Agency is given primacy 
over structure, with an instrumentalist theory thus a theory of the state in capitalist society 
rather than a theory of the capitalist state (Hay, 2005: 72).  
In contrast, Poulantzas’ more structuralist position asserts the priority of structure over 
agency, with agents as mere bearers of objective structures over which they have minimal 
influence (Hay, 2005: 71). The state serves the long-term interests of capital with the 
capitalist state a structural system whose form and function develops independently of any 
intentions, motivations or aspirations of the political elites or ruling class. A theory of the 
capitalist state, it is state centred where the state apparatus acts in the long-term interests 
of the ruling class (Hay, 2005: 73). 
While a large part of Poulantzas’ (1978) State Power and Socialism details the processes of 
how the state reproduces individuals as juridical subjects, Taylor (1995: 257) suggests its 
most significant contribution to Marxist thought is the way it develops a view of the state as 
an arena of class struggle (a view similar to that taken by the SRA). Theorising the state as a 
‘social relation’ Poulantzas (1978: 132) sees state power as relational and selective, 
referring to the state as a strategic terrain that connects networks of power (Jessop, 1985: 
127; Taylor, 1995: 258). The state is relational in that its structures and policies are, 
“historically contingent episodes in a dynamic process of evolution” and selective in that it 
is comprised of institutional mechanisms that advance or obstruct strategies and favour the 
dominant class of the moment (Kelly, 1999: 110).  
Jessop (1985: 134) highlights a tension between necessity and contingency in the way 
Poulantzas relates institutional forms and class struggle. By wanting to avoid economism 
but not wanting to abandon the Marxist view that in the long-term the capitalist state must 
reproduce the dominance of the bourgeoisie, Poulantzas introduced an element of 
contingency (Taylor, 1995: 258). No longer is state unity seen in terms of functioning to 
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reproduce the dominant class; the long-term interests of the bourgeoisie are served 
through a multitude of micro-policies that reflect the nature of class struggle. However, 
Jessop states that this fails to provide an adequate solution to the problem, “since 
Poulantzas would need to address the awkward issue of how this macroscopic necessity 
(the need to ensure bourgeois class domination) emerges out of microscopic diversity (the 
chaotic nature of state policies)” (Taylor, 1995: 259). Poulantzas fails to explain how the 
relative autonomy of the state can ensure class hegemony, and if he did manage to answer 
this, his view that crises of hegemony can occur would be undermined (Taylor, 1995: 259). 
The SRA attempts to overcome Poulantzas’ tension between necessity and contingency in 
the relationship between institutional forms and the class struggle, by abandoning the 
primary role given to class struggle. It favours a broader, more flexible conception of 
struggle not limited to class, “which acknowledges the need to disaggregate social analysis 
and embrace the particularities of divisions along the lines of ethnicity and gender” (Taylor, 
1995: 259).  
While failing to significantly advance Marxist theory, the Miliband-Poulantzas debate 
highlighted the limitations of structure-centred and agency-centred accounts, providing a 
point of departure for more recent developments in state theory (Hay, 2005: 73; Marsh, 
1995). Developments in modern Marxism have shown a convergence between pluralist and 
Marxist theories and just as (some) pluralists have begun to acknowledge the role of 
corporate power, neo-Marxists have begun to move away from the idea that the state is 
purely a reflection of the class system, with an increasing recognition that the classical two-
tier model between the bourgeoisie and proletariat is too simplistic for modern societies 
(Heywood, 2007).  
Block (1987a; b) developed Miliband’s position, concerning himself with demonstrating 
how, in spite of the division of labour between state managers and the capitalist class, the 
state will tend to work in the long-term interest of capital. Maintaining that the capitalist 
class will often provide the loudest opposition to reforms, Block argues that they (the 
capitalist class) are incapable of acting in the long-term collective interest. Those in the 
ruling class who are involved in policy formulation become atypical of their class and hence 
quite likely to diverge ideologically from those in the ruling class who are politically 
unengaged (Hay, 2005: 74). 
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To Block, state managers may have interests closer aligned to the long-term interests of 
capital than capital itself, citing the example of the dependent relationship between state 
managers on one hand and the performance of the capitalist economy on the other (Hay, 
2005: 74; Marsh, 1995: 275). The state takes on the role of custodian of the general interest 
of capital; economic activity produces state revenues, public support for a regime falls 
unless accumulation continues, state managers will do whatever they can to facilitate 
accumulation, economic activity is largely determined by private investment; hence, 
managers become particularly sensitive to business confidence (Hay, 2005: 74). 
Block’s work is a dialectical view of the relationship between state apparatus and the ruling 
class void of the intentionalism and indeterminacy of instrumentalist accounts and the 
functionalism and determinism of structuralist accounts. However, it remains an agency-
centred account due to its focus on state managers as utility-maximisers (Hay, 2005: 74). 
Jessop’s SRA attempts to transcend this dualism and while Block’s view of the state as the 
custodian of capital can be seen as the heir to instrumentalist Marxist accounts, Jessop’s 
SRA can be seen as the heir to structuralist accounts (Hay, 2005: 75).  
Main units of analysis 
Jessop’s work is an example of how modern Marxism has attempted to move away from 
economism, determinism, materialism and structuralism, developing the concept of 
strategic selectivity as an alternative to Poulantzas’ concept of structural selectivity (Hay, 
2005; Marsh, 1995; 1999; 2002: 162). Jessop’s view that the form of the state is the result 
of previous strategic struggles between social forces builds upon Poulantzas’ work, but 
marks a step forward in recognising the importance of social forces other than class and 
acknowledging the dialectical and contingent nature of the relationship between structure 
and agency (Kelly, 1999; Marsh, 1995; 2002; Taylor, 1995).  
To the SRA, the distinction between structure and agency is purely analytical, “in the real 
world, structures are constituted only by their impacts on agents, and agency takes place 
only within a structured context” (Valler and Wood, 2004: 1835, emphasis in original). The 
two logically follow one another and therefore there can be no analysis of one without the 
other (Hay, 2005: 75). Concentrating on the interplay between structure and agency in the 
real contexts of social and political interaction, while the analytical distinction is useful to 
differentiate between the two it is important to ensure that this is not hardened into a rigid 
ontological dualism (Hay, 2002a: 127).  
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For advocates of the SRA, one of the main issues with the structure-agency debate is the 
language in which it has been conducted in (Hay, 2002a: 127). The SRA deserves 
recognition for attempting to privilege neither structure nor agency and seeking to devise a 
new conceptual language that better reflects the relational and dialectical qualities of the 
ongoing interaction between the two. It sets out to bring agency into structure with the 
production of a structured context (an action setting) and structure into agency (a situated 
agent) (Hay, 2002a). Taking this a step further and repeating the process, it then brings the 
situated actor into the structured context and the structured context to the situated actor. 
This results in a new conceptual pairing where the dualism has been dissolved; strategic 
actors within strategically selective contexts can now be identified, better reflecting the 
manner in which actors appropriate the environment in which they are situated and the 
manner in that context dictates the parameters of their possible action (Hay, 2002a).  
Strategically selective contexts (structure) 
Following Poulantzas, the SRA sees the state as a strategic site sculpted by class struggles 
and a, “specific institutional ensemble with multiple boundaries, no institutional fixity and 
no pre-given formal or substantive unity” (Jessop, 1990: 267). Rather than viewing the state 
as a means where capitalism is maintained through the weakening of class tensions and an 
instrument used by the dominant or ruling class, the state is a dynamic, unfolding system 
whose specific form at a particular moment in time represents a, “crystallisation of past 
strategies”, that privileges certain actors and strategies (Hay, 2005: 75; Jessop, 1990: 129). 
An arguably pluralist view of the state, it is considered fluid and inclusive (Marsh, 2002). 
Reflecting the balance of power within society at a given time, the state obtains its power 
from the forces acting within it (Heywood, 2007; Jessop, 1982: 149; Taylor, 1995: 261). The 
effectiveness of this power is dependent on the balance of forces in any given situation, 
“the state is not simply something towards which one must adopt a political strategy but is 
something (or better, a social relation) which can be fruitfully analysed as the site, the 
generator, and the product of strategies” (Jessop, 1989: 3). Positioned within, “a complex 
dialectic of structures and strategies” (Jessop, 1990: 129), the state and the institutions 
which comprise it are strategically selective and, “more open to some types of political 
strategy than others” (Hay, 2005: 75; Jessop, 2005). It represents an, “uneven playing field 
whose complex contours favour certain strategies (and hence certain actors) over others” 
(Hay, 2005: 75; McAnulla, 2002: 280), under which there is no guarantee that the state will 
operate in the interest of capital (Hay, 2005: 76).  
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Actors’ strategies collide, affecting the structured terrain of the strategic context upon 
which they have been deployed and transforming (both intentionally and unintentionally) 
the context where future strategies are developed and deployed (Hay, 2002b; McAnulla, 
2002). “The state evolves through a series of political and social crises as the pre-existing 
mode of intervention of the state within civil society and the economy proves increasingly 
dysfunctional” (Hay, 2005: 76). The outcomes of these crises cannot be predicted and the 
SRA sees them as conditional on the balance of forces, the nature of the problem, and 
public perceptions of what the problem is (Hay, 2005: 76). 
Strategic actors (agency) 
The SRA sees actors as conscious, reflexive and strategic who act intentionally towards their 
preferences but also intuitively and/or out of habit with the ability to explicitly state their 
motivations and intentions. Actors’ intentions and preferences are neither fixed nor 
determined by the material circumstances in which they find themselves; different actors in 
similar material circumstances may construct their preferences and intentions differently 
(Hay, 2002a). By monitoring the effects of their actions, actors will review and modify their 
intentions and preferences accordingly in both the long and short term and have the ability 
to formulate strategies to overcome problems created for them by strategically selective 
contexts (Hay, 1995; 2002a; McAnulla, 2002). Likewise, actors will continuously review, 
revise and reform their interests and preferences over time as a result of changes in 
material circumstances and ideological influences (Hay, 2002a). 
The capacity to overcome any strategic disadvantage they face assumes a relationship 
between the actor and the context in which they reside. By acting strategically, actors are 
predicting the likely outcome of their actions and are therefore constantly judging the 
contours of the terrain in which they operate (the strategic context) (Hay, 2002a). Through 
this understanding, actors formulate strategies that provide them with a higher chance of 
overcoming the hurdles created by strategically selective contexts (McAnulla, 2002). The 
ability that agents have to alter the structural circumstances in which they find themselves 
is through a process of what the SRA terms strategic learning, “agents are reflexive, capable 
of reformulating within limits of their own identities and interests, and able to engage in 
strategic calculation about their current situation” (Hay, 1996: 124).  
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Explaining Policy Change 
Whereas Giddens views structure and agency as flipsides of the same coin, the SRA sees 
them as distinct phenomena; structure and agency are, “in practice completely interwoven 
(we cannot see either metal in the alloy only in the product of their fusion)” (Hay, 1995: 
200), they only exist through their relational interaction. The properties of the coin (society) 
derive not solely from the sum of its component metals (structure and agency) but also 
from the complex chemical reactions that occur between them (Hay, 1995; 2002a: 127). 
Logically following one another, the SRA believes that it is not possible to understand 
structure (strategically selective contexts) and agency (strategic actors) in isolation (Hay, 
1995; 2002a; 2005: 75). 
The SRA sees all social and political change as the result of conflict between actors upon a 
terrain that favours certain actions (and hence certain actors) over others (Hay, 2002b; 
2005; McAnulla, 2002). Strategies collide, impinging on the structured terrain of the 
strategic context within which they are formulated, “their effects (however unintentional, 
however unanticipated) are to transform (however partially) the future context within 
which future strategies are formulated and deployed” (Hay, 2005: 75). Emphasis is on 
hegemonic domination and struggle with the outcomes of past struggles shaping the 
political terrain upon which present struggles are conducted (Taylor, 1995: 251). Figure 3.6 
illustrates the process. 
 
 
Figure 3.6 Structure, Strategy and Agency in the Strategic-Relational Approach 
Source: Hay (2002a: 131) 
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Actors operate strategically, pre-judging the impact of their actions. By emphasising the 
strategic context of action, the SRA acknowledges, “that agents both internalise 
perceptions of their context and consciously orientate themselves towards that context in 
choosing between potential courses of action” (Hay, 2002a: 129). However, for action to 
have any chance of being successful it must be informed by a strategic assessment of the 
context in which action occurs and upon which strategy impinges (Hay, 2002a: 129). 
Strategic action has two results: direct effects that transform the structured context where 
action takes place and strategic learning, which enhances actors’ knowledge of structures 
(Hay, 1996; Jessop, 1990).  
In applying the SRA, the strategic selectivity of every institution needs to be assessed 
separately (Heigl, 2011: 84). As Hay and Richards (2000: 14) highlight, there is a need, “to 
understand what are the determining factors behind an individual or organisational 
selection of one particular option over another”. By understanding strategic activity, the 
often disguised meanings that operate around these activities and the rationalities that 
underscore them, business politics can be explored and policy change explained (Hay and 
Jessop, 1995).  
Applications of the SRA 
While the SRA is gaining increasing attention, compared to the ACF it has had very limited 
use in guiding empirical work particularly by its author, “Jessop is notoriously hesitant when 
it comes to using his theoretical propositions in empirical research” (Uitermark, 2005: 141) 
to the point where there is a large discrepancy between the formal methods the SRA 
proposes, and Jessop’s actual analysis (Uitermark, 2005: 141). However, there are notable 
empirical examples by other scholars, as well as those engaging with it on a theoretical 
level. 
Empirically, it is yet to be applied in the UK, but has been subject to testing in Europe (Theil, 
2010), Africa (Chettiparamb, 2007) and South America (Heigl, 2010; 2011; Ioris, 2011). Theil 
(2010) applied the SRA to explore the ways in which a changing political landscape shaped 
actor’s strategies regarding the implementation path of the Odelouca Dam in Portugal, 
finding that the SRA’s focus on the interplay of structure, strategy and agency provided the 
most useful way to ascertain how ecological modernisation informed the actors strategies 
(Theil, 2010: 497). Chettiparamb (2007) employed the SRA in a study of land mobilisation 
for road widening in Kochi, India. She found that paying attention to the structures of 
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participation processes at difference scales was a way to manage conflicting interests 
among multi-organisational partnerships. Heigl applied the SRA in examining Mexico’s 
transformation into an internationalised competition state (2010) and in investigating the 
privatisation of the Mexican oil sector (2011). Expanding the SRA to urban political ecology, 
Ioris (2011) used it to examine water management problems in Rio De Janeiro, Brazil. 
Methodologically, these applications have predominantly used a combination of 
documentary analysis and interviews, with one example where participant observation was 
used (Ioris, 2011). 
Theoretically, Goodin et al. (2005; 2006) and Jones et al. (2005) have employed the SRA to 
discuss governance and devolution in the UK. Utilising it in similar way, Lagendijk (2007) 
adopted the approach to explore the significance of the region in economic, political, social 
and spatial processes. Valler and Wood (2004) have used it to analyse the response of 
business interests to the UK’s devolved and regionalised governance context, while 
Uitermark (2005) has used it to assist in the development of an analytical framework to 
analyse the genesis and evolution of institutions involved in the initiation of urban policy in 
the Netherlands. In a multi-theoretical approach, James (2009) combines policy-network 
analysis (PNA) with the SRA to analyse changes to the European Union policymaking 
process within the UK core executive introduced under Tony Blair, employing the SRA’s key 
assumptions to evaluate and explain the impact of adaptation, with PNA employed as an 
organising framework. James’ study confirmed a number of the SRA’s key assumptions, 
notably that the strategically selective nature of contexts favour certain strategies over 
others, and the important role of strategic learning (2009: 218-219). 
Critical reactions and refinements 
Critiques of the SRA have come from those who have engaged with it theoretically and 
empirically, and more broadly from Marxist commentators. In his review of Marxist political 
theory, Barrow (1993) believes that Jessop’s ideas are far from being original and are really 
just a regurgitation of some of the basic ideas from Poulantzas’ work on structuralism, 
“albeit without the functionalist verbiage” (Barrow, 1993: 154). He comments that it is 
difficult to regard Jessop’s work as having any synthetic power and that he makes claims 
that contradict one another (Barrow, 1993). While critical of structuralism, the SRA has, in 
part, developed as a critique of it and is a natural heir to, and step forward from, 
structuralist accounts like that of Poulantzas (Taylor, 1995: 261; Valler and Wood, 2004: 
1835). Jessop maintains that the improvement the SRA makes on structuralism is that 
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structure is seen as a strategic accomplishment; the SRA analytically embeds the 
differences in the opportunities created by structures (Jessop, 2001). Jessop views 
structuration theory as conceptualising actors as relatively free and unconstrained, which 
fails to recognise their different capabilities and specificities. The SRA conceives actors as 
embedded within structures that are differentiated and specific, while at the same time 
giving them agency (Chettiparamb, 2007: 415).  
Valler and Wood (2004: 1852) see a strength of the SRA in its ability to directly engage with 
the realities and complexities of political strategy and in providing important insights into 
the process of policy change. Allowing for a deeper understanding of strategic activity, it 
pays close attention to questions surrounding the perceptions of businesses, personality 
and political manoeuvring in the analysis of business politics. Theil (2010) agrees, describing 
it as a progressive theory that reflects a changing political landscape by recognising that 
structural circumstances change and that actors modify both their intentions and strategies 
to achieve their objectives.  
Valler and Wood (2004: 1837) commend the SRA’s units of analysis, which they believe are 
less about abstract theorising and more concerned with identifying the immediate concerns 
of structural constraints, strategic actions and learning. For example, rather than seeing the 
representations of business interests as an expression of the structural characteristics of 
capitalist society, or solely reducing it to the rational calculation of individual agents, “the 
SRA examines the interaction of a strategically selective that privileges certain forms of 
interests and activities and strategic actors who continually examine the options open to 
them in pursuing their various interests” (Valler and Wood, 2004: 1837). Interestingly, as 
Uitermark (2005: 141) highlights, on the rare occasions where Jessop has applied the SRA, 
he pays little attention to the strategies of individual actors.  
The SRA’s conception of the state has received praise from scholars. In not giving it any 
form of innate power, the state’s power is determined by the balance of forces that exist 
within society at any one time (Taylor, 1995: 261), operating as a, “dynamic institution that 
offers unequal opportunities to different social groups to achieve their specific political 
purposes” (Ioris, 2011: 7). However, as pointed out by Heigl (2011: 84), there is no concept 
within the SRA to describe and assess the internal dynamics of the state resulting from the 
interaction of different political institutions of varying historical importance. 
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Chettiparamb (2007: 414) and Uitermark (2005: 141) criticise Jessop for failing to fully 
explore the scalar implications of the SRA, notably the nature of the relationships between 
actors operating at different scales. Uitermark (2005: 141) highlights that this becomes 
particularly problematic when you assume, as Jessop does, that all institutions and 
behaviours have mutually determining relationships, “the challenge is to combine such an 
ontological claim with an approach that does not provided tautological explanations”. As 
Jessop himself notes (Jessop et al., 2002), in studying the state, a more systematic 
treatment of spatial dynamics is needed, as well as, Ioris (2011) argues, the relationship 
between nature and society. 
This temporal dimension is crucial, strategic selectivity exists only in the context of specific 
horizons of actions of different actors (Heigl, 2011: 84). In employing the SRA, there is a 
need to understand current debates in the context of past ones (Valler and Wood, 2004: 
1842). Adopting the approach implies sensitivity to history, as strategies are both path 
dependent and path shaping (Lagendijk, 2007: 196; Valler and Wood, 2004: 1838). The 
temporal dimension of the SRA signals a further step on from structuralism. Whereas 
Giddens’ theory of structuration resolves the structure-agency debate over time, Jessop 
resolves the structure-agency within time (Chettiparamb, 2007: 415, emphasis in original). 
Structuration theory temporarily blots out the influence of structure when actors do or do 
not act. For Jessop however, the temporal and spatial are not separate; the choice of time 
scale will in part dictate the spatial scale at which governance is organised (Chettiparamb, 
2007: 415). 
Uitermark (2005: 141) critiques the SRA’s conceptualisation of strategies. He believes that it 
is unclear where strategies originate (Uitermark 2005: 141). Jessop’s view is that actors 
operate upon one another and the selectivities that confront them. However, Uitermark 
(2005: 142) believes that actors do not operate solely upon other identifiable actors and 
selectivities but also entities such as neighbourhood populations that are not considered 
actors or selectivities per se. In emphasising the relationship of state actors to their 
institutional and organisational context, Jessop ignores the way that categories and entities 
of government are constructed and the relationship of state actors to the entities they are 
supposed to govern. 
Uitermark (2005: 142) believes that that the actions of state actors should be explained as 
the result of the creative and generative responses of actors to the institutional context in 
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which they operate and the inherently troublesome relationship to the entities they 
govern. Through what he believes is a tendency to ignore the places where power makes 
itself felt and the body and institutional setting that surrounds it, the SRA fails to explore 
the microphysics of power (Uitermark 2005: 142). Heigl (2011: 93) agrees, commenting that 
there is a limitation to the SRA’s conceptualisation of the structure-agency relationship. 
With a tendency to focus excessively on structure-oriented actor strategies, she concludes 
that it ignores the extra-institutional strategies that may also affect the result of specific 
struggles and that play a role in framing the conflict. 
To conclude, empirically underdeveloped and in need of further theoretical testing, the SRA 
is a sophisticated Marxist conception of policy change with the unrealised and untested 
potential to offer a great deal (Hay, 2005; Valler and Wood, 2004). Both Bob Jessop and 
Colin Hay are leading figures in political science, which in itself is a good reason to engage 
with the SRA and to contribute to its development.  
Conclusions  
This chapter has provided an in-depth examination of the two theories this thesis employs 
to explore whether the aviation industry has occupied a privileged position in the 
policymaking process regarding the environmental impact of its development. While there 
is no single ‘theory of policy’, the ACF and SRA attempt to consolidate existing perspectives 
(pluralism and Marxism). Sabatier began with a desire to find an alternative to the stages-
based model that dominated political studies, synthesising the best features of top-down 
and bottom-up approaches and giving technical information a more prominent role, 
whereas the SRA is a sophisticated Marxist conception of the state building on structuralist 
accounts of the policy process, notably that of Poulantzas. Table 3.1 provides a summary of 
their main points. 
Since its unveiling in 1988, the ACF has developed into one of the most significant public 
policy theories of recent decades (John, 2003; Parsons, 1995; Schlager, 1995; Schlager and 
Blomquist, 1996). Its assumptions are abundantly clear; the primary unit of analysis is the 
policy subsystem; a long-term perspective is required; actors are grouped by their beliefs 
into coalitions and policy designs are seen as the translation of beliefs (Sabatier, 1988). 
With completely different origins, the SRA emerged in the 1990s through a desire to 
transcend the artificial dualism between agency and structure within Marxist theory. The 
SRA goes a step further than previous efforts (e.g. Althusser and Balibar, 1970; Archer, 
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1996; Giddens, 1979) by attempting to understand how agency and structure interact and 
transform one another through the analysis of strategic actors operating in strategically 
selective contexts (those which privilege certain strategies, and hence actors, over others) 
(Hay, 2002a; b; 2005; McAnulla, 2002).  
In the ACF, policy change is the result of a shift in the balances of forces within a policy 
subsystem, that is to say, a change in the dominant coalition, maintaining that there are 
two drivers for policy change: policy-oriented learning and external events. It emphasises 
the important role of information in the process as actors ‘learn’ and use information more 
constructively in their quest to dictate policy. External events have the ability to shift 
agendas, create media and public attention, redistribute resources and capture the 
attention of key decision-makers. Recent revisions of the framework have seen internal 
events and negotiated agreements added as possible routes to policy change.  
The SRA views policy change as the result of conflict between actors who are strategic upon 
a terrain that favours certain actions (and hence certain actors over others). Actors’ 
strategies collide, changing the strategic context upon which future strategic action takes 
place and facilitating strategic learning. This process of learning enhances actors’ 
knowledge of structures, providing them with the information to change structural 
circumstances and to alter their strategies accordingly.  
Whereas the ACF fails to explicitly acknowledge the state (due to its pluralist roots), viewing 
it in the same way as any other group involved in the policymaking process, it plays a 
prominent role in the SRA; seen as a dynamic entity whose form is the result of past battles, 
reflecting the balance of power at the time. Both consider actors as reflexive, who will 
continuously review, revise and reform their preferences over time as a result of changes in 
material circumstances and ideological influences (termed policy-oriented learning in the 
ACF, strategic learning in the SRA). 
The ACF has been subjected to extensive empirical and theoretical testing in an increasing 
number of policy areas and geographical domains, and through this has been subjected to a 
series of revisions (Sabatier, 1999; 2007b; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993). Whether this 
has enhanced the theory is open to debate, with criticisms that it has, or will lead to, the 
ACF sacrificing its explanatory value in its quest to explain every aspect of the policy process 
(albeit from what its pluralist roots inhibit it from i.e. structure). By contrast, the SRA 
remains empirically and theoretically in its infancy. 
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Agency-centred approaches such as the ACF arguably underplay the relationship between 
state strategies and agency, focusing on internal decision-making and the preferences of 
individual actors. The ACF’s commitment to its pluralist roots makes it unable to explore 
and explain some political phenomena, for example, the structural constraints that may 
inhibit coalitions from forming and seeking influence (Smith, 2000). Sabatier pointedly fails 
to acknowledge the existence of Marxist theories in his review of the field (Sabatier, 1999; 
2007b). On the other hand, a more structure-centred approach like the SRA can make it 
difficult to explain the specific responses of individual actors and to understand why they 
become involved in political action (Valler and Wood, 2004: 1851). However, while they are 
inherently different theories there are pluralist elements in the SRA, notably its interest in 
the policy network and institutional pluralism literature (Hay 1995; Marsh 1995).  
Empirically, through their application to the two case studies, this thesis will use these two 
contrasting explanations of policy change to guide the analysis and help understand and 
explain the pattern of power shown. Theoretically, it will initiate a worthwhile dialogue 
between the two and contribute to their development. Chapters Four and Six explore the 
two empirical case studies while Five and Seven apply the ACF and SRA to these cases to 
help understand the series of complex interactions and relationships detailed and to assist 
in explaining to what extent, and why, the aviation industry occupied a privileged position 
in the environmental policymaking process. Chapter Eight brings the main findings of Five 
and Seven together, comparing and contrasting their ability to explain policy change and 
initiating a valuable theoretical dialogue between the two. 
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 Advocacy Coalition Framework Strategic-Relational Approach 
Origins Stems from American pluralist 
literature. 
Desire to synthesise the best features 
of top-down and bottom-up 
approaches to policy implementation 
and to give technical information a 
more prominent role. 
Agency-centred. 
Sophisticated Marxist conception of the 
state. 
Attempts to transcend the artificial dualism 
between structure and agency.  
Structure-centred. 
Unit of 
analysis 
Policy subsystem comprising actors in 
advocacy coalitions united by their 
policy beliefs. 
Critical importance of ideas and the 
central role of scientific and technical 
information. 
Structure and agency (though the 
distinction is deemed purely analytical). 
Strategic actors operating in strategically 
selective contexts (i.e. those that privilege 
certain strategies and hence certain actors 
over others). 
Explaining 
policy change 
Policy change results from a shift in 
the dominant coalition.  
Policy oriented learning, external and 
internal perturbations and negotiated 
agreements all have the capacity to 
realign beliefs and create change. 
Beliefs the causal driver for political 
behaviour. 
All social and political change is seen as the 
result of strategic interactions taking place 
in a strategically-selective pre-existing 
context. Strategies collide with one another 
changing the structured terrain. 
Strategic action results in direct effects 
which alter the structured terrain and 
strategic learning which provides actors’ 
with the information they need to change 
structural circumstances. 
Applications Vastly applied by authors, their 
students, and others. Increasing 
number of policy areas and 
geographical locations.  
Limited empirical and theoretical testing. 
 
Figure 3.7 Summary of the Advocacy Coalition Framework and Strategic-Relational Approach 
Source: author’s own 
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The Search for a third London Airport 
 
“Behind the proposal to enlarge Stansted as London’s third airport there lies a long and 
extraordinary story of committees and commissions, recommendations made and rejected 
and made again, rows and ructions and furious reactions, resistance movements and 
demonstrations” (Buchanan, 1981: 23) 
 
Taking over thirty years to arrive, the decision to develop Stansted as London’s third airport 
finally came in the 1985 White Paper with the airport officially opening in 1991. Initially 
marked for development in the 1950s, the search for a site for the third London airport 
involved two inter-departmental committees, two public inquiries and a thorough cost-
benefit analysis by an independent commission. A fluid cast, an array of national and local 
level actors entered, left and re-entered the policymaking process as the site for a third 
London airport continually changed and the environmental movement emerged. 
This chapter combines extensive archive analysis from documents held at the Essex Records 
Office, Chelmsford and The National Archives, Kew with a series of elite interviews and a 
review of the existing literature to construct an empirical timeline of the events that led to 
Stansted’s eventual development as the third London airport (Figure 4.1 provides a timeline 
of these events). The chapter begins by identifying the key actors involved in this area of 
policymaking, followed by a chronological discussion of events that took place leading to 
Stansted’s approval. The chapter concludes by summarising who got what, where and how, 
and identifying the case study’s key themes. Chapter Five then applies the Advocacy 
Coalition Framework and the Strategic-Relational Approach to help explain how, and why, 
policy changed. 
  
Chapter Four 
89 
 
1953 White Paper London’s Airports proposes the rationalisation of 
London’s airport system. 
   
    
    
    
1960 House of Commons Estimates Committee demands immediate 
investigation into the possible development of Stansted as the third 
London airport. Hole Committee appointed. 
1960  
Hole 
Committee 
   
   
    
1964 Newly elected Labour Government promise to stand by Conservative 
promise to hold a public inquiry into Stansted. 
  
Chelmsford 
Inquiry 1965 BAA created, takes responsibility for Heathrow, Gatwick and 
Stansted. 
  
1966 Inquiry finds Stansted case unproven and recommends evaluation of 
alternatives. Government appoint Peterson Committee to review situation. 
  Peterson 
Committee 
1967 Findings of the Peterson Committee published in the White Paper The 
Third London Airport, Stansted advanced as third London airport. 
Publication of Inquiry report. 
   
   
Roskill 
Commission 
   
 1970  
1971 Roskill Commission recommends Cublington. 
1971 Government reject Cublington, announce Maplin. Labour (in 
opposition) makes it clear they oppose Maplin. 
   
    
    
1974 Labour announce review of Maplin and subsequently cancel the 
project. 
   
    
    
    
1978 White Paper Airports Policy focuses on development of a national 
aviation strategy. Commits to developing capacity in the London airport 
system, rules out expansion at all London airports bar Stansted. 
   
1979 BAA invited to bring forward proposals for the development of 
Stansted. 
   
 1980   
   
Eyre Inquiry    
   
1984 Eyre recommends the development of Stansted up to 15mppa with 
possible expansion up to 25mppa. 
   
1985 Government approves Stansted as third London airport.    
    
    
    
    
 1990   
1991 Stansted officially opens.    
 
Figure 4.1 Timeline of events leading to the designation of Stansted as the third London airport 
Adapted from: BAA (2008); Bailey (2007); Buchanan (1985); Feldman (1985); Hall (1980); and McKie (1973) 
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Key actors 
All with different motivations and policy goals, the search for a third London airport 
involved a huge array of actors, including airport operators, government departments, 
environmental NGOs, technical experts, inquiry inspectors, legal teams, local residents and 
the community groups they were involved in, regional airports, parish councils and airlines. 
Throughout the whole affair, the Government via some means owned Stansted, whether 
directly through the Ministry of Aviation or indirectly through the British Airports Authority 
(BAA).20 This saw the state move away from a direct, hands-on approach in all aspects of 
airport operations to one where its role was to develop national policy and guide its 
implementation. BAA became responsible for four airports, one of which was Stansted. An 
arm of government, it occupied a quango like status, benefiting from the protectionist 
mentality discussed in Chapter Two but able to push forward its own agenda, only 
becoming privatised in 1986 after Stansted’s approval.  
Airlines in the UK, though hardly noticeable in this case study, were also experiencing a 
similar shift, moving away from protected flagship carriers to privatised operations about to 
experience the effects of a liberalised air market. Regional airport operators were also 
involved, particularly during the 1980s, who wanted to see airport expansion in their 
regions, not the South East. 
Aside from BAA, the Government’s presence was felt by the various governmental 
departments involved in the case at different times dependent on where the responsibility 
for civil aviation lie: the Ministry of Civil Aviation, the Ministry of Aviation, the Ministry of 
Civil Aviation and Transport, the Board of Trade and the Department of Transport. Other 
departments, such as the Ministry of Housing and Local Government, also became involved 
if policy decisions would have an impact on their jurisdiction. 
The role of the state at the local level was quite different. Local authorities and MPs 
became involved when the site for a third London airport affected their constituency, with 
them often siding with local public opinion. In the case of Stansted, this fell to Hertfordshire 
County Council, Essex County Council, Uttlesford District Council and East Hertfordshire 
                                                             
20 Detailed in Chapter Two, the British Airports Authority was established under the 1965 UK Airports Authority 
Act. 
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District Council, all of who opposed the development at each inquiry/review and who often 
worked together.  
Environmental concerns at the early stage of this case study (circa 1950s/60s) were of a 
local nature and were concerned with the impact of airport development on noise, local air 
pollution, blight and surface access. When the search for a third London airport reached a 
climax in the early 1980s, the global environmental impact of aviation was creeping into 
and up, environmental and political agendas. Fuelled by an increasing number of active 
local and national environmental organisations, there was increasing awareness of the 
negative impacts of an ever-expanding industry and the acceptability of this. The 
characteristics of the groups that represented ‘the environment’ during the case study 
reflected these changes, with little input from national level environmental NGOs (with the 
Campaign to Protect Rural England (CPRE) and the National Trust notable exceptions). The 
local community groups at specific sites mounted the opposition on environmental 
grounds: North West Essex and East Hertfordshire Preservation Association (NWEEHPA) at 
Stansted, Wing Area Resistance Association (WARA) at Cublington and Defenders of Essex 
at Maplin.  
Events that led to the development of Stansted 
Initially developed by the United States Air Force in 1942, Stansted airport was used as a 
wartime airfield and military base until 1946 (Blake, 1966; Eyre, 1984b: 74; Hall, 1980: 17). 
In 1949, the Ministry of Civil Aviation bought it to develop as London’s second airport 
however, due to its prime location for infiltrating the continent, it become immersed in 
developing American air capacity following the onset of the Cold War. Control reverted to 
the United States Air Force who constructed a runway at the airport in 1952 (Sanders and 
Mead, 2007: 1).  
The 1953 White Paper London’s Airports (Cmd. 8902) proposed the rationalisation of 
London’s airport system to cope with the predicted increase in demand for air travel 
(Ministry of Civil Aviation, 1953). Heathrow was deemed the UK’s hub airport with Gatwick 
(unofficially) London’s second airport. Stansted would be held in reserve if and when 
Gatwick reached saturation (Eyre, 1984b: 74; Ministry of Civil Aviation, 1953). A public 
inquiry the following year confirmed Gatwick as the second London airport with the third 
yet to be determined (Feldman, 1985: 60). Becoming a Royal Air Force maintenance unit 
and licensed as a civil aerodrome, the United States Air Force maintained an interest in 
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Stansted until 1958 after which the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation took control 
(Blake, 1966; Higham, 1995: 25; McKie, 1973: 64). 
The Hole Committee (1960-1963) 
Since the 1950s, a third London airport was considered crucial for the UK’s trade and 
economic well-being, demands that were accentuated during the 1960s when the UK was 
facing increasing criticism over its economic development (Feldman, 1985: 51). In response, 
in 1960 the Estimates Committee of the House of Commons called for an immediate 
investigation into the possible development of Stansted as the third London airport (Eyre, 
1984b: 74; Feldman, 1985: 61). An inter-departmental committee (the Hole Committee) 
was appointed to consider the requirements for a third London airport but not to consider 
the need for an airport, this was assumed (Eyre, 1984b: 74).  
Chaired by George Hole, the Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Aviation (Aerodromes 
(General) Division and who would later become Chief Executive of BAA), the inter-
departmental committee was dominated by representatives from the airline industry and 
members of government departments committed to the development of civil aviation 
(Kirby, 1982: 104; Wraith, 1966: 269). The composition of the Hole Committee reflected the 
marginal consideration the Government gave to issues of national and regional planning, 
agriculture and amenity (including noise). It contained a sole representative from the 
Ministry of Housing and Local Government who, at the time, were responsible for land-use 
planning (Buchanan, 1981: 31; Eyre, 1984b: 157; Feldman, 1985: 61; Hall, 1980: 21; Ministry 
of Aviation, 1963; Wraith, 1966: 269).  
The Hole Committee presented their report in June 1963 (CAP 199) (Ministry of Aviation, 
1963; Wraith, 1966: 269). They concluded that by 1972 both Heathrow and Gatwick would 
be unable to handle all of London’s air traffic. A new airport needed to be in operation by 
1973 with the committee unanimously recommending that the site should be Stansted, 
views presented as those of the Ministry of Aviation (Blake, 1966; Eyre, 1984b: 75; Ministry 
of Aviation, 1963: ix; xi).  
They concluded that by 1980 a third London airport would require two runways to cope 
with demand but problems with air traffic control meant that any airport this size within a 
reasonable travel distance of London (which they deemed fifty miles) would be unable to 
operate planes in all directions. They also felt it would be impossible to site the airport to 
the south or north west of London (interestingly, where the Roskill Commission 
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subsequently chose in 1971). The committee advised that although Stansted was not 
perfect it, “seemed the only possible site” (Hall, 1980: 24; Ministry of Aviation, 1963).  
Stansted complied with requirements for air traffic control; was an operational airport with 
a 10,000-foot runway; had the space for the laying of parallel runways; the noise problem 
could be minimised; it was within reasonable distance of London; and with the completion 
of the M11, it would have good surface access. It would interfere with military flying in East 
Anglia and would destroy a lot of quality agricultural land, but the Hole Committee believed 
that the advantages outweighed the disadvantages. Unsurprisingly, local protest at 
Stansted followed (Buchanan, 1981: 31; Hall, 1980: 24). 
With the defeat of the Conservatives in 1964 (who appointed the Hole Committee) the 
newly elected Labour Government was left to stand by its predecessors’ promise to hold a 
public inquiry into the development of Stansted, reiterating the Conservatives promise that 
the airport question was still wide open (Eyre, 1984b: 77; McKie, 1973: 79; 86). A 
concession by Government, this was forced by political pressure as development within 
existing airport limits (which was being proposed) did not require a statutory inquiry 
(Buchanan, 1981: 32; Hall, 1980: 25). 
On 11 October 1965 Richard Crossman, Minister of Housing and Local Government, 
announced that there would be a public inquiry into the development of Stansted. He 
reiterated that questioning the need for a third airport for London was not up for debate; 
the purpose of the inquiry was to look at the suitability of Stansted as a site with objectors 
free to suggest alternatives if they wanted, which they did (McKie, 1973: 89). 
The Chelmsford Inquiry (1965-1966) 
The public inquiry sat in Chelmsford from 8 December 1965 until 11 February 1966 (Wraith, 
1966: 265). The inspector, G. D. Blake, eventually concluded that an airport at Stansted 
should only be developed if it was deemed a national necessity (Blake, 1966). Not drawn 
from the Government’s regular team, Blake was a senior partner in a Kensington estate 
agent and described as an, “unmistakeably independent figure” (Buchanan, 1981: 33; 
McKie, 1973: 87; Wraith, 1966: 280). He was assisted by a technical assessor, J. W. S. 
Brancker, a former official of the International Air Transport Association who had worked 
with airlines in both the UK and US (Buchanan, 1981: 33).  
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Objections came from local authorities proximate to the site (Hertfordshire and Essex 
County Councils), other local authorities with operating airports, the Farmers’ Union and 
NWEEHPA (Wraith, 1966: 265). The main objection to the site at Stansted was that its 
proposal was based upon, and driven by, aviation interests. Objectors felt that the proposal 
inadequately considered issues of town and country planning, noise, agricultural impacts 
and changes to the rural character of the area (Blake, 1966; Eyre, 1984b: 78; McKie, 1973: 
88; Wraith, 1966). Via the publication of the Wilson Report, noise became quantifiable and 
for the first time noise contours were drawn. However, proponents and opponents drew 
different contours. The proponents contradicted themselves, stating that the rural location 
of Stansted was a positive as it meant a minimal number of people would be affected by 
noise but also emphasising that it would create a new town of up to 10,000 inhabitants – 
increasing the number of people affected by noise (Wraith, 1966: 274). 
NWEEHPA co-ordinated and represented various local groups at the inquiry, providing a 
unified front for the local resistance. They recruited over 13,000 members and raised 
£25,000 in time for the inquiry. This meant they had enough funds to secure eminent 
solicitors, a QC, expert witnesses and a full-time organiser (Eyre, 1984b: 78; Hall, 1980: 25; 
McKie, 1973: 81; Wraith, 1966: 270). Importantly, they managed to gain national press 
support (though not local) which as Sue Forsyth, daughter of, at the time, NWEEHPA 
chairman John Lukies, recollects was quite unusual for a local protest group (Forsyth, 2010: 
00:10:14).  
Writing on 12 October 1964 (prior to the start of the inquiry), Roger Hawkey, Vice-Chairman 
of NWEEHPA, wrote to Roy Jenkins, Minister of Aviation, stating that NWEEHPA would 
strenuously oppose the development. He asked Jenkins to really consider whether there 
was a need for a third London airport, and if so whether Stansted was the most suitable 
site, NWEEHPA assumed that the terms of reference of the inquiry would be inclusive of 
questioning the need of the airport (Forsyth, 2010: 00:05:23; Hawkey, 1964). In their 
response, the Ministry of Aviation stated that the main purpose of the inquiry would be to 
consider the objections against Stansted not to discuss the need for a third London airport, 
this was once again assumed (Lovelock, 1964).  
Opposing the development, the CPRE also questioned why the need for a third London 
airport was being excluded from the debate (Dreschfield, 1965). They were informed by 
Richard Crossman, Minister of Housing and Local Government, that the issue of need was a 
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national one which could not be discussed at a local inquiry, an issue of policy to be decided 
by the Government with the views of people all over the country taken into account 
(Crossman, 1965).  
The terms of reference of the inquiry made it very clear that the need for a third London 
airport was not to be questioned (Wraith, 1966: 266). The UK Government had decided 
that relief for demand needed to be provided with a third airport in London, irrespective of 
any long-term national airport plan, taking into account the origin and destination of 
passengers and freight. Objectors were however free to suggest alternative sites (Wraith, 
1966: 267).  
Although all the local authorities opposed the development (at county and local levels) in 
his commentary of the debate A Sadly Mismanaged Affair: a Political History of the Third 
London Airport, David McKie (1973: 83) comments that the front put forward by them was 
not as monolithic as it may have appeared. Feeling that their case against the airport was 
not strong enough, in February 1965 Hertfordshire County Council agreed to accept the 
Stansted proposal if modifications were made to the runway plan. Despite her best efforts, 
Councillor of Sawbridgeworth, L. A. M. Lloyd-Taylor, was unable to convince the Council to 
oppose the development with them opting to delay making a decision on their position 
(McKie, 1973).  
In May 1965, Lloyd-Taylor encouraged her Council to follow that of Essex who voted 76-5 to 
oppose the proposal. Essex County Council had at first resigned itself to the development 
but later decided to appoint independent consultants to investigate the proposal. They 
recommended that a more conclusive study was required before firm conclusions could be 
drawn, calling for a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis to be carried out (Hall, 1980: 25).  
At the end of July 1965, Hertfordshire County Council had still not made a decision on their 
position. The planning committee stated that they could not oppose the development from 
a Local Planning Authority position, as it was not in their county. Six days before the inquiry 
was due to begin (November 1965) a unanimous decision to oppose the development was 
made (McKie, 1973: 83). The Labour-controlled local authority of Harlow were against the 
proposals from the beginning, however the local Trades Council emerged as a supporter 
(McKie, 1973: 85). 
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In Bishop Stortford, a town just three miles away from the proposed site and with a 
population of 21,000, there was indecision over what attitude the council should take 
towards the development. While there were those attracted by the proposals, many were 
concerned about the noise impact the airport would create. As late as November 1965 
there was still doubt, the Councillor who proposed the final decision stated that while he 
felt that the economic benefits outweighed the disadvantages, to present its view on noise 
and surface access with any credibility the only option was to make an objection (McKie, 
1973: 84). 
McKie (1973: 84) comments that even the village of Stansted was not entirely against the 
proposals. A parish meeting on 13 October 1965 voted 98-68 on a motion to reject the 
proposals. A resolution which called on the parish council to donate £100 to the Stansted 
Preservation Association, the local group for the Stansted parish (and affiliated to 
NWEEHPA), went through by just six votes. A parish poll took place to determine the 
parish’s position. Held on 29 October, just 29 percent of those eligible took part and the 
resolution to oppose the airport was subsequently carried 434-244 and the one approving 
the donation 351-288 (McKie, 1973: 84).  
In addition, the National Trust gave evidence at the inquiry, stating that the development 
would have very negative consequences on the tranquillity of 1,000 acres of open space 
and woodland owned by them (Hatfield Forest), a space enjoyed by thousands of people 
each year (The National Trust, 1968).  
In 1965 the Stansted Area Progress Association formed, chaired by Fred Browne, an engine 
fitter at the existing Stansted airport, it was comprised mainly of workers from the existing 
airport. They were the NWEEHPA’s counterpart, supporting the proposals. Quickly falling 
into conflict with NWEEHPA, they produced 927 letters from local residents and workers 
who did not oppose the airport (subject to certain reservations on compensation and the 
preservation of amenities) and submitted a petition to the inquiry (Blake, 1966). Played out 
in the local media, they accused NWEEHPA of being dominated by well-to-do people and 
that they reflected the views of a certain social group rather than the whole of the people 
they were meant to represent (McKie, 1973: 82).  
Reinforced at the national level, the media (primarily the BBC) depicted events in terms of a 
class struggle; affluent property owners versus airport workers, a depiction that McKie 
(1973: 82) notes was over-simplified and created objection from the opposition. The Labour 
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Government appeared to concur with the media, proclaiming that the opposition protests 
were of a middle-class origin leaving the voice of the less-articulate unheard (Travis, 1985b; 
Wraith, 1966: 271).  
Both the Government and BAA were surprised at the opposition’s level of professionalism. 
As well as arguing on technical grounds, they grounded their objections in human terms; 
the affect the development would have on quality of life as well as on the wider grounds of 
national planning. This approach was in stark contrast to the Government departments 
involved, who, as Blake emphasised in his report, were completely unprepared (Blake, 
1966; McKie, 1973: 90; Wraith, 1966: 278). The inquiry proved to be uncomfortable for the 
Government with officials shaky on critical and simple points such as whether Stansted 
really was within one hour’s travel time of London (Hall, 1980: 25; McKie, 1973: 91; Wraith, 
1966: 272).  
The inquiry finished in February 1966 and while Blake’s report was ready in June, its 
publication was delayed by 11 months (Feldman, 1985: 65; Hall, 1980: 25). It concluded 
that the case for Stansted’s development was solely proven on air traffic control grounds; 
there were strong arguments against it on a range of other criteria. In terms of planning, 
Stansted was not in the right location for this kind of urban development and traffic focus. 
In terms of access, the proposal was unacceptable to both passengers and airlines. To 
control noise, restrictions would have to be imposed that would severely affect the 
operational capacity of the airport. Noise and traffic would significantly change the 
character of the rural area and vast swathes of good agricultural land would need to be 
taken for the development (Blake, 1966: 2). Blake concluded that:  
“It would be a calamity for the neighbourhood if a major airport were placed at 
Stansted. Such a decision could only be justified by national necessity. Necessity 
was not proven by evidence at this inquiry” (Blake, 1966: 2, para. 12), 
recommending that, “a review of the whole problem should be undertaken by a 
committee equally interested in traffic in the air, traffic on the ground, regional 
planning and national planning” (Blake, 1966: 5).  
He suggested that an independent commission or another government review should study 
the problem afresh and did a short series of lectures to interested Government 
departments about how this should be tackled (Hall, 1980; McKie, 1973: 92). The 
Government initially made it clear that they would be extremely hesitant in overruling the 
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recommendations of Blake; however, this promise was subsequently broken (Sanders and 
Mead, 2007: 1; Wraith, 1966: 268). 
The tone and recommendations of Blake (and Brancker) left the Government with a 
problem; they were against an independent commission on the grounds of urgency and 
that they felt that the facts had been fully discussed (Hall, 1980: 26). An early assumption of 
the local opposition at the inquiry had been that Ministers had already made up their mind 
and the inquiry was little more than whitewashing (Wraith, 1966: 267). 
The Government appointed an inter-departmental committee chaired by Arthur Peterson, 
a Deputy Secretary at the Department of Economic Affairs, to conduct another review. 
However, this was not carried out in the way Blake and Brancker envisaged and would not 
involve anyone outside of Whitehall (Eyre, 1984b: 79; McKie, 1973: 94).  
The media did not take to this secrecy well, fuelling public antagonism. Writing on 2 
January 1967, Terence Bendixson, planning correspondent at The Guardian, wrote: 
“What seems less likely to see the light of day is the subsequent work of Whitehall 
officials. So long as this remains secret suspicion will linger that the officials were 
not given the right brief, did not ask the right questions, did not look far enough 
ahead and caved in under pressures from the defence departments. Whitehall’s 
acute nervousness about Stansted bears this out” (Bendixson, 1967). 
Peter Masefield, Chairman of the newly created BAA, and other BAA representatives had 
met with MPs and informed them that Heathrow was turning away traffic. In a letter to The 
Times on 28 April 1967, just before the publication of the White Paper, Masefield launched 
an attack on the alternative site at Sheppey, which the White Paper subsequently 
suggested was the best of the coastal sites (Masefield, 1967). On 12 June 1967, two weeks 
before the White Paper was due to be debated in the House of Commons, Masefield held a 
large press conference where the urgency of beginning the development of Stansted was 
once again emphasised (McKie, 1973: 112).  
On 24 June 1967, Norman Payne, BAA’s Director of Engineering, described the opposition 
to Stansted as, “emotional, ill-informed and exaggerated”, stating that having designed 
airports for 15 years he was confident that Stansted was the only viable site for a third 
London airport (McKie, 1973: 112). On 17 July, George Hole, Chairman of the first inter-
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departmental committee in 1960 and now BAA’s Chief Executive, commented that it would 
be, “practically impossible”, to find an alternative to Stansted (McKie, 1973: 113). 
The Government delayed the publication of Blake’s report until the Peterson Committee 
finished its review. The findings of the Peterson Committee formed the main content of the 
1967 White Paper, The Third London Airport (Cmnd. 3259) (Board of Trade, 1967), 
published at the same time as Blake’s report, “...his [Blake’s] report was not released until 
the Government were in a position to try and rebut it” (Keene, 2011: 00:14:07). A strategic 
move on the part of the Government, both reports were published on the eve of an annual 
holiday, when people were not about in Parliament to discuss it at any real length (McKie, 
1973: 95).  
The White Paper stated that a third London airport was a national necessity, emphasising 
the economic imperative of the development (Buchanan, 1981: 56; McKie, 1973: 85, 102). 
Peter Hall, town planner, urbanist and geographer who considered the Stansted debate in 
his book Great Planning Disasters, notes that it was with total predictability that the 
Stansted decision was being stuck with, due to the apparent urgency with which an airport 
was required (Hall, 1980: 26). The Peterson Committee had considered a series of other 
possible sites including the site at Foulness (which was already emerging as the favoured 
alternative site at the Chelmsford inquiry) but the objections to the alternatives were 
deemed more significant than those levelled at Stansted (Hall, 1980: 27; McKie, 1973: 111).  
Antagonising the opposition further, the White Paper was adamant that the opposition had 
been given a fair voice (McKie, 1973: 102). The Chelmsford inquiry had been framed around 
the development of an airport with two runways and the prospect of a third in the future. 
In addition, the White Paper envisaged two parallel sets of runways; the whole proposal 
had changed, changes to which the opposition had no opportunity to object to (McKie, 
1973: 103). 
By exerting government power over its recommendations, the White Paper gently 
demolished the points raise by Blake and Brancker. However, it did nothing to extinguish 
the ever growing feeling of suspicion and distrust around the Stansted case, a result of 
inadequate inquiries, the hiding of Blake’s report, and announcing the decision on the eve 
of a holiday (Eyre, 1984b: 79; McKie, 1973: 99). The media also suspected that those who 
had been in support of Stansted at the Chelmsford inquiry had been the same people who 
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comprised the Peterson Committee (Hall, 1980: 27). With the Committee’s composition 
never published this suspicion continued to manifest itself.  
In response to this criticism, the Government argued that a public inquiry would have just 
stimulated discussion over the same material. This implied that the Government had 
nothing to add to the evidence presented at the Chelmsford inquiry, an evidence base that 
Blake and Brancker considered inadequate (McKie, 1973: 96). The Government proclaimed 
that they were better placed to consider the information and that they knew best (McKie, 
1973: 97).  
In public, Lord Beswick, Chief Whip, staunchly defended the decision to keep the 
committee composition a secret, however in personal correspondence with Anthony 
Crosland, President of the Board of Trade, and Anthony Greenwood, Minister for Housing 
and Local Government, it appears this was done out of party loyalty. In a letter from 
Beswick to Crosland and Greenwood on 12 December 1967, Beswick asks whether there 
was any reason why the composition of the Peterson Committee could not be released 
stating that, “the rather unforthcoming attitude about disclosure of other facts has been a 
contributory factor in the lack of public support for the Stansted scheme” (Lord Beswick, 
1967).  
On 12 May 1967 Douglas Jay, President of the Board of Trade, announced that the 
Government’s decision was to develop Stansted as London’s third airport. He stated that 
the advice of Blake had been taken on board and a comprehensive re-examination of the 
issue been carried out (Jay, 1967). The Board of Trade advised BAA to go ahead with a plan 
for development (which would require planning permission in the normal manner). They 
would be granted this permission under a Special Development Order under the Town and 
Country Planning Act of 1962 with the only hurdle getting it through Parliament (Buchanan, 
1981: 35; Hall, 1980: 27). 
The decision created a wave of protest. As a response, just five days after the publication of 
the White Paper the Stansted Working Party formed. With no political affiliation, it was 
composed of local MP’s, amenity groups, the National Farmers’ Union, NWEEHPA and the 
Essex branch of the Landowners Association. The group claimed that the review under the 
Peterson Committee was unfair, unsatisfactory and nearly unconstitutional, fiercely 
objecting to the way that Blake’s recommendation had been dismissed and demanding 
another inquiry (Buchanan, 1981: 37; Hall, 1980: 27). 
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Providing the stimulus for a passionate debate in the Commons on 29 June 1967, the 
Stansted Working Party published The Case for Reappraisal (Stansted Working Party, 1967). 
The main analysis came from the Essex Deputy Clerk and his officers, who highlighted an 
important constitutional issue; had the Chelmsford inquiry been set under the normal rules 
for planning inquiries, following changes to the proposed development (the parallel 
runways) and the introduction of new facts, it would now be reopened (Hall, 1980: 27).  
With the opposition gaining momentum, other groups were voicing their objection to 
Stansted. The Town and Country Planning Association stated their opposition, as well as the 
South East Economic Planning Council who the Government had notably failed to consult 
regarding the Stansted decision (McKie, 1973: 107).21 The national press continued to 
condemn the decision and the process it was reached by (Buchanan, 1981: 36). 
The Government held firm on its position, but further evidence appeared which was 
difficult to ignore. An unexpected objector joined the campaign. On 29 July 1967, J. W. 
Brancker, the technical assessor at the Chelmsford inquiry, wrote to The Times stating his 
objections to what the Government were doing. NWEEHPA knew how important public 
opinion, at both the local and national levels, was so they raised enough money to fly 
Brancker back from Canada, commissioning him to write a full account challenging the 1967 
White Paper on technical and constitutional grounds and stating his objections (Brancker, 
1967a; Forsyth, 2010: 00:44:54; Hall, 1980: 28; McKie, 1973: 105). The Stansted Black Book 
was formally published by the Stansted Working Party and described as one of,“the most 
formidable”, documents in the whole debate (Brancker, 1967b; Forsyth, 2010: 00:03:30). 
Containing Brancker’s letter to The Times and two further articles by him, it concluded that: 
“As a public document, the White Paper fails to give the impression of being 
impartial...until alternative solutions have been examined in depth, and 
comparative costs are available, I cannot feel the case is proven” (Brancker, 1967b: 
18). 
Brancker’s commentary made it clear that the Chelmsford inquiry had received ministerial 
assurances that the Government would not overrule the Inspector’s decision on Stansted 
                                                             
21 A regional economic planning council set up under the Harold Wilson Labour government, the South East 
Economic Planning Council was appointed in 1965 (Hall, 2011: 00:03:43). 
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(Brancker, 1967b: 29-31). He also made clear his preference for the site at Foulness 
(Brancker, 1967b). 
A flurry of media correspondence followed a House of Lords debate on the issue on 11 
December 1967. Peter Masefield wrote a letter to the Observer on Christmas Eve, 
reiterating his claims about the economic imperative of developing Stansted and the 
disadvantages of a coastal site. He followed this with a letter in the Financial Times on 27 
December stating that the site at Foulness would cost £150million to build and have 
operating costs £20million per year more than Stansted (Masefield, 1967).  
After two inquiries, the Government were still convinced that Stansted posed the ‘least 
difficulties’ of all the considered sites (McKie, 1973: 100). It was made clear that there was 
no time for any further public debate, the decision to go ahead with Stansted was made 
(Buchanan, 1981: 56; McKie, 1973: 101). However, as before this decision did not stick. 
In August 1967, Anthony Crosland became President of the Board of Trade. His 
predecessor, Douglas Jay, had been a staunch defender of the Stansted decision whereas 
Crosland was concerned with, and had a personal interest in, the emerging public interest 
in maintaining the quality of the environment (Crosland, 1965; McKie, 1973: 125). Anthony 
Crosland, “...was someone who genuinely believed in having a much more thorough and 
open ended look which didn’t begin from the crude premise that we’ve got a bit of 
concrete in the ground which we ought to exploit. He recognised that is was a much 
broader based question that needed to be investigated” (Keene, 2011: 00:15:28). An 
economist by training, he also believed in systemic economic analysis through the new 
orthodoxy of cost-benefit analysis, a method which any review so far had lacked (Hall, 
1980: 28).  
The news that the Board of Trade were considering reopening the case quickly made its 
way into the media which reported that the urgency with which the decision had been 
made was being questioned; the capacity of Heathrow was now greater than assumed and 
the arrival of jumbo jets was now scheduled earlier than the 1967 White Paper had 
predicted. Questions arose around the predictions used, with even the Hole Committee 
failing to appreciate the increasing size and capacity of planes and vastly underestimating 
the capacity of Heathrow and Gatwick (Hall, 1980: 24).  
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The Board of Trade never officially announced that Stansted was vulnerable. Richard 
Crossman, then Leader of the House and responsible for the conduct of government 
business, stated on 10 November 1967 that Stansted was to go ahead and that a Special 
Development Order would be coming before Parliament (McKie, 1973: 133). This was 
problematic. The Government was facing an impending reform of the House of Lords and 
knew this would make it difficult to push through a Special Development Order for 
Stansted. The resulting decision was not to pursue an Special Development Order, but to 
ask BAA to apply for planning permission in the normal manner and therefore, involve a 
public inquiry (Crosland and Greenwood, 1968). This was given further weight in November 
1967 when the Council on Tribunals called in an entirely new inquiry on the grounds that 
because the Government was now asking for a realignment of the runways the proposal 
had changed, concurring with many of the opposition’s comments (Hall, 1980: 28). 
In the midst of growing rumours that Crosland and the Board of Trade were about to 
reopen the whole debate, on the 8 February 1968, Peter Masefield again emphasised the 
urgency around the development of a third London airport, “unless work begins on 
London’s third airport not later than the end of this year, Britain will be caught with her 
national and aeronautical pants down by 1974” (McKie, 1973: 114). Two days later he sent 
a letter to the Daily Telegraph accusing Sir Roger Hawkey, Co-Chairman of NWEEHPA, of 
doing a, “disservice to the country”, by suggesting that there was still time to conduct 
another inquiry (McKie, 1973: 114). 
The media were increasingly reporting on the possible changes to the Stansted plan despite 
continual statements from Ministers and BAA that there would be no question of a 
reversal. An article in the Financial Times on 12 February 1968 accused the Government of 
being particularly picky in the information they were revealing to the general public and 
that doubts about the strength of the timing argument were emerging in Whitehall 
(Keegan, 1968). Ten days later, on 22 February 1968, Anthony Crosland announced in the 
House of Commons that a new inquiry into the third London airport would take place on 
the grounds that the proposal had changed due to the realignment of runways (Kirby, 1982: 
104; McKie, 1973). This inquiry (the Roskill Commission) would question the siting of the 
third London airport (Buchanan, 1981: 39; Eyre, 1984b: 81; Hall, 1980: 29).  
A brief prepared for a Cabinet meeting on the same day stated that the Government’s 
reason for having a new inquiry was the possible rejection of the Special Development 
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Order in the House of Lords. However, it also stated that the presentation of this reversal to 
the public would be somewhat different. Publically, the case for reopening would be 
justified on three counts; to consult on the possible realignment of runways (at Stansted), 
the desirability of proposals to build a new airport at Foulness and to look at the 
assumptions made by the Ministry of Defence which almost made Stansted inevitable 
(Unknown, 1968). 
While there were some within the Board of Trade that were happy with this decision, 
liberating those who had grown tired of the Department’s official tie to Stansted, it did 
attract criticism from many of Crosland’s colleagues (McKie, 1973: 130). A decision that 
they had spent a large percentage of their working lives towards was now to be challenged 
and potentially shelved, disdain which was fuelled further by the fact that the soon to be 
appointed Roskill Commission was an outside body. This took the decision out of the hands 
of the department, implying a question on their competence and a knowledge that in the 
end, regardless of the decision, they would have to implement a decision which could 
conceivably be a one they were against (McKie, 1973: 130). 
MP’s were outspoken about the way they were treated. For reasons of party loyalty they 
had stood by a decision they knew had been crooked and now the Government was 
sweeping it aside. Backbenchers felt treated like ‘lobby fodder’, with others describing it as 
government by pressure group. MP’s such as Eric Moonman, whose constituencies were to 
be directly affected (his at Billericay), had put their natural instinct to oppose Stansted 
aside for party loyalty and now felt they were now made to look ridiculous (McKie, 1973: 
142). To add to these deliberations/uncertainties, the estimated rate of growth of civil 
aviation turned out to be about half of what was predicted in the 1960s to around 17 
percent per year and the new 747’s that were coming into service in 1969 had 
approximately five times the capacity of their predecessor (Higham, 1995). 
The Roskill Commission (1968-1970) 
Working from June 1968 until December 1970, the Roskill Commission comprised a 23 
strong research team equipped with the skills needed to carry out an in-depth cost-benefit 
analysis including academics (in economics, aircraft design and transport), a civil engineer 
and a planning inspector (Buchanan, 1981: 40; 86; McKie, 1973: 12). The use of this method 
drew huge attention to the case, planning on the grounds of attempting to quantify. It was 
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a new technique, advocated by Crosland, but its use had been considered successful in 
evaluating new road projects and the Victoria Underground Line (Hall, 1980: 32). 
The Commission did not have to answer the question of whether a third airport for London 
was needed, this was once again assumed (Eyre, 1984b: 84; Feldman, 1985: 69). They were 
appointed, “to inquire into the timing of the need for a four runway airport to cater to the 
growth of traffic at existing airports serving the London area, to consider the various 
alternative sites, and to recommend which site should be selected” (Crosland, 1968). Critics 
argued that in other words they were, “precluded from looking at the national airports 
policy and the possibility of large scale diversions to provincial airports” (Hall, 1980: 30). 
Compared with those used in earlier inquiries and reviews, the Roskill Commission 
forecasts showed a distinct increase in passenger numbers and air traffic movements but 
also a larger handling capacity at both Heathrow and Gatwick, concluding that a third 
London airport needed to be operational by the early 1980s (Hall, 1980: 32). 
BAA were asked to co-operate with the Commission’s work and provide, when requested, 
planning applications for sites other than Stansted. However, while happy to an application 
for Stansted they refused to do so for other sites, unwilling to submit applications for sites 
they did not advocate (Croft, 1968; Girling, 1968). Archive correspondence reveals that this 
concerned the Government on two counts. First, they felt it would jeopardise any success in 
persuading any other developers to submit applications. Second, they feared that if it were 
known that BAA had successfully taken this stand against the Government, the credibility of 
any investigation would be weakened (Cox, 1968). It was, “yet one more attempt by the 
aviation interests to frustrate any course of action which might result in the sighting of the 
Airport anywhere else but Stansted” (Osmotherly, 1968). 
At a huge cost, 78 sites over 20 counties were considered, narrowed to a list of 20 then a 
shortlist of four of which Stansted was notable by its absence (Eyre, 1984b: 85; Leigh, 
1985). Within seven months the shortlist was ready and it was on these sites where the rest 
of the work was focused: Thurleigh, Cublington, Nuthampstead and Foulness (later known 
as Maplin) (Hall, 1980: 32). Criticism came alongside the shortlist. The absence of Stansted 
insulted previous analysts, creating political damage and robbing the commission of 
potential political defenders who had previously advocated Stansted. In its final report the 
Commission did explain why; it was deemed inferior to Nuthampstead on the grounds of air 
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traffic control, noise impact and surface access, it had to go (Buchanan, 1981: 43; Hall, 
1980: 30).  
Another criticism rested on the inclusion of a coastal site (Foulness), endorsing a site miles 
away from London which was, in previous inquiries, seen as a key criterion for site 
selection. In hindsight, the Commission did admit a failure in the inclusion of Foulness. 
While it ranked the highest of all sites in terms of noise, defence and air traffic control it 
failed miserably in terms of expense and surface access costs. Overall it ranked thirteenth 
out of fifteen, four places behind Stansted but got its place on the shortlist for being a, 
“novel solution” (Hall, 1980: 30).  
A few criteria dominated the differences between sites with passenger-user costs providing 
the real distinction. Cublington came out as the best site from the analysis (in terms of cost) 
with Foulness (the coastal site) the most expensive of all (Hall, 1980: 33). Foulness was 
considered the most costly due to its location – the farthest site from London (and most of 
England’s population) while Cublington was ideally situated between London and 
Birmingham (Hall, 1980: 33). The cost-benefit analysis used was so significant in the 
Commission’s thinking that a site with easy access from the both the South East/London 
and Birmingham/the Midlands was going to prove hugely attractive (Keene, 2011: 
00:19:05). 
The choice of cost-benefit analysis itself attracted criticism, the most common being that it 
omitted certain items. For example, Peter Hall notes that while it was possible to quantify 
noise and agricultural impacts, and the loss of landscape and rural amenity illustrated 
through house prices, it was not possible to quantify the loss to non-residents and although 
economists would beg to differ, this type of conflict showed the ideological differences at 
play. There was also criticism that the use of money was negative in that the value of 
money is very subjective meaning different things to different people (Hall, 1980: 34).  
In separate academic pieces, Peter Self, Professor of Public Administration at the University 
of London and Vice Chairman of the Town and Country Planning Association, and John 
Adams, UCL, satirised the application of the cost-benefit analysis in choosing an airport site. 
Adams used it to justify the inclusion of Hyde Park in a short list of sites for a London airport 
due to minimal travel time from London and because it is a flat open space (Adams, 1970; 
1993; Self, 1970). In their final report, the Commission accepted that cost-benefit analysis 
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could never be inclusive to all factors relevant to the case but maintained that it provided a 
useful framework under which to encompass all the evidence (Hall, 1980: 34).  
Specialist consultants were brought in to produce sub-regional plans of each site under 
consideration and these combined with the overall cost-benefit analysis were first 
published in the early part of 1970 (Hall, 1980: 32). Subsequently, these plans were subject 
to detailed criticism both by the Commission and in the various public hearings that 
followed, providing the basis of the Commission’s final evaluation.  
The Commission concluded that despite the negative environmental impacts, Cublington 
was the best site (Commission on the Third London Airport, 1971: 140, para. 13.61). There 
was however one member of the Commission who dissented from this view. In the latter 
stages of the Commission’s work, Professor Colin Buchanan, a town planner, announced 
that he could not accept the choice of Cublington. Outspoken in his disagreement he 
argued that Foulness was the only suitable site and that in recent years too many decisions 
had favoured the economy over the environment (Higham, 1995: 29; Leigh, 1985). In his 
account of the affair, Peter Hall (1980: 36) comments that the rest of the Commission were 
surprised with Colin Buchanan’s dissent while David Keene comments how the Roskill 
Commission were irritated as he [Buchanan] left it very late to express his disagreement 
(Keene, 2011: 00:19:33).  
The official line of the Roskill Commission was that the first 12 chapters of the report had 
been virtually completed, with only the recommendation left to do when they were 
informed that Colin Buchanan disagreed (Commission on the Third London Airport, 1971: 
140, para. 13.63). However, correspondence between Buchanan and Justice Roskill shows 
that this may not have been entirely the case. In a letter dated 30 September 1968, 
Buchanan expressed his doubts over the conclusions raised in the second stage of the 
inquiries (before the shortlisted sites were taken to local inquiries) (Buchanan, 1968). 
Buchanan emphasised the need to provide the public with correct information, for 
example, what the actual land-take of an airport would be and the effects this would have 
on noise and associated urbanisation. This was in contrast to the Commission’s approach, 
which was to inform them of the actual land-take but to leave them to draw their own 
conclusions regarding the subsequent noise and urbanisation impact (Buchanan, 1968). The 
letter leaves the reader feeling that even at this early point in the inquiry, Buchanan was 
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becoming disillusioned with the process, alluding to the need for validity and transparency 
when informing those people who could be potentially affected by development. 
Colin Buchanan produced an 11-page note of dissent, a passionate and highly emotional 
personal account in stark contrast to the logical, detached nature of the Roskill report. It 
concluded that, “I believe it would be nothing less than an environmental disaster if the 
airport were to be built at any of the inland sites, but nowhere more serious than at 
Cublington where it would lie athwart the critically important belt of open country behind 
London and Birmingham” (Colin Buchanan, Commission on the Third London Airport, 1971: 
149). 
Buchanan explains how he was sceptical of the cost-benefit approach being used, stating 
that planning considerations needed to be paramount (a view rejected by the rest of the 
Commission) (Commission on the Third London Airport, 1971: 149). His dissent hints at 
deeper considerations than those considered by the Commission: the belief that natural 
heritage and particular landscapes need to be protected for future generations (Hall, 1980: 
36). Terence Bendixson, planning correspondent at The Guardian, wrote how Buchanan 
would have been under huge pressure to agree with the Commission and that a less 
opinionated and unconscientious man may have fallen to this pressure (Bendixson, 1970: 
855). However, Peter Hall takes a different stance, noting that Colin Buchanan, “completely 
put a bomb under the whole rest of the [Roskill] report and wrecked it” (Hall, 2011: 
00:11:36). 
In January 1971, the Roskill Commission published their report and as expected, the split in 
the Commission was widely reported. However, unlike within the Commission, Colin 
Buchanan’s view was not the minority, garnering support from those who agreed that 
Cublington would be an environmental disaster. Like Buchanan, the South East Economic 
Planning Council favoured the coastal site at Foulness but conceded that if it had to be an 
inland site then Cublington would be their choice, while the Countryside Commission also 
announced their preference for the Foulness site (South East Economic Planning Council, 
1970; The Countryside Commission, 1970: 8). 
The Wing Area Resistance Association (WARA) formed immediately, uniting those in the 
Cublington that were against the development. Named after the wartime airfield at Wing 
(one of the original reasons for its selection), WARA modelled their campaign on 
NWEEHPA’s one at Stansted with resources coming from some very affluent residents and 
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the protests making national headlines. Providing the opposition with crucial political 
strength, 218 MPs signed a motion opposing an inland site for the third London airport 
(Bendixson, 1970: 856; Buchanan, 1981: 46; 93; Hall, 1980: 37; Ridley, 1974: 416) 
Much like the criticism levelled at NWEEHPA in the 1960s, proponents of Cublington 
criticised the prosperous nature of the opposition. However, this critique was not 
surprising: WARA had a Rothschild as its Treasurer and the wife of the editor of a major 
daily national newspaper on its committee. Those fighting against the Cublington proposals 
were able to draw on a huge professional body of support and advice for free and had 
unanimous grass-root support (Bendixson, 1970: 855; Ridley, 1974: 416). It was also aided 
by a growing environmental movement motivated by the desire to improve and maintain 
nature, of which Cublington, a rural and beautiful site, fell neatly into the remit of 
(Bendixson, 1970: 855; Ridley, 1974: 416). Akin to NWEEHPA before them, courting the 
press was a central part of the campaign (Buchanan, 1981: 94)  
The strength of the planning profession, the media, public opinion, political support and 
Colin Buchanan succeeded in overcoming the Roskill Commission. The Government 
accepted Roskill’s recommendation that a third London airport in operation by 1980 was 
necessary, however it went against the recommendation of the site at Cublington, 
considering the coastal site at Foulness the most appropriate (Eyre, 1984b: 88; Feldman, 
1985: 71; Turrall-Clarke, 1983: 29). On 26 April 1971 John Davies, Secretary of State for 
Trade and Industry and President of the Board of Trade, announced that the third London 
airport would be developed at Maplin (Foulness) on environmental and planning grounds 
(Perman, 1973: 17). In Cublington: a Blueprint for Resistance David Perman (1973) wrote 
that, “the Cublington victory was tinged with a weary relief that it was all over and with 
sadness that now another community would suffer ... the first prayer said in Stewkley 
Church was for the people of Foulness”, illustrating perfectly a dilemma environmentalists 
face, unless of course they were really just NIMBYs (motivated by Not In My Back Yard 
concerns). 
In 1973 the Maplin Development Bill was introduced, giving power to the recently 
established Maplin Development Authority to reclaim and manage the land needed, with 
the Maplin Project Management Committee (formed in 1971) co-ordinating and monitoring 
progress (Eyre, 1984b: 89; Helsey and Codd, 2010: 35). Huge opposition arose at Maplin 
(Eyre, 1984b: 88). Local politician Derek Wood had formed a local group, Defenders of 
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Essex, during the Roskill inquiry and it was now having its voice heard alongside local MPs 
voicing their opposition (Hall, 1980: 38). Helped by documents published by the Roskill 
Commission that showed the vast impact the development would have, the economic 
feasibility of the project was starting to be questioned and the merits of the Roskill 
Commission’s work becoming evident (Hall, 1980: 39; McKie, 1973: 21). Those who 
supported the Roskill Commission were not surprised at the increasing questions 
surrounding Maplin. Notably, this included Anthony Crosland, at the time Shadow Secretary 
of State for the Environment, now in opposition and Labour MP for Grimsby, who, as 
discussed, had been mainly responsible for setting up the Roskill Commission in 1968. He 
voiced concerns about the vast amount of national resources that would be needed for the 
Maplin project, resources that he felt could be put to better use, describing it is as a, “mad 
plan for Heathograd in South East Essex” (Crosland, 1973; Hall, 1980: 39).  
Even in March 1971, two months before the final Maplin decision, Crosland argued for a 
national aviation strategy that would make better use of existing airports with the 
development of a two, not four, runway airport, possibly at Cublington. Peter Hall (1980: 
39) comments that it was Crosland’s position that shifted the position of the Labour Party 
and without any formal discussion, they adopted the view that Maplin was a Tory prestige 
project and that national resources could be put to better use (McKie, 1973: 218-220). In a 
Commons debate on 23 October 1973, Crosland made clear his objections to the scheme, 
confirming that if elected, the Labour Party would scrap the plans (Helsey and Codd, 2010: 
36).  
The oil crisis of 1973-74 added to Maplin’s woes (Higham, 1995: 30). Creating a fall in the 
predicted rate of growth, this further questioned the economic feasibility of the project and 
the sense in providing such an increase in mobility (Feldman, 1985: 75; Hall, 1980: 39; 
Leigh, 1985). The increasing use of jumbo jets pressurised the capacity of airport terminals 
but reduced runway demand hence it was the provision of more terminal not runway 
capacity that was emerging as the pressing issue and alternatives to flying, such as high 
speed rail and the Channel Tunnel were also being talked about. The case for a large-scale 
project such as Maplin was becoming less compelling (Eyre, 1984b: 90; Hall, 2011: 00:17:38; 
Higham, 1995: 30). By 1974, there was strong local and national opposition to Maplin. 
In February 1974, the newly elected Labour Government announced a review of the Maplin 
project (Feldman, 1985: 75; Hall, 1980: 39; Helsey and Codd, 2010: 12). Hall (1980) 
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comments that this review was a hasty exercise, conducted internally by the Department of 
Trade and resembling the 1967 White Paper. In a statement to the House of Commons on 
18 July 1974, Peter Shore, then Secretary of State for Trade, announced the Government’s 
decision to abandon the Maplin project (Shore, 1974). Regardless of the review, Crosland 
committed the Labour Party to dismissing the project even before they had returned to 
power.  
In light of the revised demand forecasts, the Government were under no pressure to 
choose a site for the third London airport and decided to conduct a review of national 
airport strategy (Brancker, 1967b: 19; Hall, 1980: 44; Sanders and Mead, 2007: 2). 
Published in 1975 the Airport Strategy for Great Britain reiterated many of the comments 
made in the Maplin review, notably that increasing capacity at regional airports was not a 
substitution for the provision of capacity in the South East. It concluded that the most 
pressing issue was that of terminal capacity, not air traffic capacity; with the provision of 
more terminal capacity existing airports could cope (Department of Trade, 1975). Maplin 
was abandoned and, “...they began to circle around Stansted once again” (Haselhurst, 
2011: 00:04:47).  
The Town and Country Planning Association continued to support the Maplin project, 
urging the Labour Government to uphold the policy of the Conservatives, highlighting its 
advantages on environmental grounds. They believed that the Labour Government had 
downplayed the advantages of Maplin, “because they are not directly or obviously related 
to the needs of airlines and air passengers with whom the aviation authorities are 
concerned. But they are of direct economic, environmental and social significance” (ENDS, 
1979). Essex and Hertfordshire County Councils immediately reiterated their previous 
arguments against Stansted but they failed to attract the same level of attention as before. 
In his commentary, Peter Hall speculates that the public had become tired of the whole 
debate or that in light of the oil crisis and recession, people were viewing the issue in a 
different way (1980: 44).  
The Department for Trade published a national aviation strategy in the 1978 White Paper 
Airports Policy (Cmnd. 7084) (Department of Trade, 1978). While it lacked any emergency in 
accommodating air travel, London having survived 20 years without the construction 
deemed essential in 1960 and with no evidence showing any traffic loss as a result, it did 
stress the important role of the aviation industry to the UK economy (Department of Trade, 
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1978; Eyre, 1984b: 96; Feldman, 1985: 78; Leigh, 1985). Acknowledging that more capacity 
would be needed during the 1990s, the White Paper gave assurances that Heathrow would 
not be taken beyond four terminals, Gatwick beyond two, Luton beyond 5 million 
passengers per annum (mppa) nor any wholly new airport developed (Buchanan, 1981: 51; 
Department of Trade, 1978). Effectively ruling out expansion everywhere bar Stansted this 
was a, “Stansted by stealth”, policy (Anon, 2011; ENDS, 1980). The local area erupted with 
anger (Haselhurst, 1982: 1). 
The Eyre Inquiry (1981-1983) 
Resulting from the White Paper, in August 1978 two committees were set up to look at 
long-term options for handling London’s air traffic: the Advisory Committee on Airports 
Policy (investigating the need for a third London airport) and the Study Group on South East 
Airports (investigating potential sites, assuming the need was proven) (Fulton, 1981: 201). 
Both reported in December 1979 (Department of Trade, 1979a; b). Immediately after, John 
Nott, then Secretary of State for Trade, invited BAA to, “bring forward proposals for the 
construction of a single terminal building at Stansted based on the existing runway facilities 
capable of handling about 15mppa”, subject to a public inquiry (Buchanan, 1981: 54; 
Fulton, 1981: 201; Nott, 1979). The Government had chosen Stansted to meet the 
incremental demand for airport capacity as it arose and it was their view that Stansted 
chose itself, even though it had never done before (Buchanan, 1981: 56; Eyre, 1984c: para 
4.1).  
BAA lobbied hard in a number of areas and emphasised the job creation that would occur 
as a result, both during and after development, with the local construction industry were 
told of the benefits of the proposal in the hope that they would rally their local councils to 
support it (Turrall-Clarke, 1983: 2). However, while securing the support of the Greater 
London Council, BAA failed to persuade the local authorities around Stansted. Essex and 
Hertfordshire County Councils and East Hertfordshire and Uttlesford District Councils 
completely condemned the proposals and formed a consortium to work together in 
opposing the development (Essex and Hertfordshire County Councils and East Hertfordshire 
and Uttlesford District Councils, 1981; Hertfordshire County Council, 1981; Jameson, 2010: 
00:00:53). 
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By inviting BAA to submit a planning application, the opposition felt the Government had 
given legitimacy to the proposal placing it in a favourable position going into the public 
inquiry: 
“There is a danger that the application will attract to it a measure of credibility and 
respectability by virtue of the fact that it is brought forward at the invitation of 
Government, despite the repeated changes in policies and decisions by 
Government over the years in respect of a third London airport” (Essex and 
Hertfordshire County Councils and East Hertfordshire and Uttlesford District 
Councils, 1981). 
BAA submitted their application to Uttlesford District Council on 25 July 1980. It detailed 
plans for the construction of a new terminal and associated facilities; and defined the land 
that would be needed to provide a second runway and further terminals should one be 
required in the future (BAA, 1980; Turner, 1980). BAA believed that, “a major new terminal 
at Stansted is essential to meet demand, to maintain an efficient airport system for London 
and to keep the UK at the forefront of world air transport” (BAA, 1981). 
The public inquiry sat from 29 September 1981 until 28 October 1982 at Quendon Hall, 
Essex with Graham Eyre the inquiry inspector (Anon, 2011; Eyre, 1984c: para. 8.1; 8.2). 
There were 246 witnesses in total with the youngest just 13 years old, 3850 inquiry 
documents and 21069 pages of inquiry transcript (Eyre, 1984c: para. 8.6; 8.7; 8.8).  
David Keene, QC for the local authority consortium, recollects that the character of the 
inquiry was interesting, “not a jolly atmosphere exactly it was too tense for that, but it was 
conducted on a reasonably friendly basis, behind the scenes at least. I mean there were one 
or two social gatherings for all those involved” (2011: 00:24:06). However, Sue Forsyth, of 
NWEEHPA, remembers it a little differently: 
“the first time NWEEHPA started giving evidence and my father who was chairman 
came to give his evidence and we had the hall packed with people, everybody 
clapped, and Eyre said I can’t have clapping in my inquiry. His inquiry? We had been 
fighting for years, it was our inquiry, it was our livelihoods” (Forsyth, 2010: 
00:28:44).  
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Characterising Graham Eyre as a ‘bully’, Forsyth believes that the agenda was already set 
and Graham Eyre didn’t like anything that went against it, “I don’t think we dominated 
anything, we were dominated” (Forsyth, 2010: 00:31:00).  
NWEEHPA regrouped and refocused. Sue Forsyth, by now Campaign Director, remembers 
feeling that although she knew she had to re-engage with the campaign, she really did not 
want to devote her life to it again. “It dominates your life, I was rung by the press at 2am 
one morning to ask a question before they went to print, your life was no longer yours”, 
continuing that it was, “all run from here [her personal residence], paid nothing. Nothing 
for electricity/heating/lighting, everybody did it because that is what they wanted to do” 
(Forsyth, 2010: 00:42:06). “Technical experts, witnesses to give evidence, planners, noise 
experts all had to be found and it was, a lot to achieve and it does not happen overnight” 
(Forsyth, 2010: 00:45:52). To their advantage, through representing hundreds of people in 
over 240 affiliated groups, so long as they ensured that people felt involved in the 
campaign and were able to keep morale high they had a large pool of individuals to draw 
upon for expertise (Forsyth, 2010: 00:46:44).  
The Countryside Commission objected to the development on the grounds that it would 
have an, “unacceptable impact on the natural beauty and amenity of the area” (Coleman, 
1980). Lord Winstanley, Chairman, wrote to Michael Heseltine, Secretary of State for the 
Environment, stating that the proposal, “...would constitute a massive urbanisation of an 
attractive area of the countryside...” (The Countryside Commission, 1980). 
The opposition argued that Stansted’s development was totally at odds with local and 
regional planning policies. With an unemployment rate far below other parts of the 
country, the area around Stansted was not one that desperately needed the economic 
benefits that came with an airport. It was argued that development should go to areas such 
as Manchester, who were desperate for economic stimulus (Forsyth, 2010: 00:12:23; 
Jameson, 2010: 00:01:03; Keene, 2011: 00:28:20). However, BAA did not own Manchester 
or any regional airports and hence had little interest, financial or otherwise, in regional 
solutions to the capacity problem (Jameson, 2010: 00:01:28). Those opposing the 
development of Stansted tried to draw on the support of regional airports such as 
Manchester who wanted to see development at their airports, however this proved difficult 
due to the power of BAA. Regional airports, “didn’t think it was worth it” (Forsyth, 2010: 
00:13:16). With this involvement of regional airports, however small, an interesting case 
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arose where a state owned corporation was attacked by a municipally owned airport 
(Doganis, 2011: 00:06:58). 
Robert Jameson, instructing solicitor for the consortium of local authorities, remembers the 
shock they received when they arrived at the inquiry. They thought they had a trump card; 
that regional planning policy stated that this was an area of restraint and the economy of 
the South East did not need the development. However, at the start of the inquiry Graham 
Eyre made it clear that as this was a nationally important decision regional planning policies 
would be set aside, “that was our first indication that things weren’t necessarily going to be 
easy for us” (Jameson, 2010: 00:03:15). He recalls a conversation with a senior civil servant 
who implied that the local authorities were only there to keep up appearances and keep 
ratepayers happy. Shocked, Jameson replied that no, they wanted to win the inquiry and 
stop the development to which the civil servant appeared shocked and embarrassed (2010: 
00:05:36). On reflection, Jameson recalls that they [the opposition] had, “a fond, if 
mistaken, belief that we were going to win the thing” (Jameson, 2010: 00:13:04). 
In his evidence at the inquiry Alan Haselhurst, then, and still now, MP for Saffron Walden, 
emphasised that after two inquiries the people of Stansted deserved a respite. By this 
inquiry people had become resigned to the airport, either through disillusionment with the 
process or convinced that the civil service would get Stansted by whatever means and that 
the decision had already been made (Haselhurst, 1982: 2; 2011). This claim was refuted by 
Graham Eyre, “I was left in no doubt that the Government had intended from the very 
outset that the inquiries were to provide the opportunity for a comprehensive and wide 
ranging examination of its proposals” (Eyre, 1984c: Ch. 2, para 4.12). However, while the 
decision may have not have already been made David Keene, QC for the consortium of local 
authorities, believes that, “the economic arguments on the whole are likely to win and that 
the most one can normally hope for is to minimise environmental damage” (Keene, 2011: 
00:34:15). 
The consortium of local authorities maintained a good relationship with NWEEHPA, 
agreeing on the angles each should promote at the inquiry and the tactics that should be 
employed (Jameson, 2010: 00:12:12). While the local authorities had the resources to fund 
a broad set of arguments this relationship meant that NWEEHPA were able to focus their, 
much more limited, resources on the local human impact, “they were in a position to deal 
with matters certainly with a lot more emotion than local authorities would have applied” 
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(Keene, 2011: 00:21:40). Sue Forsyth recollects that the activities of the local authorities 
were markedly different to how they were at the 1964 inquiry, “I don’t think the local 
authorities took it very seriously at all [in 1964], felt that they could do nothing. NWEEHPA 
had all the technical expertise and their witnesses were massively superior to the local 
authority ones...whereas at Eyre inquiry, it was the local authorities that led the whole 
thing” (Forsyth, 2010: 00:19:25). 
While the opposition challenged the need for increasing airport capacity, if Graham Eyre 
concluded that there was a need for increasing airport capacity in the UK, they had to prove 
why the objections to meeting it at Stansted were overwhelming and that other sites were 
more suitable (Essex and Hertfordshire County Councils, 1984). Working closely with British 
Airways, who were concerned that expansion would occur at Stansted at the expense of 
Heathrow, the consortium of local authorities put forward an application for a fifth terminal 
at Heathrow. They argued that the UK needed a strong hub airport and that the solution to 
the air capacity problem would be better met there (Essex and Hertfordshire County 
Councils, 1984; Harris, 2011; Keene, 2011: 00:25:13), “of course there were objections to 
the alternative but we had to say that the objections to Stansted were greater than the 
objections to T5” (Keene, 2011: 00:27:15).  
BAA were not opposed to a fifth terminal at Heathrow per se but argued that as there were 
substantial issues regarding the relocation of a sewage works on the site it could not 
achieved quickly enough to cope with the forecast increase in demand.22 Graham Eyre 
agreed and according to David Keene, QC for the local authorities, “that was principally why 
he gave Stansted the go-ahead” (Keene, 2011: 00:32:24). 
In 1984, Graham Eyre recommended the immediate development of Stansted to handle up 
to 15mppa and ruled out the possibility of a second runway: 
“There is no doubt that a two-runway airport at Stansted would have so 
detrimental an effect on the environment, would so affect the character of the 
                                                             
22 The Inspector’s recommendation for the T5 proposal debated at this inquiry was that it should be refused at 
this time but recommended that the Government take action to ensure that the Perry Oaks sludge treatment 
facility is removed in preparation for the objective of providing a fifth terminal in the f uture (The Airports 
Inquiries 1981 – 1983, Parts VII, VIII: Chapters 55-62 inclusive, Graham Eyre). 
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local communities and the ecology of the area and would have such implications 
beyond its immediate neighbourhood as to be wholly unacceptable” (Eyre, 1984a). 
The opposition had made it clear to Graham Eyre that granting permission up to 15mppa 
would inevitably lead to development beyond that. In response, Eyre stated that 
permission should only be granted for expansion to 25mppa if the Government could 
provide assurances that there would be no permission to go beyond this or the 
development of a second runway (Sanders and Mead, 2007: 2). Eyre’s report concluded 
that the provision of additional capacity at regional airports would not reduce the need for 
further airport capacity provision in London and that there was a need to maintain and 
enhance the London airport system (Eyre, 1984a; Leigh, 1985) 
In his commentary of the Stansted inquiry, Robert Turrall-Clarke notes that the approach 
taken at the inquiry was one of a feasibility study, testing the objections to see whether, or 
how, they could be ignored, minimised or met: 
“The inquiry appears to have set out on the footing that the decision had been 
made, certainly in the minds of the Government, and that what needed to be done 
was to ensure that the problems that might arise from the development were kept 
at a minimum or were overcome” (Turrall-Clarke, 1983: 4). 
The 1985 White Paper Airports Policy (Cmnd. 9542) announced Stansted’s approval ending 
25 years of indecision (Department of Transport, 1985). The White Paper went partway to 
implementing the recommendations of Eyre, granting permission for an increase in capacity 
from two to 15mppa but it was subject to an interim limit of seven to eight mppa. Eyre’s 
recommendation that there would be no expansion beyond 25mppa was accepted with 
capacity being restrained by the single runway (Higham, 1995: 35). However, there were no 
assurances on its future growth via the development of a second runway (ENDS, 1985).  
In response, Nicholas Ridley, then Secretary of State for Transport, faced hostility from both 
his party and the opposition. Many criticised the lack of regional airport planning and the 
focus on airport development in the South East as well as questioning him over the 
possibility of a fifth terminal at Heathrow (Travis, 1985a). Alan Haselhurst, MP for Saffron 
Walden, told him the decision to expand Stansted was a, “case of putting the most capacity 
in the wrong place in order to meet the prescription which you have given”, Ridley 
maintained that Stansted’s development was in the national interest (Travis, 1985a). With 
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the aim of getting it through before the protest movements built up enough steam to stop 
it, a week after the decision was made the Government motion to approve it went through 
the House of Commons (McKie, 1985). Stansted officially opened in 1991.  
Eventually, who got what, when and how? 
A diverse cast of actors were involved in the search for a third London airport each with 
different motivations for wanting to influence the policymaking process and with varying 
degrees of participation. Aside from BAA, the aviation industry was hardly noticeable until 
the Eyre inquiry, when British Airways and regional airport operators joined the opposition 
against the development of Stansted (albeit with differing motivations to those they 
worked with). BAA’s participation was limited but in the end, they still prevailed: action 
without agents. 
At the national level, the state’s role was twofold. First, in the aftermath of the Second 
World War, the aviation industry was seen as an engine of growth and crucial in 
redeveloping the UK economy. The Government committed itself to fostering the 
development of the UK aviation industry, part of which was the development of a third 
London airport. Second, from its formation in 1965 until its privatisation in 1986, BAA was 
an arm of the government, occupying, and benefiting from, a quango like status and the 
nationalist mentality that characterised the industry. This interweaved the interests of the 
state with those of the aviation industry. Conflicts at the national state level were down to 
ideological differences between political parties, however, while their solutions to the 
capacity problem may have differed, they were united in the belief that there was a 
problem and that capacity should be provided. 
The role of the state at the local level was quite different. Local Government had a 
responsibility to reflect the concerns of its constituents, which meant it was often in conflict 
with the state at the national level. Local authorities and MP’s were actively involved in the 
opposition campaigns, adding political legitimacy and credibility to their arguments. 
Local community groups (such as NWEEHPA, WARA and Defenders of Essex) played a 
prominent role, reflected in their commitment to often-prolonged campaigns. While groups 
such as the CPRE and the National Trust made their position on specific site developments 
known in as much as it affected their direct remit, they did not play a prominent role, with 
the environmental arguments left to local groups. This representation is unsurprising and 
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reflects the nature of the environmental movement at the time. The environmental impact 
of the aviation industry was not on their agenda; the national and global impact of an ever-
expanding aviation industry was not yet recognised with the environmental impacts largely 
constrained to the local level, for example, noise, local air pollution and the loss of land. 
Not an actor as such, the media played a crucial role in creating and managing public and 
political opinion. First, it was a tool used by actors to create and manage public and political 
opinion, for example, proponents and opponents conducted their disputes in the national 
press. Second, it provided commentary on events via journalists, disseminating their (the 
journalist’s/media outlet’s) perception and opinion on events. Finally, and arguably most 
critically, it linked the issue of airport development to broader environmental, economic 
and social concerns, through the media, the development of a third London airport became 
an issue of national importance.  
The structure of both the legal and planning system worked in the favour of proponents of 
development. The legal system reflected the effect of the inequality in resources between 
actors. Those with the most financial resources (e.g. BAA) were able to fund, attract and 
sustain the best legal team with those less financially secure (e.g. local community groups) 
unable to sustain their physical presence at inquiries or afford the top legal team. The 
planning system, illustrated via the public inquiries, assumed an adversarial rather than 
inquisitorial nature with inquiries becoming feasibility studies for specific sites. The tight 
terms of reference that characterised inquiries and reviews inhibited information from 
entering the policymaking process and stopped any form of policy learning taking place, 
with some issues completely omitted from debate. With the need to increase airport 
capacity, and the filling of it, always assumed, debate circled around implementation, that 
is to say the location of the third London airport and not whether or not one should be 
developed.  
Throughout the whole affair, a sense of inevitability surrounded the development of 
Stansted as the third London airport (Buchanan, 1985; Hall, 1980). Each time the Stansted 
decision was reversed, proponents of the site (namely BAA) were able to steer the agenda 
back in its direction, by, for example, refusing to co-operate with the Roskill Commission.  
The debate appears to be sufficiently polarised to reduce all available interpretations to a 
standoff between the proponent and opponent. However, on closer inspection, it is more 
complex than this. The position of BAA, changing forecasts, political oscillation, external 
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shocks, underhand strategies, public pressure and a moving definition of the ‘need’ all 
contributed to why the designation of a site for the third London airport took so long. The 
next chapter applies the Advocacy Coalition Framework and the Strategic-Relational 
Approach to help comprehend the series of complex interactions and relationships detailed 
here and to help to explain whether, and if so how and why, the aviation industry occupied 
a privileged position in the environmental policymaking process. 
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Explaining policy change: the prolonged search for a third London 
airport 
 
The series of events that led to the decision to develop Stansted as the third London airport 
spanned over thirty years, saw three sites approved (with ten times as many suggested), 
involved two public inquiries, three in-depth reviews, and featured an evolving cast of 
actors from both the public and private spheres. This chapter employs the two theories 
detailed in Chapter Three, namely the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) and the 
Strategic-Relational Approach (SRA), to shed light on, and make sense of, the empirical 
observations and events that led to the decision to approve Stansted for development as 
the third London airport. The application of these theories, and the critical reflection on this 
application, will aid the explanation and understanding of these events and will explore the 
precise mechanisms behind the claimed position of privilege it is claimed that the aviation 
industry enjoys. Furthermore, this chapter initiates a process of theoretical evaluation that 
the rest of the thesis builds upon.  
This chapter begins by explaining the series of events in the search for a third London 
airport from the perspective of the ACF. An advocate of the ACF studies the policymaking 
process over a decade or more and sees power as broadly shared among a range of interest 
groups. Policymaking takes place in the policy subsystem, which unites all those actors 
interested in influencing the process. Beliefs stimulate political behaviour and these beliefs 
unite actors in advocacy coalitions within the policy subsystem. Coalitions battle for 
dominance in order to control the broad direction of policy. This application is then 
critically reflected on, drawing on existing critiques, discussing new insights it has 
uncovered and touching upon future theoretical refinements. 
It will then explain events from the perspective of the SRA and similarly subject it to critical 
reflection. An advocate of the SRA attempts to transcend the dualism between structure 
and agency by focusing attention on the recursive nature of relationship between the two. 
Policy change is viewed as the result of struggles between actors, who employ various 
strategies to achieve their (explicitly stated) policy goals. These struggles take place on a 
terrain that by its very nature privileges certain strategies, and hence certain actors, with 
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the form of the state representing the latest incarnation of these battles and illustrating the 
current balance of power.  
The Advocacy Coalitions Framework’s perspective 
As Chapter Three explained, the ACF seeks to explore policy change by employing the core 
concepts of policy subsystems, advocacy coalitions, exogenous shocks and policy-oriented 
learning.  
The ACF would view the policy subsystem as uniting those actors who had an interest in the 
development of a third London airport as a means to implement the UK Government’s 
policy to develop UK air traffic capacity. A changing cast of actors over a long period, this 
included airport operators, airlines and government departments concerned with the 
development of UK civil aviation. The initiation of site-specific public inquiries saw the 
policy subsystem expand and contract, as actors at the local level entered and left the 
policymaking process, for example, Essex and Hertfordshire County Councils and the North 
West Essex and East Hertfordshire Preservation Association (NWEEHPA) at Stansted, and 
Defenders of Essex at Maplin. Widening the analysis beyond the traditional iron triangle of 
actors, the policy subsystem encompassed journalists, commentators and academics such 
as David McKie, Terence Bendixson, Peter Hall and John Self.  
From the ACF’s perspective, advocacy coalitions united actors within the policy subsystem, 
glued together by their policy core beliefs. These coalitions held distinct viewpoints and co-
operated over time to achieve their policy goals. Throughout the search for a third London 
airport, conflict within the policy subsystem took place primarily between two advocacy 
coalitions. One dominant, which was in control of the broad direction of policy, and one 
minority, which hoped to exploit a window of opportunity emerging from a shake to the 
subsystem (i.e. an external perturbation).  
The advocacy coalition uniting those actors who held a policy core belief that a third 
London airport should be developed, occupied the position of dominant coalition. For 
example, at the Chelmsford inquiry (1965-66) the dominant coalition united those actors 
holding a policy core belief that Stansted should be developed as the third London airport: 
the Ministry of Aviation, the British Airports Authority (BAA), and the Stansted Area 
Progress Association (that united those local level actors supportive of the proposals). After 
the report of the Roskill Commission (in 1971), the dominant coalition united those actors 
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who held a policy core belief that Cublington should be developed as the third London 
airport. While at the Eyre inquiry (1981-83) the dominant coalition, once again, united 
those with a policy core belief that Stansted should be developed: BAA, the Department of 
Trade and the Greater London Council.  
Minority coalitions emerged as a response to policy outputs, in an attempt to overthrow 
the dominant coalition and steer policy in their direction. For example, in 1965, when 
Richard Crossman, Minister of Housing and Local Government, announced that there would 
be a public inquiry into the development of Stansted (the Chelmsford inquiry) an advocacy 
coalition emerged, which united those actors with a policy core belief that the site should 
not be developed as the third London airport. This brought together NWEEHPA, the 
National Trust, local authorities directly affected by the proposal, the Farmers Union and 
the Campaign to Protect Rural England (CPRE).  
Similarly, when the Roskill Commission recommended the development of Cublington, a 
minority coalition emerged with a policy core belief that Cublington should not be 
developed, uniting BAA, Colin Buchanan, the Wing Area Resistance Association (WARA), 
Peter Self and John Adams. When the Government then announced the reversal of the 
Cublington decision and that Maplin was to be developed instead, in response, a minority 
coalition emerged there, uniting actors who held a policy core belief it should not, 
encompassing the Defenders of Essex, local MPs, BAA and the Labour Party (at the time, in 
opposition). In 1980, when the Government invited BAA to submit a planning application 
for the development of Stansted, a minority coalition uniting those held a policy core belief 
that Stansted should not be developed emerged, uniting NWEEHPA, Essex and 
Hertfordshire County Councils and East Hertfordshire and Uttlesford District Councils, the 
Countryside Commission and the airport operator at Manchester Airport. 
The ACF acknowledges the important role resources play in constraining and facilitating the 
actions of coalitions. With better-resourced actors often occupying the position of 
dominant coalition, proponents of a specific site were in a favourable position compared to 
their counterparts. For example, during the Eyre inquiry (1981-83), the dominant coalition 
was able to afford the top legal team, sustain a daily presence at the inquiry and court the 
media. By contrast, those actors in the minority coalition did not have access to the same 
level of resources and hence, were unable to finance the same calibre of legal 
representation and technical expertise. Furthermore, the minority coalition often contained 
Chapter Five 
124 
 
actors who had to fundraise extensively just to fund their participation and survival in the 
policy subsystem (e.g. NWEEHPA, WARA and the Defenders of Essex).  
From the ACF’s perspective, two exogenous variables affected the behaviour of actors 
within the subsystem: relatively stable parameters and external subsystem events. Changes 
in the former, failed to provide the basis for policy change, but did affect actors’ behaviour 
and stimulated policy-oriented learning. For example, the emerging environmental 
movement created a change in fundamental socio-cultural values, which affected actors’ 
perceptions of the problem and its solution, highlighted by the actions of Anthony Crosland, 
whose belief in the public’s emerging interest in the quality of the environment reopened 
the Stansted decision in 1967. 
To the ACF, external subsystem events played an important role in the process of policy 
change. With the potential to create major policy change, they quickly redistributed 
resources and provided a window of opportunity for minority coalitions to exploit. Changes 
in the governing coalition brought a new set of ideological preferences into the policy 
subsystem and hence, a different construction of what the solution was to solve the UK’s 
air capacity problem. For example, in opposition in the early 1970s, the Labour party made 
it clear they viewed Maplin as a ‘Tory prestige project’ and would cancel it, should they 
return to power. 
Changes in socioeconomic conditions had similar effects. For example, in the early 1970s, 
when Maplin was the chosen policy output to address the UK’s air capacity problem, the oil 
crisis, subsequent recession and altering forecasts of demand provided a window of 
opportunity for the minority coalition to exploit, which they did successfully. Other 
socioeconomic changes with similar subsystem-shaking effects included the onset of the 
Cold War, which meant control of Stansted airport reverted to the United States Air Force, 
and the reform of the House of Lords in the 1960s, which meant the Board of Trade were 
unable to push through a Special Development Order for Stansted. 
The ACF would view the development of the jumbo jet as an exogenous (technological) 
event, which created a change in the basic attributes of the problem area. Through the 
increased use of the jumbo jet, terminal capacity, not runway capacity, became the 
pressing issue, which redefined the problem. Furthermore, other external events 
exacerbated the effect the jumbo jet had on changing the basic attributes of the problem 
area. The oil crisis and subsequent recession created a fall in predicted growth rates, while 
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discussions in other policy subsystems surrounding the development of the Channel Tunnel 
and high-speed rail questioned the need for a large-scale problem such as Maplin.  
The ACF also views changes in public opinion as an external event, with the potential to 
shake the policy subsystem and redefine the problem. A dominant coalition out of favour 
with public opinion provides a window of opportunity for minority coalitions, for example, 
when public opinion failed to align with the recommendations of the Roskill Commission. 
To the ACF, public opinion is not solely an external subsystem event, but is itself an 
important resource that constrains and facilitates the actions of coalitions. For example, 
leading up to the Chelmsford inquiry, both coalitions attempted to gain national media 
support as a means to achieving favourable public opinion.  
In contrast to external events, the exclusion of Stansted from the Roskill Commission’s 
shortlist of sites is an example of what the ACF would consider an internal event. While 
similar in effect, those within the subsystem stimulate internal events, while external 
events are largely outside the control of subsystem actors. By excluding Stansted from the 
shortlist of sites, the Roskill Commission insulted previous analysts, an omission that 
robbed them of potential coalition members.  
In summary, while minority coalitions were able to exploit windows of opportunity and 
exert pressure on the direction of policy, the dominant coalition behind the development of 
a third London airport prevailed. Conflict between coalitions was site-specific, driven by 
changes to the relatively stable parameters resulting from changes in fundamental socio-
cultural values and to the basic attributes of the problem, and from external events shaking 
the policy subsystem. In the early 1980s, when conflict returned to the site at Stansted, the 
minority coalition was unable to exploit any window of opportunity and hence, the decision 
to develop Stansted stuck.  
Critical reflections: the Advocacy Coalition Framework’s perspective 
While the ACF has provided a convincing explanation of the mechanisms behind the 
process of policy change that led to the development of Stansted as the third London 
airport, its application has both provided evidence that backs up existing critiques of the 
framework and has uncovered new theoretical insights. This section identifies and 
considers these.  
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The application refutes the criticism posited by John (1998) and Mintrom and Vergari 
(1996) that the ACF relies too heavily on external events as the driver of policy change. In 
explaining the process of policy change in the search for the third London airport, external 
events did play a prominent role; shaking the policy subsystem, which redistributed 
resources and importantly, provided windows of opportunity for the minority coalition to 
exploit. However, it would be unfair to suggest that the ACF relied too heavily on these 
events as the causal drivers of policy change. Rather, it was a combination of external 
events, changes to the relatively stable parameters and skilful coalition members that 
drove policy change, the latter a point picked up by both Ameringer (2002) and Jordan and 
Greenaway (1998), who conclude that after an external shock, skilful coalition members are 
needed in order to exploit the opportunity.  
An extension of this, and a question that the ACF fails to address adequately, is how can a 
minority coalition effectively exploit a window of opportunity that arises immediately after 
a shake to the policy subsystem? As Albright (2011) comments, a more nuanced 
understanding of how different shocks shift agendas and redistribute resources among 
coalitions would assist in developing the ACF’s understanding of these causal mechanisms, 
as would an analysis of the event beyond its proximity to the subsystem. While internal 
events, notably the omission of Stansted from the Roskill Commission’s shortlist of sites, 
created effects similar to external events (the redistribution of resources and opening up of 
a window of opportunity), beyond observation, what does this dichotomy add to the ACF’s 
understanding of policy change? Are internal events more likely to be pre-empted by those 
within the policy subsystem and hence, have less of a shock? Are they more likely to 
encourage policy-oriented learning?  
The application provides evidence of the existence of coalitions of convenience, a 
phenomena commented on by Hann (1995) and Kim and Roh (2008), but rejected by the 
ACF (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993: 27). Coalitions of convenience are where actors 
motivated by short-term interests work together to achieve said interests. For example, the 
minority coalition that emerged in response to the Roskill Commission’s decision that 
Cublington should be developed as the third London airport, in which actors were 
motivated by a short-term interest to stop the development of Cublington. 
The existence of coalitions of convenience calls into question a key assumption of the ACF: 
that policy core beliefs are the ‘glue’ behind coalitions (Weible et al., 2009: 122). Using the 
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same example, the empirical evidence provides uncertainty as to what level actors in the 
minority coalition held their opposition to the development of Cublington. BAA’s rejection 
of Cublington could be described as a secondary level aspect, that is to say, a means to 
achieve their policy core belief that Stansted should be developed. Similarly, Colin 
Buchanan’s opposition to Cublington could be a secondary level aspect, a means to 
achieving his policy core belief that Foulness (Maplin) was the most appropriate site for the 
third London Airport. In fact, it is feasible that the Wing Area Resistance Association 
(WARA), the local community group, were the only actor in this coalition who held their 
opposition to the development of Cublington as a policy core belief.  
Adding further complexity to the internal dynamics of advocacy coalitions, this application 
has uncovered the existence of coalitions within coalitions, with the local community 
groups that united local actors against a specific site exemplifying the phenomena. 
NWEEHPA and SAPA at Stansted, WARA at Cublington and Defenders of Essex at Maplin all 
united local actors with a policy core belief that their locality should not be the site for the 
third London airport, coalitions that were then part of a broader coalition (arguably, of 
convenience).  
Reflecting the fluid nature of policymaking, this application provides evidence that not all 
actors in the policy subsystem are engaged in the policymaking process to the same extent. 
While Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999: 137) acknowledge that there are regular (those 
that are involved in virtually all issues) and periodic (involved in only a distinct set of issues) 
participants within a policy subsystem, the evidence here demonstrates that actor 
participation can also vary within an advocacy coalition. For example, the coalition opposed 
to the development of Stansted at the Eyre inquiry (1981-83). NWEEHPA and the local 
authorities took an active role on a broad range of issues (regular/core actors), while British 
Airways, the airport operator at Manchester and national non-governmental organisations 
such as the National Trust, took a less active role and only became engaged on specific 
issues (periodic actors). Similarly, in the coalition opposed to the development of 
Cublington, Colin Buchanan and WARA were regular/core actors, while BAA, Peter Self and 
John Adams were periodic.  
This application has highlighted the important role resources play in facilitating and 
constraining the ability of actors, and the coalitions within which they exist, to achieve their 
policy goals. However, it also uncovers an important insight into the typology of resources 
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that was included in the most recent revision of the framework (Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 
201); that certain resources have more of an effect on coalition activity than the ACF 
acknowledges and that resources themselves affect one another. Equally, the ACF’s 
application highlights the crucial role financial resources play with well-financed coalitions 
in a better position to attain other resources, such as information and the recruitment of 
influential actors to their coalition. 
The nature of this case study, with its focus of the public inquiry as the venue in which 
conflict takes place, automatically pushes the analysis from the national to the local level, 
which uncovers a useful insight into the ability of the ACF to handle multi-level structures of 
policymaking. From the perspective of the ACF, there is a broad understanding of ‘the 
problem’ throughout the policy subsystem: the development of a third London airport to 
fulfil the need to increase UK airport capacity. However, with the initiation of site-specific 
public inquiries, an influx of local level actors entered the policy subsystem and with them, 
entirely new conceptions of ‘the problem’. 
From the ACF’s perspective, policy-oriented learning did not feature in the process of policy 
change. Critically reflecting on this uncovers an important insight: that the assumed need 
for a third London airport, and the presumption that this need would be filled, actively 
blocked any form of learning. A structural concept that the ACF struggles to engage with, 
the tightly defined terms of reference at all inquiries and reviews, inhibited actors from 
questioning the need for increasing the UK’s airport capacity. Conflict in the policy 
subsystem was over the implementation of policy, that is to say, the site of development 
for the third London airport, with no room for the discussion of technical information and 
subsequent learning among coalitions.  
Although the ACF provides a convincing explanation of the events that led to the decision 
to develop Stansted as the third London airport, illuminating the importance of external 
events and relatively stable parameters in facilitating and constraining the ability of actors 
to achieve their policy goals, this application has provided evidence that backs up a number 
of existing critiques of the framework as well as uncovering new critical insights. Drawing 
on former applications, it has provided evidence that refutes the claim that the framework 
relies too heavily on external events as the driver of policy change; shows that coalitions of 
convenience and coalitions within coalitions do exist; and questions whether policy core 
beliefs are really the ‘glue’ of coalitions. Furthermore, it has uncovered new insights into 
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the dynamics of coalition activity; the role that differing resources can have in facilitating 
and constraining the ability of actors’ to achieve their goals; and has questioned its ability 
to handle multi-level policymaking.  
These critical reflections will be evaluated further in Chapter Eight, where they will be 
combined with those that emerge from the ACF’s application to the second case study. 
However, this chapter now explains the events that led to the approval of Stansted as the 
third London airport from the perspective of the SRA. 
The Strategic-Relational Approach’s perspective 
In what it perceives to see as an artificial dualism between structure and agency, in 
understanding the policymaking process an advocate of the Strategic-Relational Approach 
(SRA) focuses on the relationship between the two, employing the concepts of strategic 
actors and strategically selective contexts to explain policy change.  
From the SRA’s perspective, throughout the search for a third London airport the strategic 
selectivity of the terrain upon which conflict took place, remained largely unchanged: an 
emphasis on the economic imperative of increasing the UK’s air capacity via the 
development of a third London airport and the urgency with which it was required. 
Furthermore, the favourable position of the British Airports Authority (BAA), which at the 
time was an arm of government, ensured that the debate around a site for a third London 
airport continually returned to Stansted (which BAA owned).  
Broader than the site specificity of Stansted, the need, and the apparent urgency with 
which a third London airport was required, shaped the strategically selective context to one 
that favoured those actors whose strategies aligned with the fulfilment of this need (i.e. 
airport operators). Setting rigid structural conditions, this need (enshrined and reflected in 
the form of the state, observable in the White Papers of 1953, 1967 and 1978), was fiercely 
protected, with tightly defined terms of reference constraining all public inquiries and 
reviews, providing a structural barrier to its challenge.  
Explicitly stating their intentions and motivations, actors acted strategically to achieve their 
policy goals, reflecting upon the strategically selective context and calculating their 
strategic actions in light of this knowledge. At the start of the search for a third London 
airport, circa 1950s, a single, state-based, actor was involved: the Ministry of Civil Aviation, 
who had a clear policy goal to rationalise London’s airport system and a defined strategy to 
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achieve this via the development of a third London airport (enshrined in the 1953 White 
Paper). As time passed, and debate turned to the implementation of this policy goal, more 
and more strategic actors entered the conflict.  
There were those behind specific sites. BAA motivated by an intention to develop Stansted 
airport; the Roskill Commission who made the strategic calculation that Cublington was the 
best site; the Conservative Government that saw the solution to the air capacity problem as 
the development of Maplin as the third London airport; and the Conservative Government 
who invited BAA to submit a planning application for Stansted in the early 1980s. The 
strategies of these actors collided with those of another swathe of strategic actors who 
were against the development of specific airport sites: at Stansted, NWEEHPA, local 
authorities and local MPs; at Cublington, Colin Buchanan, BAA, and WARA; and at Maplin, 
the Defenders of Essex and BAA. 
From the viewpoint of the SRA, the delays to Stansted’s approval as the third London 
airport was the result of there being no guarantee that the state will always act in the best 
interests of capital. For example, the Chelmsford inquiry did not find the Stansted case 
proven, placing the Government in an awkward position. Themselves a strategic actor, they 
deployed a strategy to collide with the inspector’s recommendation, appointing the 
Peterson Committee to conduct a review. The recommendations of the Peterson 
Committee, not the Chelmsford inquiry, were enshrined in the form of the state (illustrated 
in the 1967 White Paper). This strategic action went on to transform the strategic context 
for future action, with many strategic actors cynical over the ability of the state to reflect 
accurately the balance of power in society, instead choosing to consciously align with those 
interests crucial in the reproduction of economic growth.  
Similarly, from the SRA’s perspective, the events proceeding Anthony Crosland’s 
appointment as President of the Board of Trade in 1967, further demonstrate the lack of 
guarantee that the state will always act in the best interests of capital. At the time, in the 
aftermath of the Peterson Committee, the terrain was set in BAA’s favour. However, 
Crosland transformed the strategically selective context. His concern with both the 
emerging environmental movement and the use of thorough cost-benefit analysis in the 
decision-making process changed the balance of power and hence, the forces crystallised in 
the form of the state. Through a process of strategic learning, those opposed to the 
development of Stansted could see the terrain shifting and employed strategies to exploit 
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this shift, ultimately proving victorious and overthrowing, albeit temporarily, the Stansted 
choice.  
Perfectly illustrating the recursive nature of the relationship between structure and agency, 
actors formulated their actions based on what they knew about the strategic selective 
context. For example, in the late 1960s, in the knowledge that the terrain was against them, 
the groups of actors opposed to the development of Stansted took the strategic move to 
recruit Brancker, the technical assessor at the Chelmsford inquiry, into their campaign, 
predicting that this would shift the terrain towards them. Equally, many actors opposed to 
a specific site grounded their arguments in economic terms, knowing this had the best 
chance of impinging on the strategically selective context. 
Learning from past conflict, actors considered both the short and long-term effects of their 
action. BAA played the long game, and when short-term decisions went against their 
interests, they altered their strategy accordingly, for example, the strategic decision to 
refuse to co-operate with the Roskill Commission’s research. Equally strategic and forward-
looking, Colin Buchanan pre-judged the effect his dissent from the Roskill Commission 
would have in transforming the strategically selective context. By publicising his rejection of 
Cublington, he stimulated a process of strategic learning among actors and tilted the terrain 
away from those advocating the development of Cublington.  
From the SRA’s perspective, the reversal of the Maplin decision was the result of a shifting 
terrain. The oil crisis and subsequent recession in the early 1970s, had transformed the 
strategically selective context, and the structural conditions surrounding the decision for a 
site for the third London airport were changing, notably, growth forecasts were falling, 
meaning that the attraction of a large-scale project like Maplin, requiring vast injections of 
capital, was becoming less appealing.  
Illustrating the balance of forces in society, the state (observable in the 1978 White Paper) 
reflected these changes, setting the strategically selective context for what was to be the 
final battle in the search for a third London airport. The White Paper all but selected 
Stansted than by name: ruling out the development of a wholly new airport as well as the 
expansion of London airports bar Stansted. From the perspective of the SRA, the 
Department for Transport then formulated their strategy within this context, inviting BAA, 
at this time still an arm of government, to submit a planning application, providing it with 
political legitimacy and tilting the terrain further in its favour.  
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Though ultimately unsuccessful, leading up to the Eyre inquiry, the collective of strategic 
actors opposed to Stansted pre-judged the terrain, and through a process of strategic 
learning, modified their strategic actions. Confident that the inquiry would prove there was 
a need for a third London airport (this never before challenged), they took the strategy to 
prove why Stansted was not the best solution to the capacity problem and the need could 
be fulfilled better elsewhere. To this end, they put in a planning application to develop a 
fifth terminal at Heathrow Airport, calculating that this was their best chance of pulling the 
terrain in their favour. It failed to have the desired effect, with the approval of Stansted in 
1985 reflecting the balance of power within society.  
To an advocate of the SRA, structural factors inherent in the policymaking process placed 
the aviation industry, and in particular BAA, in a favourable position. Tightly defined 
structural conditions at inquiries and reviews meant that planning inquiries took on the 
characteristics of site-specific feasibility studies. The legal system favoured those more 
financially resourced actors who could afford top legal representation and sustain their 
presence at inquiries. However, it was not straightforward, with public opinion, a powerful 
social force, forcing the state to re-open and re-examine the problem. While those 
opposing the development of the third London airport at Stansted, Cublington and Maplin 
won battles and forced the re-examination of the problem, ultimately, in the early 1980s, 
those at Stansted faced a terrain that was so uneven their strategic actions failed to 
impinge upon it. 
Critical reflections: the Strategic-Relational Approach’s perspective 
Akin to the ACF’s application, the SRA has provided a convincing narrative in explaining the 
mechanisms behind the process of policy change that led to the development of Stansted 
as the third London airport and the position the aviation industry occupied in it. Similarly, 
its application has provided evidence that both backs up existing critiques and uncovers 
new insights into the theory’s ability to explain policy change. As before, this section 
identifies and considers these.  
Advancing Marxist thought, and in-line with the current era of politics, the application here 
has provided evidence that the SRA is a step forward from Poulantzas, notably in the way it 
abandons the primacy given to class struggle (a critique posited by Barrow, 1993). 
Explaining the process of policy change witnessed in this case study purely through class 
domination would have ignored other social forces. For example, the role that public 
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opinion played in transforming the strategically selective context after the Roskill 
Commission’s recommended Cublington. Nonetheless, this is not to rule out class as a 
powerful social force, with a criticism often levelled at local opposition groups (e.g. 
NWEEHPA and WARA) that they were affluent middle-class NIMBYs, using their political 
and financial resources to maintain their quality of life with no care for the environmental 
impact of development. However, while this is an advance on the thinking of Poulantzas, 
theoretically the SRA falls short by failing to explore what these other social forces are. 
The application concurs with Valler and Wood’s (2004: 1837) comment, that a strength of 
the SRA is that its units of analysis are concerned less about abstract theorising, and more 
about detecting the immediate concerns of structural constraints, strategic actions and 
strategic learning, that is to say, they focus on what is happening in reality. Empirically, this 
is achievable via the close attention that the SRA pays to the perceptions of actors, making 
the identification of actors’ motivations and intentions achievable through empirical 
observation. For example, it was clear that BAA’s intention was to get Stansted developed 
as the third London airport. Furthermore, by encouraging an examination of the strategies 
that actors employ, the SRA directs attention to the way actors plan to achieve their policy 
goals, for example, BAA’s refusal to co-operate with the Roskill Commission’s work.  
However, while this focus on observable strategic actions is useful, the SRA fails to explore 
where the strategies of actors originate, a point picked up by Uitermark (2005: 141) and to 
which this application adds weight. Empirically, it fails to encourage an examination of the 
beliefs and motivations that lay behind these actions. For example, the SRA explains Colin 
Buchanan’s dissent from the Roskill Commission as a strategy to achieve his intention to get 
the Cublington choice shelved. However, as both the empirical evidence in Chapter Four 
and the application of the ACF demonstrate, the motivations behind his dissent were more 
complex than this and included a belief that Maplin was the most appropriate site. 
Scholars have praised the SRA’s conception of the state (Taylor, 1995: 261). In not giving it 
any form of innate power, the state’s power is determined by the balance of forces that 
exist within society at any one time, operating as a, “dynamic institution that offers unequal 
opportunities to different social groups to achieve their specific political purposes” (Ioris, 
2011: 7). However, this application adds evidence to Heigl’s (2011: 84) critique that what 
the SRA’s conception of the state lacks, is a mechanism to describe and assess the internal 
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dynamics of the state, which would assist in, for example, assessing the internal dynamics 
between BAA and other government departments.  
An extension of this is the failure of the SRA to fully explore its scalar implications, a critique 
highlighted by both Chettiparamb (2007: 414) and Uitermark (2005: 141). By failing to do 
so, the SRA is unable to assess the internal dynamics of the state’s form at multiple levels. 
This is particularly problematic in a case such as this, where national level policymaking 
takes place at the local level, creating an interesting dynamic where the state at the 
national level (e.g. the Ministry of Civil Aviation, BAA, etc) was often in conflict with the 
state at the local level (e.g. site-specific local authorities). 
Although the SRA is innovative in its attempt to analyse the recursive nature of the 
relationship between structure and agency, it is yet to examine the role of group dynamics, 
putting co-ordination among actors down to a strategic decision. This fails to explore the 
mechanisms behind how and why actors work together to achieve their policy aims and the 
potential obstacles to co-ordination, activities that need to be understood to fully grasp the 
agency side of the structure-agency relationship. Furthermore, the SRA fails to theorise on 
the ability of actors to alter structural circumstances in which they exist; for example, do 
they all have the same ability to do so? If not, why? 
In spite of the terrain so heavily tilted in favour of the aviation industry, and even more so 
in favour of Stansted, from the perspective of the SRA, the final decision still took an 
inordinate amount of time. To advocates of the SRA, with its clear focus on an uneven 
terrain placing certain strategies, and hence certain actors, in a position of privilege, BAA 
should have been able to achieve their policy goals far quicker. This suggests that there are 
underlying mechanisms behind the how and why of policy change that the SRA cannot 
grasp. 
In summary, the application here illustrates that the SRA is a definite step forward for 
Marxist thinking, notably in its attempt to draw attention to the recursive nature of the 
relationship between structure and agency and its acknowledgement of powerful social 
forces other than class. A major strength of its application is its focus on the realities of 
political action via the observation and analysis of actors’ intentions and the strategies they 
employ to achieve them. However, this application has provided evidence to back up 
existing critiques and uncovered new critical insights. Notably, in the case of the former, its 
inability to explore fully what underpins actors’ strategies and its failure to engage with the 
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scalar implications of the policymaking process, and in the case of the latter, its negligence 
of group dynamics. As with those of the ACF’s application, these critical reflections will be 
evaluated further in Chapter Eight, where they will be brought together with those that 
emerge from the SRA’s application to the second case study.  
Conclusions 
To conclude, this chapter has applied the ACF and SRA to help explain the series of complex 
interactions and events that led to decision to develop Stansted as the third London airport, 
and in particular, to explore how, and why, the aviation industry was able to occupy, what 
is oft-claimed, a position of privilege within the policymaking process. Both offered 
convincing accounts of the process of policy change that occurred in the search for a third 
London airport and both explored some of the mechanisms by which the aviation industry 
was able to enjoy a privileged position within the policymaking process. However, 
singularly, neither is able to explain sufficiently the events that took place. Structural 
influences having too big a role for the ACF to fully explain, and simultaneously, the process 
was too drawn out and chaotic for the SRA to wholly comprehend.  
Policy change in this case proved to be slow; a process that, due to its pluralist roots, the 
ACF was better able to comprehend. For the SRA, the process was arguably too drawn out: 
in theory, the terrain should have been heavily in favour of those actors crucial in the 
reproduction of capital (i.e. the aviation industry) and their policy aims should have swiftly 
been achieved. To an advocate of the SRA, any activity that aligns itself with these 
objectives is likely to occupy a privileged position within a capitalist system. However, as 
the ACF uncovered, events outside of their control meant that this process was not as 
simple as the SRA would have liked. However, the ACF’s explanation was not exhaustive. 
Though hard to believe that more could be added to such a comprehensive approach, 
through its pluralist roots, the ACF is unable to engage the economic, political and 
institutional structural influences that have played a key role in this case study, affecting 
the actions taken by actors to achieve their policy goals. 
By employing the ACF’s core units of analysis (policy subsystems, advocacy coalitions and 
the hierarchal belief system) close attention was paid to the motivations behind why actors 
became involved in the policymaking process and how and why they work together to 
achieve their policy goals. This focus helped to explore some of reasons behind how and 
why the aviation industry is able to occupy a privileged position, notably, through the 
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assemblage of powerful pro-growth coalition(s) that were able to retain control over the 
broad direction of policy. Complementary to this understanding, the SRA engages with the 
strategies actors used to achieve their policy aims (as opposed to the beliefs that lay behind 
their aims), which uncovered some of the strategies used by actors to place them in a 
position of privilege and maintain this position. Structural factors inherent in the 
policymaking process facilitated the actions of the aviation industry and those promoting its 
interests, while these same factors inhibited the actions of those opposed to it. 
These findings will be brought together with those of the second case study in Chapter 
Eight, to assess the ability of each theory to explain policy change and the reasons behind 
the aviation industry’s position of privilege in the policymaking process. Furthermore, it will 
initiate a theoretical dialogue between the two theories, which will analyse and evaluate 
the extent to which they are complementary or contradictory, and if there is any scope or 
indeed any need for, synthesis. However, prior to further theoretical evaluation, the next 
chapter (Six) provides an in-depth account of the events that led to the approval of a 
second runway at Manchester Airport. A far shorter case involving one public inquiry, 
Chapter Seven will then subject the case to the same theoretical application and reflection 
as here. 
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The Approval of Manchester Airport’s Second Runway  
 
“As connoisseurs of disaster movies know, airports can be the backdrop for the strangest 
alliances” (The Times, 1997b) 
 
To keep up with the predicted growth in air traffic, which it estimated would outstrip 
existing capacity within a few years, on 29 July 1991, the airport operator at Manchester 
Airport announced plans to develop a second runway. Ranked third in the UK, both in terms 
of passenger numbers and volume of freight, between 1983 and 1993 terminal passenger 
traffic more than doubled to 12.9 million and flown freight almost trebled to approximately 
89,000 tonnes (Mason, 1994: 3, para. 3.1). With projections showing strong passenger 
growth to 30 million by 2005, a second runway was considered by the airport as a strategic 
necessity (Holden et al., 2011: 6). The Civil Aviation Authority had warned Manchester that, 
for scheduling purposes, with a single runway there was little potential to increase the 
hourly sustainable capacity beyond 42 air traffic movements; a figure that with a second 
runway could increase to 63 (Butcher, 2010b: 2; Civil Aviation Authority, 1995). 
Figure 6.1 outlines the main events that led to the runway’s approval. In August 1991, 
Manchester Airport formally announced their plans to develop a second runway 
(Manchester Airport plc, 1991). In March 1993 a runway option had been chosen and in the 
following July a planning application and environmental impact assessment submitted. Due 
to the nature of the development, in October 1997 the proposal was ‘called-in’ by the 
Secretaries of State for the Departments of Transport and Environment and in the following 
December it was announced that a public inquiry would be held. This sat from 21 June 1994 
until 9 March 1995 at Wythenshawe Forum, Manchester (Booth, 1995; Smith, 1996: 1, 
para. 13). Gaining approval on 15 January 1997, on 10 February 2001, after ten years of 
planning and construction, Manchester Airport’s second runway officially opened.  
To explore the events that led to the runway’s development, this chapter proceeds in the 
same manner as Chapter Four. By combining extensive archive analysis from documents 
held at the John Rylands Library, Manchester with a series of elite interviews and a review 
of the existing literature, an empirical timeline of the events that led to the approval of a 
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second runway at Manchester Airport is constructed. The chapter begins by identifying the 
key actors involved in this area of policymaking before moving to a chronological discussion 
of events. It concludes by summarising who got what, where and how, and identifying the 
case study’s key themes. Chapter Seven applies the Advocacy Coalition Framework and the 
Strategic-Relational Approach to help explain how, and why, policy changed. 
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1978 White Paper Airports Policy designates Manchester as a 
gateway international airport and principal airport outside 
the South East. 
  
1984 Greater Manchester Green Belt Local Plan acknowledges 
unique circumstances relating to the Airport.  
  
1985 White Paper Airports Policy encourages use of regional 
airports in meeting the UK’s aviation needs. 
  
August 1991 Manchester Airport announces plans to develop a second 
runway, site to be confirmed. Three informal rounds of 
public consultation take place. 
 
Pre-
inquiry 
16 July 1993 Manchester Airport submits planning application for 
second runway (with closure of Altrincham Road). 
October 1993 Planning application is called-in. 
November 1993 Six months of negotiations begin between Manchester 
Airport and Cheshire County Council resulting in agreement 
of extensive mitigation package. 
21 June 1994 Public inquiry begins.  
The 
inquiry 
31 August 1994 Section 106 Agreement signed between Manchester 
Airport, Manchester City Council and Cheshire County 
Council. 
16 September 
1994 
Manchester Airport submit second planning application 
(includes diversion of Altrincham Road). 
31 January 1995 Section 106 Agreement and Second Supplemental 
Agreement signed between Manchester Airport, 
Manchester City Council and Cheshire County Council. 
9 March 1995 Public inquiry completes. 
15 January 1997 Secretaries of State approve 1994 application.  
Post-
inquiry 
24 January 1997 Campaign Against Runway 2 (CAR2) begins.  
31 May 1997 Local residents march. 
10 February 
1998 
Manchester Airport awards the contract for the 
construction of the runway to AMEC-Tarmac Joint Venture. 
27 March 1998 CAR2 received a two-week reprieve from the High Court.  
10 May 1998 CAR2 lose stay of execution. 
20 May 1998 Operation Fulcrum begins. 
20 January 1999 New protests begin in Cedar’s Wood and Arthur’s Wood in 
the Bollin Valley against the lopping of trees. 
June 1999 Appeal court rules that protestors can be evicted as 
trespassers. 
February 2001 Tony Blair, Prime Minister, opens the second runway. 
 
Figure 6.1 Timeline of events that led to the approval of a second runway at Manchester Airport 
Adapted from: Butcher (2010b); Department of Trade(1978); Department of Transport (1985); Holden et al. 
(2011); Twigg (1994); and Manchester Airport plc (1991) 
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Key actors 
Four key groups were involved in the events that led to the second runway’s approval: the 
aviation industry; the various local authorities that had an interest in the runway’s 
development; local communities (predominantly Mobberley and Knutsford, the two areas 
directly affected by the runway proposal); and a number of national and local 
environmental organisations (Yates, 2011: 00:14:12).  
The aviation industry 
After the 1986 Airports Act, which resulted in the commercialisation of Manchester Airport, 
ten local authorities gained ownership of Manchester Airport (Butcher, 2010b: 2; Dudley, 
2005: 96). Manchester City Council were, and still are, the majority shareholder owning 55 
percent, while the local authorities of Bolton, Bury, Oldham, Rochdale, Salford, Stockport, 
Tameside, Trafford and Wigan each owning five percent (Gibbs et al., 2002; Humphreys and 
Francis, 2002).23 Remote from the airport, many of the local authorities involved in the 
airport’s ownership were, and remain, unaffected by the immediate impact of the airports 
operations (Moss et al., 1997: 324). Setting the airport up as a public limited company 
created a distance between the airport and the local authorities. Graham Stringer, then 
Airport Chairman and later Leader of Manchester City Council, acted as a mediator 
between the two (Dudley, 2005: 96). Manchester Airport considered itself the Heathrow of 
the north and saw the development of a second runway the way to solidify this position 
(Carter, 2011: 00:03:31; Keene, 2011: 00:12:34). 
At the time under study, four major airlines operated at Manchester Airport: British 
Airways, Caledonian Airways (British Airway’s charter subsidiary), Britannia Air, and 
American Airlines. Along with the tour operator Airtours, they all supported the proposal. 
They felt there was a need to increase capacity at the airport, particularly during peak 
periods, in order to provide flights at convenient times for the consumer, connecting 
airports, and the US market. All made it clear that should this need not become a reality, 
they would look elsewhere to expand their business (Carter, 1994b: para. 9.10, 11.3; 1994c: 
para. 1, 2; Doganis, 2011: 00:15:26; Feeser, 1994: 11, para. 5.6; 12, para. 5.12; Marcall, 
                                                             
23 Still owned by the local authority consortium, in 2001 the Manchester Airports Group formed to operate and 
manage Manchester Airport and a number of smaller acquisitions; purchasing an 82.7 percent share in 
Humberside airport from the local authorities in 1999 and both East Midlands and Bournemouth airports for an 
estimated £241million from National Express in 2001 (Humphreys and Francis, 2002). 
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1994: 6, para. 10; Parker-Eaton, 1994: 2-3; Smith, 1996: 89, para. 3.5.79; Thomas, 2011: 
01:07:39).  
Local authorities 
Unsurprisingly, as majority shareholder, Manchester City Council supported the proposal 
for a second runway, stating that it was, “consistent with urban regeneration and economic 
development policies in the existing and emerging development plan framework for 
Manchester Airport and the surrounding area” (Smith, 1996: 381, para. 4.1.1). They saw the 
airport’s development as essential to the economy of Manchester and the wider North 
West region; to the aspirations for the future economic and social health of the City; and to 
reinforce both Manchester and the North West’s place in Europe and the world 
(Manchester City Council, 1995; Smith, 1996: 381, para. 4.1.3).  
Echoing the sentiment of City Council, local business and commercial interests and the 
Trades Union Congress (TUC) supported the proposal (Smith, 1996: 947). Alan Manning, at 
the time North West Secretary of the TUC, said that, “the economic and social benefits 
arising from the project far outweigh the environmental concerns ... Trade Unions across 
the North West are deeply concerned to protect the living standards and quality of life of 
workers, and the unemployed, across the region” (Alderson, 1994). The proposals also had 
the support of the Trafford Park Urban Development Corporation and the Central 
Manchester Development Corporation. Introduced under the 1980 Local Government and 
Planning Act, in their role as statutory regeneration agencies, both supported the second 
runway due to the economic and regenerative benefits it would bring to the area (Keene, 
1994: 2; Smith, 1996: 438, para. 5.1.1; 5.1.5).  
Aside from those with an ownership stake in the airport, two other local authorities had an 
interest in its activities. Located nine miles south of Manchester City Centre, then, as now, 
the airport lies on the administrative boundary between Cheshire and Greater Manchester. 
The local planning authorities for the site were Manchester City Council and Macclesfield 
Borough Council with the then Cheshire County Council, a strategic planning and 
transportation authority for the Cheshire part of the site (Holden et al., 2011: 6; Twigg, 
1994: 1, para. 6).24  
                                                             
24 In 2008, the roles of Cheshire County Council and Macclesfield Borough Council merged into the new 
Cheshire East Council. 
Chapter Six 
142 
 
Initially opposing the second runway, just days before the public inquiry began, Cheshire 
County Council announced their support for the proposal. Manchester Airport recognised 
that gaining approval for the runway would be easier with their support and quickly 
became involved in negotiations with them over the ways in which the proposal could be 
made acceptable (Dudley, 2005: 97; Holden et al., 2011: 9). After these negotiations, 
Cheshire County Council, Manchester City Council and Manchester Airport agreed on an 
extensive environmental mitigation package enshrined in a Section 106 Agreement. 
Rosemary Williams, then Principal Planning Officer at Cheshire County Council, stated that 
the proposal was in line with national policy, was needed to cope with forecast demand 
and that the site was acceptable as long as additional mitigation measures were carried out 
(Williams, 1994).  
Macclesfield Borough Council, with responsibility for many of the towns and communities 
at the end of the proposed runway and much of the surrounding landscape, objected to the 
proposal on five counts (Holden et al., 2011: 9). First, was the impact that the development 
would have on the landscape, both visually and recreationally. In particular, there was 
concern that the construction of the Bollin Tunnel (to divert the Bollin River) would breach 
the visual continuity of the valley through the introduction of an engineered structure into 
a landscape that had slowly evolved over thousands of years (Macclesfield Borough Council, 
1994b). Second, was the ecological impact of the development, notably the loss of 
irreplaceable environmental capital. Third, they felt that the runway was inappropriate 
development in the Green Belt (Griggs et al., 1998: 361). Fourth, the noise impact of the 
runway, and finally, its negative impact on listed buildings (Macclesfield Borough Council, 
1994b; Smith, 1996: 545-612).  
The proposals did divide the North West with Merseyside authorities opposing the 
development. They wanted to see expansion at Liverpool John Lennon Airport and believed 
that expansion at Manchester would scupper these plans (Bounds, 2011; Griggs et al., 1998; 
Smith, 1996: 613, para. 10.1.1). At the time of the inquiry, Manchester Airport dominated 
the market in the North West, handling 90 percent of demand (Mackenzie, 1994: para. 4.2; 
Read and King, 1994; Tucker, 1994: para. 4). Liverpool Airport had submitted development 
plans in December 1993 for expansion, up to 12 million passengers per annum by 2030 as 
an alternative to the construction of a second runway at Manchester, and in a tactical move 
had the support of the Macclesfield Borough Council (Bounds, 1994: para 1.2; 2011; Halsall, 
1994; Smith, 1996: 613, para 10.1.1; Yates, 2011: 00:42:59). The position of the Merseyside 
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authorities was that any claim of regional development should consider that Liverpool was 
an area in desperate need of economic growth and considerably worse off than 
Manchester (Bounds, 1994: para. 3.2, 4.1, 8.1, 8.2, 8.4; 2011).  
Central government, though not a key actor in the public inquiry process (Smith, 1996: 511-
544) retained two important mechanisms of power. First, by setting the policy conditions 
that provided the political backdrop that the second runway resonated with, and second, 
by calling-in the proposal, they, in the guise of the Secretaries of State for the Environment 
and Transport, made the final decision. At the inquiry, the Department of Transport 
contributed to the discussion of national aviation policy objectives. Furthermore, through 
the liberalisation of air services via bilateral and European policies the Government 
provided policy conditions to support the growth of regional airports (Smith, 1996: 511, 
para. 8.1.6).  
Local communities 
In July 1991, when Manchester Airport announced plans to develop a second runway, local 
communities were mobilised into action. The airport had previously submitted plans for a 
second runway in the 1970s so when revived, a strong conservationist ideal was already 
embedded in the local community (Griggs and Howarth, 2000: 58; Griggs et al., 1998). The 
Mobberley Village Society was an established community group from which emerged a 
working group of residents opposed to the second runway (Griggs et al., 1998: 360). This 
group formed the Knutsford and Mobberley Joint Action Group in 1991 as a direct response 
to the airport’s announcement (Griggs et al., 1998: 360). Tactically they knew they stood a 
better chance of success by uniting all those opposed to the development so took the lead 
in the formation of the Manchester Airport Joint Action Group (MAJAG), an umbrella 
organisation that went on to represent local groups at the inquiry. Chaired by Derek 
Squirrell (Mayor of Knutsford), MAJAG’s overall objective was, “to oppose the construction 
of a second runway and associated development at Manchester Airport” and to ensure 
there was a collective voice at the public inquiry (Smith, 1996: 641, para. 11.1.5; Squirrell, 
1994: para. 5). Each group retained its identity, appointing one member to the MAJAG 
committee (Butcher, 2010b: 3; Griggs and Howarth, 2000: 56; Griggs et al., 1998: 360; 
Manchester Airport Joint Action Group, 1994b; Smith, 1996; Squirrell, 1994).25  
                                                             
25 Others that emerged against the proposal were; the Styal Action Association, Hale Altrincham and Bowden 
Action Group (HABAG), Stockport Campaign Against Runway Expansion (SCARE), Heald Green and Long Lane 
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At its peak, MAJAG united an estimated 10,000 individuals against the second runway 
(Griggs et al., 1998: 360; Manchester Airport Joint Action Group, 1994b: para. 1.2). In his 
analysis of the group, Booth (1995: 70) notes that there were surprisingly few internal 
conflicts despite the concerns of each group being slightly different. As the group united a 
diverse pool of individuals, they were able to draw on expert support and resources from a 
range of professionals as well as politicians from the various local authorities around the 
airport (Griggs et al., 1998: 360).26 With resources a major issue, by organising local events 
the group raised £300,000 in the run up to the public inquiry (Griggs et al., 1998: 360). 
There was however, one rupture in the group. Emerging due to a split over strategy, in April 
1994, just prior to the start of the inquiry, Jeff Gazzard formed the Manchester Airport 
Environmental Network (MAEN). MAEN was, “a voluntary group, campaigning to control 
the environmental impact of Manchester Airport through research, media activities and 
forging links with other similar groups both here in the UK and abroad” (Gazzard, 1994; 
Griggs et al., 1998: 361). Gazzard disagreed with MAJAG’s strategy to concentrate their 
(limited) resources on the hiring of expert witnesses, preparing for the inquiry and the 
appointment of a solicitors firm from London. He believed that a greater proportion of their 
resources should be put into lobbying at Westminster and a national media campaign 
(Griggs and Howarth, 2000). As well as MAJAG, and MAEN, there were local residents who 
made individual representations at the inquiry (Manchester Airport Joint Action Group, 
1994b: para. 1.4). 
National and local environmental organisations 
At various points, different national and local environmental organisations entered the 
debate into a second runway. The National Trust had three main objections to the 
development. First, they considered it out of scale with the setting, causing unacceptable 
damage to three of their properties. The Styal Estate was within 130 metres of the airport 
boundary; Tatton Park within 2000 metres of the proposed runway and under a flight path; 
and Dunham Massey, under the predominant northern flight path (Gibbs, 1994: para. 35; 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Ratepayers Association, Ashley Action Group, Mere Residents Association, Handforth Ratepayers Association 
and the Knutsford Civic Society (Manchester Airport Joint Action Group, 1994; Squirrel: 1995, para. 2; Smith: 
1996, para. 11.1.2). 
26 MAJAG had the support of Peter Burns, a Stockport Councillor, Fred Ridley, from the Liberal Democrats in 
Stockport, Bert Grange, a Knutsford County Councillor, Harold Tucker, the former Lord Mayor of Manchester, 
Bill Firth, the Chairman of the Hale Ward Conservative Association and Meg Taylor, Chairman of the Mobberley 
Women’s Branch of the Conservatives (Booth 1995). 
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Nixon, 1994a: para. 5; 1994b: para. 11.1; 2011). Their second objection was that it required 
the taking of inalienable land from Mobberley, land that the National Trust had a 
responsibility to preserve and protect, though it turned out the proposed runway was not 
on inalienable land but very close (Nixon, 2011). Finally, they felt that the mitigation and 
compensation packages on offer were inadequate (Nixon, 1994a: para. 9.1; 1994b: para. 
11.1). The Trust were also concerned with the precedent that development would set, the 
likely financial impact the properties would see as a result of falling visitor numbers, and 
the effect on events that relied on the tranquillity of the area (Nixon, 1994a: para. 9.2, 9.3; 
1994b: para. 11.6).  
Cheshire Wildlife Trust and Manchester Wildlife took the lead on the environmental 
arguments for the protection of badgers, wildfowl and natural habitats. From their point of 
view, as nature conservation organisations, full mitigation was impossible as irreplaceable 
ancient woodland would be lost and that habitat re-creation was, at best, a second 
measure and still in the experimental stage (Mahon and Grayson, 1994: 1, para. 7.0, 8.0, 
9.0). 
Due to the airport lying just out of the city boundary and because there was no initial 
groundswell of interest in opposing it, Manchester Friends of the Earth (FoE) were not 
immediately involved in the campaign against the second runway (Howden, 2011: 
00:02:17). However, as it became clear that approval and subsequent construction of the 
runway was imminent, the group decided they should have some sort of presence, with the 
environmental impact of the land-take in the Bollin Valley their main argument for 
opposing the runway (Howden, 2011: 00:02:46; 00:23:22). The group made connections 
with existing groups in Cheshire, namely MAEN and the Manchester sect of Earth First!, 
who were at the more radical, direct action end of the environmental movement (Howden, 
2011: 00:03:59). The unity brought together two different models of working; Manchester 
FoE were skilled in media work and had formal organisational structures whereas Earth 
First! had a larger group of people who wanted to be involved in actions, hence there was 
merit in making common cause (Howden, 2011: 00:07:08).  
Events that led to the second runway’s approval 
Manchester Airport’s plans to develop a second runway resonated well with the political 
landscape at the time. At the national level, due to its strategic role geographically, 
successive governments continued to support the development of Manchester Airport 
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(Griggs et al., 1998: 359). During the late 1980s/early 1990s, when the North West was seen 
as an area in desperate need of economic growth and modernisation, both the Thatcher 
and Major Conservative governments (1979-1997) pledged the expansion of regional 
airports to cope with the predicted increase in passenger and freight numbers, policy 
commitments that resulted in significant investment into terminal facilities at Manchester 
(Griggs et al., 1998: 359).  
Emphasising the importance of civil aviation to both local and national economies, the 1978 
White Paper Airports Policy (Cmnd. 7084) had designated Manchester as a gateway 
international airport and the principal airport outside the South East (Department of Trade, 
1978). A position reaffirmed in the 1985 White Paper Airports Policy (Cmnd. 9542), which 
encouraged the utilisation of regional airports in meeting the UK’s aviation needs 
(Department of Transport, 1985: para. 6.27; Doganis, 1994: 4, para. 5.2). Advocating the 
market model and taking airport planning outside the remit of central government, the 
1986 Airports Act, commercialised the airport, strengthening its institutional autonomy 
(Dudley, 2005: 96).  
The runway plans also aligned with regional level policies. The Regional Economic Strategy, 
published in June 1993 by the North West Regional Association, set out a vision for the 
future that made it clear Manchester Airport was an asset of huge value and strategic 
importance, emphasising that its continued growth was central to the region’s 
development (Twigg, 1994: 3, para. 12). Following this, the Regional Transport Strategy also 
supported the region’s airport facilities, citing the second runway at Manchester Airport as 
a key priority for investment (Twigg, 1994: 3, para. 13). A presumption in favour of the 
second runway’s development infiltrated the Greater Manchester Structure Plan (Twigg, 
1994: 3, para. 15), and the Cheshire Structure Plan viewed Manchester Airport as a key 
component of the area’s economy (Cheshire County Council, 1992).  
Though the second runway was entirely sited in the Green Belt, the Greater Manchester 
Green Belt Local Plan contained a specific policy stating that any development directly 
related to the operational efficiency and amenity of the airport would be acceptable within 
the confines of the Airport Operational Area (Greater Manchester Council, 1984; Twigg, 
1994: 5, para. 30). At the time of the inquiry there was no central government approved 
Regional Planning Guidance (RPG) for the area, however, a draft RPG had been submitted 
to the Secretary of State in 1994 and this was referenced at the inquiry (Twigg, 1994: 2, 
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para. 10; Yates, 2011: 00:44:09). The central theme of the RPG was the economic 
revitalisation of the region and it confirmed Manchester Airport as one of the North West’s 
key assets, whose development should be supported (Twigg, 1994: 2, para. 11).  
By the time of the public inquiry, there was a strong economic and political regional agenda 
throughout planning policy as well as national policy support for the development of 
regional airports. At a time when the UK was coming out of a recession, the development of 
Manchester Airport was seen as key to the regeneration of the North West with the second 
runway, “a common cause” (Holden et al., 2011: 6).27  
Pre-inquiry (1991-1994) 
In August 1991, Manchester Airport formally announced their plans to develop a second 
runway in the Manchester Airport Development Strategy to 2005 (Manchester Airport plc, 
1991). Under the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, the airport made two applications 
to the local authorities of Macclesfield and Manchester City for planning permission to 
develop land for a second runway and associated facilities. The first was dated 16 July 1993 
and the second 16 September 1994 (during the inquiry). They were identical except that 
the second included the closure rather than the diversion of the Altrincham Road, plus 
further mitigation measures (Butcher, 2010b: 2; Holden et al., 2011: 7). The National Trust 
had highlighted potential problems with the road diversion, so to avoid any delays the 
airport took the strategic decision to submit the second application just in case the first 
proved problematic (Macclesfield Borough Council, 1994a). The application was for a 3050-
metre parallel runway, 390 metres away from the existing one, which halfway along would 
cut across the River Bollin via an earth embankment with the river diverted through a 
tunnel (Butcher, 2010b: 2; Twigg, 1994: 2, para. 8). 
Driven by the desire to gain planning permission, the airport endeavoured to mitigate the 
impact of the second runway at every opportunity. Manchester Airport took the approach 
that if they were to be a world leading airport they needed to have a world leading 
environmental programme, a philosophy partly based upon the ownership structure of the 
airport and the responsibility this entailed (Thomas, 2011: 00:09:29; Twigg, 2011). For 
example, after the announcement of the runway plans, the airport initiated a lengthy 
scheme of public consultation and environmental assessment (Moss et al., 1997: 325; 
                                                             
27 The inquiry inspector, Kenneth Smith, stated that there were no European level policies that needing 
referencing at the inquiry (Smith, 1996: 990, para. 26.2.2). 
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Thomas, 2011:23:59; Twigg, 2011). The airport knew that as soon as discussions began 
internally about the possibility of a new runway, the public would find out, and hence took 
the strategic decision to go public from the start (Thomas, 2011: 00:16:34; Twigg, 2011).  
In preparation for the inquiry, Manchester Airport assembled a powerful growth coalition 
drawing on support from ‘privileged relations with successive national governments’ as well 
as business and political elites who had the desire to transform Manchester into a 
‘headquarter city’ (Griggs and Howarth, 2000: 58). Crucially, they had the support of 
Cheshire County Council who, as mentioned previously, just days before the start of the 
inquiry revoked their position of opposition and announced their support for the proposals 
due to an agreed environmental mitigation package.  
In recognising that gaining approval for the runway would be easier with their support, 
Manchester Airport quickly became involved in negotiations with Cheshire County Council 
over the ways in which the proposal could be made acceptable (Dudley, 2005; Holden et al., 
2011: 9). Cheshire County Council felt that the development of the runway would have a 
significant ecological impact, which they deemed unsustainable in nature conservation 
terms and at odds with the Cheshire Replacement Structure Plan (Marshall, 1994: para. 1.5; 
2011). Armed with a ‘shopping list’ of requests, they entered negotiations with Manchester 
Airport and Manchester City Council, which formed the basis of an extensive Section 106 
Agreement that included a thorough environmental mitigation package (Bartlett, 1994; 
Cheshire County Council, 1994; 1995; Harrison, 1995: para. 10.5; Muirhead, 1994; Smith, 
1996: 449, para. 6.1.21; 451, para. 6.1.29; Various, 1994).  
Section 106 Agreements are a private, legally binding agreement between local planning 
authorities and a developer, intended to make development acceptable when it would 
otherwise be unacceptable in planning terms (i.e. the developer provides ‘public’ benefits 
such as roads, playgrounds, etc). Enforceable in the courts, they are tougher than planning 
conditions alone but rarely imposed on a developer, so require extensive negotiation 
between interested parties (Dudley, 2005: 97; Holden et al., 2011: 10). Though normally 
agreed post-approval, agreement in this case was made early in the application (the first 
draft was completed prior to the 1994 application) (Holden et al., 2011: 3). A strategic move 
on the part of Manchester Airport, this meant it played a key role, “not just in the decision 
on the application, but in advance of emerging schemes of mitigation and operation of the 
runway, the discussion of planning conditions, and on the subsequent operation of the 
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Airport” (Holden et al., 2011: 10). Dudley (2005: 93) describes the agreement as a political 
solution to the Airport’s need to create a pro-growth coalition and by doing so, marked an 
attempt to deal with the competing ideas of economic growth and sustainable 
development. He comments that in the long-term, the problem with this was that the idea 
of economic growth was entrenched in the activities of the airport, while sustainable 
development had shallower roots. 
Once agreed, Cheshire County Council committed its support to the proposal (Bartlett, 
1994; Booth, 1995; Cheshire County Council, 1994; 1995; Harrison, 1995: para. 10.5; Holden 
et al., 2011; Muirhead, 1994; Smith, 1996: 449, para. 6.1.21; 451, para. 6.1.29; Various, 
1994). They believed that, “those adverse ecological effects which mitigation measures 
cannot overcome are not sufficient to outweigh the benefits that a second runway is 
considered to provide” (Gilfoyle, 1994a; b: 24, para. 5.11; Marshall, 1994: para. 5.6). Peter 
Yates, then Chief Planning Officer for Macclesfield Borough Council, remembers that they 
felt let down by Cheshire County Council (Yates, 2011: 00:33:18). However, Cheshire 
County Council criticised Macclesfield Borough Council, suggesting that they did not carry 
out a balanced exercise and purposefully avoided entering into a debate about the benefits 
of the proposal (Bartlett, 1995: 1).  
The Section 106 Agreement was, what Callum Thomas, then Head of the Environment 
Department at Manchester Airport, termed, ‘a contract with the communities’ containing 
more provisions than any other planning agreement, “because we just went out to 
communities and said what do you want” (Thomas, 2011: 00:20:29; Twigg, 2011). Through 
this, and the assemblage of a strong pro-growth coalition, Manchester Airport went to the 
public inquiry reasonably confident and ready to be ‘tested’ (Thomas, 2011: 00:14:55). 
Down to extensive consultation prior to the inquiry, and an approach that sought to 
minimise the problems discussed by objectors, Manchester Airport could, “prove we did 
everything we did and the reasons we didn’t do some things” (Thomas, 2011: 00:18:38). 
Just prior to the start of the inquiry, British Airways (BA) pulled their transatlantic route 
from Manchester to Los Angeles stating that leisure traffic alone was not sufficient to 
maintain the route. This led to those opposed to the proposal questioning the airlines 
commitment to the airport and subsequently, the need for a second runway (Carter, 1994a; 
Spencer, 1994). However, a letter dated 20 June 1994 from Sir Francis Kennedy, Chairman 
of BA Regional, attempted to alleviate any fears. This stated their [BA’s] commitment to the 
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development of their regional services and cited their recent establishment of BA Regional 
as a separate business and the construction (at the time underway) of new BA Maintenance 
facilities at Manchester as evidence of this commitment (Carter, 1994a). 
The inquiry (1994-1995) 
Starting on 21 June 1994 and completing on 9 March 1995, the public inquiry into the 
second runway received evidence from over 180 witnesses with written representations 
made by, or on behalf of, 14,813 parties of which 11,632 supported the runway and 3,114 
objected. MAJAG also submitted a petition with 18,984 signatures (Butcher, 2010b: 2; 
Griggs and Howarth, 2000: 56; Holden et al., 2011: 7; Smith, 1996: 949). In his opening 
speech, David Keene, QC for Manchester Airport, highlighted that, “the written 
representations sent in to the Secretary of State so far are, very unusually for a major 
project, split more or less evenly, with a slight majority in favour. Normally, as experience 
shows, it is those who object who are moved to put pen to paper” (Keene, 1994: 2). 
Kenneth Smith was the Inquiry Inspector who was aided by P. M. Brannan, the Assistant 
Inspector and Highway Assessor, and for part of the inquiry H. H. Jones, the Architect 
Assessor (Smith, 1996: 1, para. 13).  
In promoting the economic imperative of the runway, Manchester Airport cited a planned 
£530 million capital expenditure programme between 1994 and 2004 as evidence to their 
commitment to the growth of the airport. They argued that the development of a second 
runway would create employment benefits both at the airport and further afield and would 
attract new commercial and industrial activities to the region (Griggs et al., 1998: 359; 
Mason, 1994). An economic impact study carried out by York Consulting Ltd on behalf of 
the airport concluded that the second runway would have substantial economic benefits 
for the North West, providing a much needed stimulus to economic development and 
urban regeneration in the region and developing its position as a key business location in 
both Europe and the world (Mason, 1994: 22, para. 7.1, 7.3). Those opposing the runway 
saw it as a threat to, “an area that is one of the wealthiest and environmentally most 
pleasant commuter belts outside the South East” (Griggs et al., 1998: 359). They argued 
that the communities south of Manchester (Knutsford, Mobberley and Wilmslow) were not 
areas in need of economic stimulus and among the highest per capita income areas of the 
UK (Griggs et al., 1998: 360; Yates, 2011: 00:09:00).  
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Both Macclesfield Borough Council and MAJAG argued that the proposal conflicted with 
national, county and local planning policies and Green Belt policy (Yates, 1994: para. 3, 4; 
2011: 00:18:00; 00:31:38). They felt that the central issue for consideration by the 
Secretaries of State was whether the proposal was contrary to local (and national) policy 
and if so, whether there were any material considerations that justified the granting of 
permission contrary to that policy (Manchester Airport Joint Action Group, 1994b: para. 
3.1). 
In defence, John Twigg, then Infrastructure and Planning Manager at the airport, cited 
occasions where development had taken place on Green Belt land: two Channel Tunnel 
Freight Terminals (Coleshill, West Midlands and Port Wakefield, West Yorkshire); a new 
terminal building at Birmingham Airport; and the development of a major business park at 
Ashton Moss, Greater Manchester. He noted that the difference between these and the 
second runway was that the runway did not involve the construction of any substantial 
buildings (Twigg, 1994: 8, para. 41). While they acknowledged the environmental impact of 
the development, by contributing to, “the economic and social health of the city”, 
Manchester Airport maintained that development was an appropriate use of Green Belt 
land (Griggs et al., 1998: 361). Cheshire County Council echoed this, commenting that 
where the proposal was potentially in conflict with national policy, the economic benefit 
from the development was enough to justify the environmental impact and that through 
the agreed environmental mitigation package there would be ‘no net loss’ of biodiversity 
(Griggs et al., 1998: 361; Harrison, 1995: para. 10.2).  
Giving evidence for the Cheshire Wildlife Trust, Christopher Mahon and Robin Grayson, 
drew attention to the unique habitats and woodland that would be affected, “[the] 
Cheshire Wildlife Trust cannot support development applications which reduce non-
replaceable habitats as a point of principle” (Mahon and Grayson, 1994: 1, para. 2.0). Their 
evidence highlighted the affected legally protected species and the wildlife corridors the 
runway would interrupt, affecting the movement of animals and the dispersal of plants. Dr. 
D. M. Parker, giving evidence on the ecological aspects on behalf of Macclesfield Borough 
Council, echoed their view that the proposed mitigation package was inadequate and 
hence that the development should not be permitted (Mahon and Grayson, 1994: 1, para. 
4.0, 5.0; Parker, 1994). The National Rivers Authority also objected to the proposals 
because of the loss of approximately 800m of high conservation value river (Smith, 1996: 
742, para. 12.1.1). 
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Benefitting from Macclesfield Borough Council opposing the proposals, MAJAG presented 
themselves as the legitimate voice of the community, focusing their arguments on the local 
impact (Booth, 1995; Griggs et al., 1998: 361; Smith, 1996: 641-741). They accepted that 
the airport was important for the regional economy but argued that the economic benefits 
of a second runway had been overstated; questioning the commercial viability of the 
project and contesting the official line that it would result in the creation of 50,000 jobs. An 
arguably NIMBYist attitude, they also argued that Liverpool Airport could be expanded to 
handle a larger proportion of leisure passengers with Manchester focusing on business 
travellers (Griggs et al., 1998: 362; Thomas, 2011: 00:53:16).  
Merseyside Authorities made a case for a complementary airport system, utilising the 
existing runways at Manchester and Liverpool, an idea that was unsurprisingly rejected by 
Manchester Airport (Doganis, 2011: 00:06:43; Read and King, 1994). Louise Congdon, then 
General Manager for Market Strategy at Manchester Airport, made it clear that airlines 
were not receptive to the use of Liverpool Airport as an alternative to Manchester. Tom 
Carter, witness for British Airways, reiterated this point, “to say that Liverpool is an 
alternative to Manchester is to say Gatwick is an alternative to Heathrow” (Carter, 1994b: 
para. 11.2; 2011: 00:13:27; Congdon, 1994: 22, para. 9.9, 9.10; Feeser, 1994: 13, para. 6.2; 
Marcall, 1994: 7; Parker-Eaton, 1994). 
MAJAG also argued that the claimed economic benefits of a second runway could be 
achieved with better utilisation of the existing runway (Smith, 1996: 641, para. 11.1.5). Jim 
Shepherd, covering operational and technical matters for MAJAG, maintained that it was a 
completely inefficient proposal, citing Gatwick as an example where one runway was being 
used far more efficiently (Mackenzie, 1994: para. 4.7, 4.8; Shepherd, 1994: para. 1.6; 2011). 
An Environmental Impact Assessment, commissioned by MAJAG and using the airport’s 
own data, backed up these claims (Lichfield, 1994: 26, para. 9) and they had the support of 
Macclesfield Borough Council (Yates, 2011: 00:23:26).  
Terry Waite, a high-profile patron of MAJAG who had grown up in the area, gave evidence 
for the group (Waite, 2011). A strategic move on the part of MAJAG, Waite became 
involved in the campaign at the request of local people who wanted him to ‘fight their case’ 
and ‘give it some profile’ (Waite, 2011: 00:10:30). While he did not pretend to know about 
the technicalities of the proposal, he used his profile to bring attention to the 
environmental consequences of the development which he called, “nothing less than 
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environmental vandalism masquerading under the pretence of progress” (Waite, 1994: 
para. 5). Graham Stringer, at the time Leader of Manchester City Council, was aware of the 
profile that Waite would bring to the case, and as a counter-move invited him to visit the 
airport even though he no longer lived in the area nor really knew anything about the 
airport (Waite, 1994: para. 3).  
Manchester Airport took the opposition very seriously, pouring vast resources into both the 
inquiry itself and their publicity campaign (Bowen, 1995; Halsall, 1995; Macclesfield 
Borough Council, 1994b; Manchester Airport plc, n.d.; Twigg, 2011). The Independent 
reported that they became involved in the kind of tactics usually employed by protesters. 
For example, handing out ‘Yes to R2’ sticks of rock, badges and bumper stickers at party 
conferences and encouraging airport workers and the public to write letters of support 
(Bowen, 1995).  
MAJAG made it clear how resources constrained their activities and tilted the debate in 
favour of the Airport. Unable to sustain their presence at the inquiry, they felt they were 
relegated to the bottom of the inquiry process (Manchester Airport Joint Action Group, 
1994a: para. 2.1, 2.4): 
 “The applicants, and the supporting local authority, are in the fortunate position of 
being able to instruct leading members of the bar and national consultants of the 
highest stature. In order to present its case in opposition, MAJAG through its 
membership, has had to raise funds, privately, through collection or donation in 
order to be able to instruct consultants of a calibre similar to those instructed by 
the applicants and their supporters” (Manchester Airport Joint Action Group, 
1994a: para. 2.3). 
Giles Kavanagh, barrister for MAJAG, expressed the groups growing frustration of the 
process. They were disillusioned by the inequality in terms of money, manpower and 
resources between the groups which was reflected in the calibre of evidence provide by 
Manchester Airport and that they had legal representations each day (Booth, 1995). Terry 
Waite highlighted his dismay with what he perceived to be inequality in the public policy 
process, “the inevitable analogy between the Airport and Action Group is that of Goliath 
and David. I hope that David, armed with a sling of common sense, will be sufficient to 
demonstrate that this bad proposal should not be allowed to proceed further” (Waite, 
1994: para. 10). 
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In their closing submissions, Manchester City Council addressed claims by MAJAG that as a 
shareholder in the airport they were a corrupt body and unable to deal with the application 
impartially (Manchester City Council, 1995). MAJAG believed that had the airport been in 
private sector ownership it would have been less likely to have made the application on the 
grounds that a private sector company would be far more concerned with maximising the 
efficiency of the existing runway (Mackenzie, 1994: para. 4.11). Manchester City Council 
stated that they had been, “alert to its potentially conflicting roles and diligent in keeping 
its functions [as shareholder and Local Planning Authority] separate” (Castle, 1994: 3; 
Manchester City Council, 1995: para. 1.4, 1.5).  
Anthony Merrick, an owner of one of the properties highlighted for demolition, wrote to 
Kenneth Smith, the Inquiry Inspector, on 6 March 1995, outlining his dismay at not being 
able to present his case at the inquiry (Merrick, 1995b). Merrick felt that the costs of 
relocation and temporary accommodation for those affected had not been adequately 
addressed and claimed that Manchester Airport had withheld information and harassed 
him and his family (Merrick, 1995b). However, return correspondence shows that Merrick’s 
motivations were not entirely innocent. The response from Manchester Airport outlined 
the context in which Merrick made his claim; Merrick committed himself to purchasing 
Hanson House in October 1992 – ten months after Manchester Airport announced plans for 
runway (Manchester Airport plc, 1995).28 
An article in the Manchester Evening News on 25 February 1995 (and reported a few days 
later in the Guardian) showed that the motivations of the local residents were not as 
unified as they tried to project. An owner of an affected property admitted that he had 
received secret payments for the early acquisition of his property (Merrick, 1995a). Dr. John 
Westwood, a senior lecturer at the Manchester Business School, began the campaign 
promising the airport, “the fight of their lives” however, over time this mantra became, “at 
some point you have to look after number one”. Dr. Westwood also purchased twenty 
acres of land next to his property to use as a bargaining chip (Merrick, 1995a).  
To exacerbate discontent within the local community, only the official price paid for the 
property was published, not the value of the secret payments, which in turn depressed the 
                                                             
28 The announcement of the second runway proposal (in the Development Strategy to 2005) highlighted the 
potential risk to Hanson House from one of the runway options with the airport immediately opening 
negotiations with landowners in December 1991 once the runway option had been decided.  
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value of other properties. Both Manchester Airport and Manchester City Council denied any 
secret payments and while Jeff Gazzard of MAEN uncovered the deal claiming it was 
another example of the ‘sleazy tactics’ being employed, those who supported the runway 
claimed that the revelation backfired and purely illustrated that people were more 
concerned in achieving a good price for their property (Merrick, 1995a). 
Post- inquiry (1995-2001) 
Kenneth Smith, Inquiry Inspector, recommended that permission be granted for the 1994 
application for a second runway (closure rather than the diversion of the Altrincham Road) 
(Smith, 1996: 1179). After considering Smith’s report, in January 1997 John Gummer, then 
Secretary of State for the Environment, and Sir George Young, for Transport, announced 
their joint decision in favour of a new runway (Butcher, 2010b: 2). The Secretaries of State 
felt that the openness of the Green Belt (deemed its most important attribute) would be 
retained and the amount of built development in the Belt would be lowered through the 
removal of the south-side hangars complex (Butcher, 2010b: 4; Smith, 1996: para. 
26.24.30). They accepted Smith’s conclusion that Manchester Airport had achieved a critical 
mass of services and facilities to attract air services sufficient to warrant a second runway: 
“It is important to build on Manchester airport’s success. It is already the 18th 
busiest airport in the world in terms of international traffic, with more passengers 
than Chicago. The second runway will cater for long-term customer demand. It will 
also create thousands more jobs and brings benefits for the whole of the North 
West. This decision will be a boost for Manchester and the whole of the North 
West. A development of this scale will inevitably have impacts on the local 
environment, but the applicants have put together an impressive package of 
proposals to reduce these impacts and to seek the balance implicit in the concept 
of sustainable development” (Gummer, 1997).  
The decision to approve the runway signalled the beginning of a prolonged campaign of 
direct action, “the scene was now to shift decisively away from the committee meetings of 
the protest groups to the construction site and muddy camps of the eco-warriors” (Griggs 
et al., 1998: 363). Activists across the UK had been alerted to the approval and the second 
runway was to become their next big ‘battle’ to play out in front of the media, “it was the 
ideal follow-up to the actions at Twyford Down, Newbury and Fairmile” (Griggs et al., 1998: 
363-364; Howden, 2011: 00:08:41). Less than ten days after the decision was announced, 
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activists began to establish camps and the Coalition Against Runway 2 (CAR2) was born 
(Griggs and Howarth, 2000: 57; Howden, 2011). CAR2 united activists through the loose 
networks that characterise the direct action movement and brought together the cultures 
and tactics of activists and campaigners from Manchester FoE, Earth First!, the Green Party, 
Manchester Wildlife and MAEN.  
Jeff Gazzard, MAEN lead, was chief co-ordinator for CAR2 and worked as a crucial hinge 
between the different groups involved and, with organisational support from Manchester 
FoE, co-ordinated the local and national media coverage (Griggs and Howarth, 2000: 59; 
Griggs et al., 1998: 363). Earth First! set up the first camp, Flywood, with five others 
established soon after: Cliff Richard, River Rats, Jimi Hendrix, Wild Garlic and Zion Tree 
(Durham, 2000: 79; Howden, 2011: 00:07:41).  
The campaign was media driven, with the national press reporting on the backgrounds and 
tactics of activists, as well as experiences from journalists who were residing at the camps. 
Due to the attention he gained at Newbury, Swampy became the mouthpiece for the 
campaign. On 1 April 1997 The Times reported that he intended to stand as a candidate at 
the general election for the Never Mind the Ballots Party in the Blackley constituency 
against Graham Stringer, former leader of Manchester City Council, then Chairman of 
Manchester Airport (1996-1997) and soon to be Labour MP for Blackley (1997-2010) 
(Jenkins, 1997; The Times, 1997a). Furthermore, he was commissioned to write a column 
for The Mirror which earned him £550 per week and appeared on an episode of Have I Got 
News For You on 18 April 1997 alongside Neil Hamilton, then MP for Tatton (1983 – 1997) 
and who was against the second runway (Howden, 2011: 00:13:05).  
Prior to, and during the inquiry, MAJAG had struggled to gain media support, even at the 
local level (Seel et al., 2000: 152). Once CAR2 began, they had to adapt quickly as the media 
dissented on the area. Though they had informal connections with the activists, there were 
those within MAJAG who were concerned that they would be seen to be endorsing the 
illegal action. However, akin to the environmental activists, they were people disillusioned 
by the inquiry process. They had placed great faith in the political process to deliver a fair 
judgement and the approval of the runway completely undermined the confidence they 
had in such processes. The recognition that established democratic channels were 
unreliable, helped many local residents (of a generally affluent demographic) to identify, 
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and form linkages with, the environmental activists; a linking yet to be seen in the UK 
(Griggs and Howarth, 2000: 52; Griggs et al., 1998: 364; Nixon, 2011).  
Described as a Vegan and Volvo alliance, The Times commented, “on the queer way in 
which the camp dwellers were working closely with the twinset and pearled Cheshire 
residents” (Howden, 2011: 00:17:29). A marriage of convenience, they were two groups 
that would otherwise have no association (Howden, 2011: 00:17:38; Moss et al., 1997; 
Thomas, 2011). The Mobberley Women were a prime example of such linkages. Led by 
Gaynor Trafford, a housewife, and Sylvia Selfe, a company director, they established a 
support group for the camps, providing baked goods, recharging mobile phones and car 
batteries, and filling water containers (Farrell, 1997; Griggs and Howarth, 2000: 62). The 
Times described them as, “women in Barbour coats and Hunter Wellingtons who joke about 
having become surrogate mums to the dreadlocked and nose pierced protestors” (Farrell, 
1997). Analogous to the criticism levelled at MAJAG during the inquiry, there was the 
suggestion that some of the local residents who supported the camps were motivated 
more for concern over their house prices than the environmental impact of the runway 
(Seel and Plows, 2000: 124).  
High-profile support once again came from Terry Waite who, on 23 May 1997, led members 
of MAJAG onto the runway site. Their goal was to emphasise the moral authority of the 
activists while also highlighting that the legal process had been weighted against them from 
the start. It was behind the media profile of Waite that the local residents and the 
environmental activists really merged. He provided the campaign with the legitimacy and 
credibility that local residents needed to become involved (Griggs and Howarth, 2000: 62; 
Griggs et al., 1998: 366).29 
Manchester Airport was quick to react to the campaign, branding those involved as ‘anti-
progress’ and claiming that they were rich Cheshire NIMBYs opposed to economic growth. 
However, this only served to solidify the relationship between the divergent groups with 
the media, publishing pictures of local residents and direct action campaigners standing 
side by side, further legitimising the coalition (Griggs and Howarth, 2000: 61).  
                                                             
29 Not all local residents partook in the campaign of direct action, opting to drop out of the campaign (Griggs 
and Howarth, 2000: 64). 
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On 10 February 1998, Manchester Airport awarded the contract for the construction of the 
runway to AMEC-Tarmac Joint Venture who became responsible for security on the site 
(Butcher, 2010b: 5). There was no immediate attempt to remove the protestors with a 
‘phoney war’ composed of light conflicts taking place throughout February and March. 
Media coverage intensified as both sides battled over public opinion. Manchester Airport 
continually raised concerns over the safety of activists and the dangers that they posed to 
the emergency services if they were called upon to rescue those in tunnels (also aware that 
the death of a protestor would have been a PR nightmare) (Durham, 2000: 80). On the 
other side, CAR2 engaged in equally media-driven tactics, for example, making it known 
that the police and security guards had cut off water supplies to the camp (Griggs et al., 
1998: 365).  
On 27 March 1998, CAR2 received a two-week reprieve from the High Court to provide time 
for them to organise their case against eviction. However, they lost at the full hearing on 10 
April, signalling the start of camp evictions and on 10 May, a Judge at the High Court in 
Manchester refused the protestors a stay of execution (Butcher, 2010b: 5). Operation 
Fulcrum, led by the Under-Sheriff of Cheshire Randal Hibbert, began on 20 May when the 
Zion Tree and Jimi Hendrix camps were stormed by 60 bailiffs and 100 police (Howden, 
2011: 00:35:18). Expert tree climbers used ‘cherry-picker’ platforms to evict tree dwellers 
while quad bikes driven by evictors in black boiler suits drove across the camps. The 
evictions took approximately four weeks when the final few individuals were removed from 
the Cakehole tunnel at the Flywood camp (Howden, 2011: 00:35:53).  
New protests against a directive from the Civil Aviation Authority, that trees had to come 
down to enable planes to safely use the second runway, arrived in January 1999 at Cedar’s 
Wood and Arthur’s Wood in the Bollin Valley, areas owned by the National Trust (BBC 
News, 1999; Holden et al., 2011: 7). In June 1999, appeal court judges ruled that the 
National Trust could evict the activists as trespassers, leading to accusations that the 
National Trust was bought-off. Attracting less attention than CAR2, the last evictions from 
Arthur’s Wood took place in September 1999 (BBC News, 1999).  
In February 2001, Tony Blair, then Prime Minister, opened the second runway. Around the 
site, approximately 150,000 trees were planted, 97 ponds restored or recreated and 37,000 
amphibious creatures relocated (Butcher, 2010b: 1; Buyck, 2001: 46; Manchester Airport 
plc, 2011b). In their ten-year review of the Section 106 Agreement, Holden et al. (2011: 3) 
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conclude that in hindsight, more could have been done to mitigate the environmental 
impacts, particularly in regards to noise control and public transport. Passenger growth has 
also not been as great as was predicted. However, in overall terms, their review concludes 
that the agreement, “significantly mitigated the impact of the Second Runway” and there is 
a commitment to continuing the agreement (in some form) beyond 2011 (Holden et al., 
2011: 3).  
Dudley (2005) takes a slightly different view of the lasting effect of the Section 106. He has 
carried out an analysis of the effect that time has had, and will continue to have, on the 
agreement, concluding that it represented a policy solution to an immediate problem, 
rather than a long-term infiltration of the idea of sustainable development into the 
workings of the Manchester Airport. Both Cheshire County Council and Macclesfield 
Borough Council have played a role in monitoring the agreement, however, without the 
level of technical expertise or resources required, there have been difficulties in keeping 
the Airport to its agreed commitments and targets, and its salience among the local 
communities has also dissipated over time (Cheshire County Council, 2001; Dudley, 2005: 
99). 
Eventually, who got what, where, when and how? 
Prior to Manchester Airport’s announcement of the second runway proposals, the political 
landscape, both at the regional and national levels, presumed in favour of development. 
The thrust of national policy during the 1980s and 1990s was to promote economic 
development and urban regeneration with the North West identified as a region in urgent 
need of economic stimulus. Considered key in achieving these goals was the development 
of Manchester Airport. Through this support, Manchester Airport entered discussions into a 
second runway with strong political and economic backing. 
Furthermore, the 1986 Airports Act had lessened the role of central government in the 
operation of the airport, leaving its success to market forces and the airport responsible for 
the protection of local communities. Municipally owned, the consortium of local authorities 
were in the unique position of having responsibility to the airport, their constituents and 
the environment. The airport held their inbuilt responsibility to local communities to high 
regard, both economically in terms of the provision of employment opportunities but also 
in protecting their quality of life and the environment. However, those opposed to 
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development of the second runway felt that this pattern of ownership left those local 
authorities with an insurmountable conflict of interest. 
Uniting those with varying motivations, a diverse group of actors were involved in the 
campaign of opposition. In the run up to, and during, the public inquiry, this included an 
array of local resident and community groups united under the MAJAG umbrella; MAEN 
emerging from an internal split within MAJAG; local environmental NGOs such as the 
Cheshire Wildlife Trust; national environmental NGOs such as The National Trust; and the 
local authorities of Macclesfield Borough Council and Merseyside. Manchester Airport 
assembled a powerful pro-growth coalition, uniting the local authority consortium that 
owned the airport with key business interests in the region. However, what proved crucial 
to their success was the recruitment, through an extensive environmental mitigation 
agreement, of Cheshire County Council to their coalition. By conducting a lengthy process 
of negotiation prior to the public inquiry, both with Cheshire County Council and local 
communities, Manchester Airport entered the public inquiry in a relatively bulletproof 
position with the Section 106 agreement reducing the vulnerability of the airport to attacks 
on its environmental awareness.  
With the announcement that the runway had been approved the story of the second 
runway entered a new phase, characterised by environmental activism that united direct 
action protestors with local residents in what was a pairing yet to be seen in the UK, 
bringing a wave of new actors into the process. Though ultimately unsuccessful, the 
campaign was important in the movement against the uncontrolled expansion of the 
aviation industry and for the first time, united actors with truly diverse motivations but a 
common policy goal. Through the media, it became one of national significance and in the 
long-term facilitated a process of learning, transforming the political landscape and pushing 
the aviation issue up political and environmental agendas.  
Debate about whether the economic benefits of the second runway outweighed the local 
environmental impact dominated the public inquiry. Manchester Airport had worked hard 
to minimise the environmental impact of the development. However, while an extensive 
environmental mitigation package and Section 106 agreement dealt with this at least in the 
short-term, time will only tell how salient it remains. Interestingly, discussion failed to 
address the global environmental impact of the second runway, notably the environmental 
impact of increasing the number of flights to the levels now seen and illustrated through 
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the diversity of actors that became involved, airport expansion was becoming a national 
issue, however, it appears these ideas were yet to fully infiltrate the policymaking process. 
Manchester Airport’s second runway was the first runway built in the UK in twenty years 
and at the time of this writing (2012) remains the most recent (Butcher, 2010b: 2). Framed 
as the economy versus the environment, an array of actors, united in two clear coalitions, 
debated the merits of a second runway. However, as in the previous case study, the 
situation is more complex than this simple polarisation with the political backdrop of the 
time implicitly in favour of the second runway’s development and strategy and tactics 
playing a key role in swaying public and political opinion. The next chapter applies the 
Advocacy Coalition Framework and the Strategic-Relational Approach to help explain and 
comprehend the events and mechanisms that underpinned the decision to approve the 
second runway and to shed light on whether the aviation industry was able to occupy a 
privileged position in the policymaking process. 
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Explaining policy change: the approval of Manchester’s second 
runway  
 
Adopting the same format as Chapter Five, this chapter applies the Advocacy Coalition 
Framework (ACF) and the Strategic-Relational Approach (SRA) to shed light on, and make 
sense of, the empirical findings discussed in Chapter Six, against the backdrop of the 
broader historical and political context detailed in Chapter Two. The theoretical insights 
these theories offer will help to explore the oft-cited claim that the aviation industry 
occupies a privileged position in the environmental policymaking process and will assist in 
exploring the mechanisms behind how and why. 
This chapter begins by explaining the series of events that led to the approval of the second 
runway from the perspective of the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF). An agency-
centred theory that studies the policymaking process over a decade or more, the ACF views 
power as broadly shared among a range of interest groups. According to its advocates, 
beliefs stimulate political behaviour, which takes place in the policy subsystem among 
advocacy coalitions. These coalitions battle to become dominant and control the broad 
direction of policy. The following section critically reflects on this application and examines 
the capacity of the ACF to explain events by drawing on existing critiques and highlighting 
new potential theoretical refinements. 
The decision to approve a second runway at Manchester Airport is then explained from the 
perspective of the SRA. In attempting to transcend the relationship between structure and 
agency, the SRA focuses attention on the recursive relationship between the two and views 
policy change as the result of battles between actors who use various strategies to achieve 
their (explicitly stated) policy aims. As before, the subsequent section critically examines 
the ability of the SRA to explain the events that led to the runway’s approval and, once 
again by drawing on new and existing critiques, illuminates theoretical insights. 
The Advocacy Coalition Framework’s perspective  
As Chapter Three explained, the ACF seeks to make sense of decision to approve a second 
runway at Manchester Airport by employing its core concepts of policy subsystems, 
advocacy coalitions, exogenous shocks and policy-oriented learning.  
Chapter Seven 
163 
 
In explaining the approval of the second runway, an advocate of the ACF would define the 
policy subsystem as the result of two, overlapping, local ‘legs’ of national level policy 
subsystems: that concerned with the provision of regional airport capacity and that 
concerned with the economic regeneration of the regions. The development of a second 
runway at Manchester Airport was a policy solution to the problems faced by both of these 
subsystems, simultaneously increasing the UK’s airport capacity and providing an economic 
stimulus to Manchester and more broadly, the North West. Policy outputs such as the 1978 
White Paper (that had designated Manchester as a gateway airport and principal airport 
outside the South East) and the 1985 White Paper (that encouraged the use of regional 
airports to meet the UK’s aviation needs) reflect these complementary goals.  
The ACF’s definition of the policy subsystem would encompass all those actors interested in 
this area of policymaking, including the airport operator, the consortium of local authorities 
who owned the airport, other interested local authorities, local communities, airlines and 
environmental non-governmental organisations (NGOs) such as The National Trust and the 
Cheshire Wildlife Trust. 
From the ACF’s perspective, within the policy subsystem two coalitions fought to control 
the broad direct of policy: the dominant, which united all those actors who held a policy 
core belief that the second runway should be developed; and the minority, which united all 
those actors holding a policy core belief it should not. The former included the airport 
operator, the consortium of local authorities that owned the airport, the major airlines 
operating out of the airport, Cheshire County Council, local business and commercial 
interests, and central government (who were committed to the expansion of regional 
airports as part of the solution to the UK’s air capacity problem). Emerging in response to 
the airport operator’s announcement of the proposal, the latter included the Manchester 
Airport Joint Action Group (MAJAG); the Manchester Airport Environmental Network 
(MAEN); Macclesfield Borough Council; Merseyside Authorities; and local and national 
environmental NGOs (e.g. Cheshire Wildlife, Manchester Wildlife Trust, the National Trust).  
The ACF would explain Cheshire County Council’s change in coalition as the result of a 
process of policy-oriented learning, which altered their policy core beliefs. Initially, Cheshire 
County Council held a policy core belief that the environmental impact of the second 
runway outweighed the economic benefit and hence, was part of the minority coalition in 
opposition to the runway’s development. However, the development of an extensive 
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Section 106 agreement, which saw new information enter the policy subsystem and 
stimulated a process of policy-oriented learning, shifted the Council’s policy core beliefs.  
To the ACF, changes to the relatively stable parameters that characterise ‘the problem’ are 
unable to provide the stimulus for policy change but are able to affect actors’ behaviour. 
Politically constructed, and in stark contrast to the previous case study where the problem 
was continually redefined, the basic attributes of ‘the problem remain’ unchanged. To the 
dominant coalition, there was a need to increase the capacity of regional airports, and a 
need to regenerate the North West: to the minority coalition, the economic benefit of the 
runway did not outweigh its environmental impact. Fundamental sociocultural values were 
equally as static, with a pro-growth mentality characterising the dominant coalition and a 
conservationalist ideal entrenched in the minority coalition.  
In contrast to the previous case study, where the ACF explained policy change as being 
driven by external events shaking the policy subsystem, in the approval of Manchester 
Airport’s second runway there were no external events that provided a route to policy 
change. While there is evidence of what the ACF would consider internal events, they 
proved insufficient to overthrow the dominant coalition, with the minority coalition unable 
to exploit the window of opportunity they offered. For example, British Airways pulling 
their transatlantic route from Manchester Airport just prior to the start of the public inquiry 
created an endogenous shock, providing an opportunity for the minority coalition to 
question the airlines commitment to the airport and hence, the need to increase capacity 
when airlines were reducing their routes. Equally, the Merseyside Authorities submission of 
a planning application for development at Liverpool John Lennon Airport failed to provide a 
sufficiently large endogenous shock, with airlines (an airport’s key customer) never 
considering it an alternative to development at Manchester.  
Highlighting the critical role, to the ACF, of technical information in the policymaking 
process, from the perspective of the ACF, policy changed incrementally through a process 
of policy-oriented learning, concerned with determining whether the economic benefits of 
the runway outweighed the environmental impact (i.e. in a quest to achieve balance). The 
dominant coalition used information to emphasise why the economic benefit of the runway 
was so crucial to both Manchester and the North West and to defend why it warranted 
development within an area protected by Green Belt legislation. The minority coalition 
used it to highlight the environmental impact, to prove that the economic benefits were 
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overstated and could be achieved with more efficient use of the existing runway, and to 
persuade policymakers that the economic benefits were not enough to warrant 
development in the Green Belt. As both coalitions brought information into the policy 
subsystem about the environmental and economic impact of a second runway, actors 
engaged in a process of policy-oriented learning, where ultimately, the economic 
outweighed the environmental. The inspector concluded that, through an extensive 
environmental mitigation package, enshrined in the Section 106 agreement, a suitable 
balance had been struck.  
As predicted by the ACF, resources played a crucial role in constraining and facilitating the 
ability of coalitions to achieve their policy goals. For example, the recruitment of actors in 
positions of formal legal authority provided a major resource for coalitions, illustrated via 
the dominant coalition’s successful recruitment of Cheshire County Council. Furthermore, 
with the financial resources of the dominant coalition dwarfing those of the minority 
coalition, akin to the previous case study, the former was able to fund advertising and 
media campaigns, employ the best legal team and sustain a strong presence at the public 
inquiry. 
From the ACF’s perspective, the period of direct action that occurred after the runway’s 
approval was a policy impact, that is to say, a consequence of the policy output to approve 
the runway. It transformed the policy subsystem. New actors entered, for example, direct 
activists from across the UK and Manchester Friends of the Earth, while existing ones left, 
for example, Macclesfield Borough Council, Cheshire County Council and the Merseyside 
authorities. Again, two advocacy coalitions were in conflict: the dominant coalition, 
consisting of the airport operator, and a minority coalition, which united all those with a 
policy core belief to stop the runway’s construction, namely local residents and direct 
activists. In contrast to events pre-approval, conflict was media-driven, consisting of a 
series of internal events that attempted to open a window of opportunity for the minority 
coalition to exploit, and hence, gain control of the direction of policy, for example, 
campaign marches around the runway site. However, as before, the minority coalition was 
unsuccessful in overthrowing the dominant coalition. 
Critical reflections: the Advocacy Coalition Framework’s perspective 
The application of the ACF provides a convincing narrative of the events that culminated in 
the second runway’s approval, explaining it as a process of incremental, and mostly 
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endogenous, change created by policy-oriented learning. However, there are areas the ACF 
inadequately addresses and/or under-specifies, to which this chapter now turns. 
The application here extends on a problem raised by the ACF’s authors, Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith, who acknowledge the policy subsystem definition can be made problematic 
through the existence of overlapping policy subsystems (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999; 
Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 193). As Figure 7.1 illustrates, the policy subsystem 
encompassing those actors with an interest in this area of policymaking was the result of 
two overlapping policy subsystems, however, what the ACF fails to fully specify is the 
implications that multi-level governance structures pose for policy subsystem definition (i.e. 
how conflict over national level policy was taking place at the local level).  
 
 
 
 
Building on Hann (1995) and Kim and Roh (2008), and agreeing with the previous case 
study, these findings cast doubt on the ACF’s outright rejection of coalitions of convenience 
(Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993: 27), where actors motivated by short-term interests 
work together to achieve said interests. The hierarchal belief system the ACF employs 
suggests that no coalition could exist between actors who do not share policy core beliefs 
and that these beliefs are the ‘glue’ of coalitions. However, in this case study, while 
advocacy coalitions did unite those actors who shared specific beliefs (e.g. opposing the 
second runway), it would be unwise to suggest that all actors held this belief at the same 
level and misleading to think actors would be unable to work together as a result.  
Figure 7.1 The approval of a second runway at Manchester Airport - policy subsystem 
definition 
Source: authors own 
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The minority coalition against the development of the second runway is an example of a 
coalition of convenience. While all actors united in this coalition held a belief to oppose the 
second runway, the empirical evidence does not suggest that all these actors held their 
rejection as a policy core belief, rather, that many held it as a secondary aspect, that is to 
say, a means to achieving their policy core beliefs. The local residents united in MAJAG saw 
the second runway as a threat to their quality of life; they held a policy core belief to stop 
it, as did MAEN. However, the National Trust held a number of policy core beliefs that the 
second runway threatened, based around the protection of their estates. Their rejection of 
the second runway was a held as a secondary aspect, the means to protecting their policy 
core beliefs. Equally, Merseyside Authorities held their opposition to the runway’s 
development as a secondary aspect, with the development of a second runway a threat to 
their policy core belief to develop Liverpool John Lennon Airport. 
Equally, the dominant coalition in support of the second runway was a coalition of 
convenience. While the airport operator held the development of a second runway as a 
policy core belief, it was not widely held at the policy core level. For example, to the airlines 
operating at Manchester, the development of a second runway was a means to achieving 
(i.e. a secondary aspect) their policy core belief to expand their operations, while business 
and commercial interests in the North West considered the development of a second 
runway a means to achieving a economic stimulus.  
The coalition that emerged as a direct response to the Secretaries of State’s approval of the 
runway can similarly be described as a coalition of convenience, uniting direct activists from 
across the UK with local residents. For the former, the campaign against the second runway 
neatly followed up action at Newbury and Twyford Down, with it providing the next big 
battle to fight for their policy core belief that the policymaking process was unjust, a belief 
that was much broader than the site-specificity of Manchester. For the latter, while they 
retained their policy core belief to reject the second runway, through a process of policy-
oriented learning, stimulated by their disillusionment with the public inquiry process their 
secondary aspects shifted to those that aligned with the direct activists (i.e. the campaign 
of direct action a means to achieve their policy core belief). 
Adding further complexity to the analysis of coalition activity is the existence of coalitions 
within coalitions. For example, MAJAG, where a coalition of actors is itself encompassed 
within a broader coalition, in this case, the minority coalition against the second runway’s 
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development. Bringing together local community groups (and hence, possibly coalitions 
within coalitions within coalitions), MAJAG operated as an umbrella organisation that 
represented local concerns as a united front both to, during and post inquiry. As a single 
entity, MAJAG held a policy core belief to oppose the second runway. However, the beliefs 
of those MAJAG united was not as uniform, with actors holding varying policy core beliefs 
(e.g. to maintain their quality of life, to protect the environment, to protect their house 
prices), with their belief to oppose a second runway a means to achieving these beliefs (i.e. 
a secondary aspect).  
The ACF has been criticised for its failure to account for how actors within a coalition 
overcome (or do not overcome) issues of collective action. While it assumes that there will 
be highly coordinated behaviour between actors who share policy core beliefs, the actions 
of MAJAG add weight to the growing evidence base that suggests this may not always be 
the case (Fenger and Klok, 2001; Kim and Roh, 2008; Schlager, 1995; Schlager and 
Blomquist, 1996). By assuming collective action, the ACF is unable to fully explain cases 
where this is not the case, for example, the split within MAJAG that occurred over the 
distribution of resources. Furthermore, an extension of this critique and contributing to the 
emerging body of research that examines coalition stability within the ACF, with a result of 
the split in MAJAG the formation of MAEN, this research tentatively suggests that there 
may be a connection between collective action and coalition stability. 
Similarly, by presuming collective action, the ACF would take the view that all actors in the 
minority coalition opposed to the second runway’s development would work together to 
achieve this goal. However, beyond Macclesfield Borough Council providing support to the 
Merseyside Authorities application to develop Liverpool Airport, there is little evidence to 
suggest that this was the case.  
While Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith have acknowledged the possibility of core and periodic 
actors within a policy subsystem (1999: 137), this application provides further evidence that 
actor participation within advocacy coalitions also varies. For example, in the dominant 
coalition pre, and during, the inquiry, the airport operator, Manchester City Council and 
Cheshire County Council were core actors, providing evidence on, and engaging with, a 
broad range of topics. By contrast, others, such as the Trade Union Congress, central 
government and airlines, occupied a periodic position, only becoming engaged on certain 
issues. The minority coalition pre and during the public inquiry shows the same pattern. 
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MAJAG took the lead, providing evidence on nearly all issues, while other actors, such as 
the Cheshire Wildlife Trust, Manchester Wildlife and the National Trust, occupied a 
peripheral position. 
Refuting an existing critique of the ACF, that it relies too heavily on external and ad-hoc 
events as the driver of policy change (John, 1998; Mintrom and Vergari, 1996), exogenous 
events (defined as changes in socioeconomic conditions, public opinion, in the governing 
coalition or in other policy subsystems) were absent from the ACF’s analysis of events. 
Furthermore, while there were internal events that had the potential to create policy 
change, they did not prove substantial enough to create a window of opportunity for the 
minority coalition to exploit.  
A broader question, which brings together many of the insights raised here, is whether, 
through its constant development and revisions, the ACF remains an integrative theory as 
Sabatier intended, or whether, it has become stretched and hence, has become too 
complex. Its application here has remained true to its core foundations, employing the 
concepts of policy subsystems, advocacy coalitions, and policy-oriented learning to explore 
the process of change, with recent additions out of consideration. The insights, both those 
raised by this application and those that build upon or extend existing critiques, relate to 
these core foundations and are not areas that recent developments have addressed: policy 
subsystem definition, coalition dynamics, inconsistencies in the hierarchal belief system, 
and what drives really policy change.  
Chapter Eight discusses further this broader, meta-theoretical critique, when these critical 
reflections are combined with those that emerge from the ACF’s application to the first 
case study. This chapter however, now moves on to explain the events that led to the 
approval of a second runway at Manchester airport from the perspective of the SRA. 
The Strategic-Relational Approach’s perspective 
By focusing on the relationship between structure and agency, the SRA seeks to transcend 
what advocates perceive to be an artificial dualism between the two. It regards policy 
change as the result of struggles between conscious and reflexive actors, which takes place 
on a terrain that by its very nature, privileges certain strategies (and hence certain actors) 
with the form of the state representing the latest incarnation of these battles and 
demonstrating balance in the policymaking process at a specific time.  
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From the perspective of the SRA, even by the time the public inquiry began, the terrain was 
tilted in favour of the second runway’s development and hence, in favour of those actors 
promoting it. The state’s form at the national level provided structural conditions that 
supported the growth of Manchester Airport, observable in the 1978 White Paper, which 
designated Manchester as a gateway airport and principal airport outside the South East, 
and the 1985 White Paper, which encouraged the use of regional airports in meeting the 
UK’s aviation needs. The state’s form at the regional and local levels provided equally 
supportive structural conditions, illustrated in the Regional Economic and Transport 
Strategies, which considered the development of the airport key to the region’s economic 
growth. In addition, and neatly illustrating the relationship between structure and agency, a 
collective of strategic, state-based, actors (the local authority consortium) owned 
Manchester Airport. From the perspective of the SRA, this pattern of ownership meant the 
airport’s intentions were interwoven with those of the state, which created a powerful, 
agent-based force in favour of the runway.  
The airport operator, already in a position of privilege, employed a range of strategic 
actions to overcome potential obstacles that stood in the way of the runway’s approval, 
formulated in light of the terrain they would be deployed on. For example, the submission 
of a second planning application, which was a strategy deployed to collide with the actions 
of The National Trust, who, in opposition to the runway, had identified potential problems 
with the airport operator’s first application. To overcome any potential problem this 
created (and any delay to achieving their policy goals) the airport submitted a second 
application.  
The SRA would view the Green Belt legislation that encompassed the proposed runway site 
as another structural constraint. Once again pre-judging the terrain, the airport operator 
knew the proposal would be challenged as being contrary to Green Belt policy and hence, 
formulated their strategic actions accordingly. Above providing evidence that the economic 
benefit of the runway outweighed its environmental impact, at the public inquiry John 
Twigg, at the time Infrastructure Planning Manager at Manchester Airport, cited occasions 
where other infrastructural development had taken place in land protected by Green Belt 
legislation, development he maintained was more intrusive than the second runway.  
Through what an advocate of the SRA would describe as a process of strategic learning, the 
airport operator built up their capacity to alter the structural circumstances they potentially 
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faced. For example, an awareness that once discussions over the second runway had had 
begun internally, word would get out. To this end, they made the strategic calculation to 
announce the plans publically from the start and to engage with interested actors and local 
communities.  
From the SRA’s perspective, the airport operator’s commitment to minimise the 
environmental impact of the runway was a strategic action, motivated by their desire to 
achieve planning permission. Aware that the strategically selective context (i.e. the terrain 
the battle took place on) was increasingly receptive to environmental issues; nationally, the 
environmental movement had gained momentum and consequently, environmental issues 
were creeping up political agendas, the airport operator calculated their strategy 
accordingly. For example, at every opportunity the airport operator highlighted their 
environmental credentials and their efforts to minimise the runway’s environmental impact 
(i.e. the creation, and promotion, of their environmental department and the development 
of an extensive environmental mitigation package). 
Conscious of the terrain they faced, all actors knew the economic argument behind the 
runway was not itself enough; there needed to be a powerful social force, such as a 
coalition of actors or favourable public opinion, behind its development. Demonstrating 
that the economic argument itself was not strong enough, the authorities in Merseyside 
argued, unsuccessfully, that Liverpool was an area in need of economic regeneration, even 
more so than Manchester. Explicitly stating their motivations, they wanted to see 
development at Liverpool John Lennon Airport as a route to the area’s economic 
redevelopment and saw a second runway at Manchester as a threat to that development. 
However, the airport operator at Manchester had not only assembled a strong economic 
argument, but, crucially, had also assembled a strong pro-growth collective of actors.  
In what the SRA would describe as a strategic move, the airport operator recruited Cheshire 
County Council into this collective, knowing that getting the strategic planning authority 
behind its proposals would help tilt the terrain even further in its favour. Initially opposed 
to the development, Cheshire County Council was equally as strategic, constructing its 
actions in the knowledge that the airport operator wanted its support. Cheshire County 
Council, though in support of the economic benefits of the runway, had concerns over its 
environmental impact and did not believe the former outweighed the latter.  
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Cheshire County Council formulated their strategy within context (one tilted in favour of 
the development). They entered negotiations with the airport operator and Manchester 
City Council armed with a shopping list of demands, a strategy that proved successful and 
transformed the context upon which future action would take place. Cheshire County 
Council secured their demands via an extensive environmental mitigation package 
enshrined in a Section 106 agreement. Furthermore, the agreement of the Section 106 
prior to the start of the public inquiry was a strategic coup for the airport operator, further 
enhancing their strategy to promote their environmental credentials and placing them in a 
relatively bulletproof position at the public inquiry regarding their attempts to minimise the 
environmental impact of the second runway. 
The airlines were another collective of strategic actors who, while being part of the 
collective in support of the runway, had slightly different intentions, all wanting to see the 
development of a second runway at Manchester Airport in order to expand their 
operations. Deliberate positioning, they made it clear that development at Liverpool Airport 
was not an alternative to Manchester and made it clear that if the second runway was not 
approved they would look elsewhere to grow their business. 
The SRA maintains that it is not guaranteed that the state will act in the best interests of 
capital and the position Macclesfield Borough Council took against the second runway 
proposal demonstrates this. An affected local authority, they took the strategic action to 
oppose the second runway, maintaining that the environmental impact of the development 
outweighed its economic benefit.  
Although the airport operator assembled a powerful collective (i.e. social force) in favour of 
the runway’s development, many strategic actors opposed the runway, it itself a social 
force than the airport operator did not take lightly. These actors had an explicit intention to 
stop the second runway’s approval and formulated strategies to attempt to achieve this 
goal. In pre-empting their effectiveness at the inquiry, the local residents opposed to the 
development of a second runway took the strategic decision to work as a collective, with 
the formation of MAJAG, the umbrella group that united those actors from the local 
community who were opposed to the runway, their strategy in doing so. MAJAG were 
explicit in their intentions: they were not against the growth of the airport per se, but 
argued that the airport could achieve the capacity increase by utilising the existing runway 
more efficiently and hence, did not warrant the environmental impact. A strategic action, 
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they used evidence from Gatwick Airport that showed a more efficient use of a single 
runway. However, this strategy failed to affect the strategically selective context, or to shift 
the terrain in their favour. 
Illustrating the SRA’s view that enhanced strategic knowledge of the terrain affects the 
actions of actors, MAJAG took the strategic action to recruit Terry Waite, a high-profile 
patron of MAJAG, into their campaign. Formulating their strategy within the strategically 
selective context and hoping to bring the terrain towards them, MAJAG knew that Waite 
was an agent who the public and interested stakeholders would perceive as rational and 
impartial, and who would provide high-profile support to the opposition campaign and 
attract positive media attention. Proponents of the runway were also aware of the 
potential effect of this action and acting reflexively Graham Stringer, then Leader of 
Manchester City Council (and hence, an indirect owner of the airport), attempted to shift, 
unsuccessfully, Waite’s position to one that supported the runway. 
While those actors opposed to the development of the second runway deployed a range of 
strategic actions calculated in light of the terrain upon which they would be deployed, they 
failed to shift the terrain that was tilted in favour of the runway’s development. Favourable 
structural conditions, creating a strategically selective context, reflected in the state’s form 
at both the national and local levels and given added weight by the Section 106 agreement, 
combined with a powerful pro-growth social force meant the terrain was stacked in favour 
of the runway’s development, even prior to the public inquiry. Furthermore, with the 
interests of the airport interwoven with those of the state, the strategies of those opposing 
the runway had very little chance of success. 
Once the Secretaries of State approved the second runway (and enshrined this decision in 
the state’s form at both the local and national levels), opponents reacted. A new collective 
of strategic actors sprang up uniting direct activists and local residents, both disillusioned 
by the public inquiry process. Direct activists, fuelled by past conflicts at Newbury and 
Twyford Down, considered the second runway as the next way to manifest their disdain at 
the policymaking process and intended to disrupt the runway’s construction. Local 
residents, many from MAJAG, who had gone through a process of strategic learning, joined 
them. Reflecting on, and learning from, the strategies they had deployed (to no effect) 
during the public inquiry, they amended their strategy of operating within the tightly 
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defined structure of a public inquiry to one completely outside of formal democratic 
channels.  
Though ultimately it failed to reverse the Secretaries of State’s decision, this action 
transformed the context upon which future debates into the development of the aviation 
industry in the UK would take place on. It was the first time direct activists from across the 
UK had united with local residents against a common cause, and by gaining widespread 
media attention, it brought the issue of the development of the aviation industry firmly 
onto national-level political and environmental agendas. 
Critical reflections: the Strategic-Relational Approach’s perspective 
The SRA has provided an as convincing explanation as the ACF of the events that that led to 
the approval of a second runway at Manchester Airport. Similarly, there are areas where it 
struggles. By drawing on existing critiques (discussed in Chapter Three) and detailing new 
theoretical insights, this section will critically reflect on the SRA’s ability to explain policy 
change and the distribution of power and influence within it. 
Agreeing with Valler and Wood (2004), a value of applying the SRA is that by drawing 
attention to the perceptions of actors and the strategies they employ, it is able to engage 
with political realities, uncovering the how to achieve policy goals behind the why. To the 
SRA, strategic actions are the means by which actors attempt to achieve their policy goals. 
For example, MAJAG, aware of the economic force behind the airport’s growth, took the 
strategy to argue that more efficient use of the existing runway could achieve the capacity 
increase that airport operator claimed the second runway would provide. However, 
concurring with a critique raised by Uitermark (2005: 141), the SRA fails to examine where 
actors’ strategies originate. For example, did MAJAG employ this strategy because they 
believed in the airport’s growth but wanted it achieved within environmental limits, or 
because they saw it as the most effective strategy to simply stop the runway’s development 
and hence, achieve other underlying motivations (as identified by the ACF’s application).  
The SRA provides a realistic look at the policymaking process, by not reducing the two sides 
of conflict to a simple polarisation (which, by contrast the ACF does), demonstrating the 
reality that it is not necessarily the case that actors on the same side of a conflict will 
necessarily choose to co-ordinate their strategic action. For example, though both in 
opposition to the runway’s development, Macclesfield Borough Council had little to do with 
Chapter Seven 
175 
 
MAJAG, let alone working with them. However, it fails to fully explore and engage with the 
dynamics of a collective of strategic actors: why do strategic actors decide to work 
collectively? What conditions provide for successful collective action? A failure that appears 
shortsighted when attempting to analyse the recursive nature of the relationship between 
structure and agency. For example, it shone little light on the internal conflict that created 
the split in MAJAG and the subsequent creation of MAEN (a conflict over strategic action 
that created a split within a collective of strategic actors). Similarly, once actors who 
realised that the terrain was so stacked against them, the empirical evidence shows that 
some within the MAJAG collective reformulated their strategy, opting to sell their 
properties in secret, gaining the best possible price for themselves and undermining the 
ability of others to do so in the future.  
Likewise, the SRA is unable to explore what underpinned the airport operator’s motivation 
to go public with their proposals from the start. In pre-judging the terrain, they knew that 
not having public opinion in favour of the runway could create a potential obstacle, but 
were their intentions simply to achieve their ultimate goals or did they hold a wider social 
and commercial responsibility? Equally, while Macclesfield Borough Council took the 
strategic action to oppose the second runway on environmental grounds, they were not 
adverse to runway expansion elsewhere, pledging to support Liverpool’s plans, suggesting 
that what underpinned their environmental opposition to expansion was a motivation to 
protect their constituents’ way of life rather than the environmental impact of airport 
growth per se. Without any consideration of what underpins strategic action and the beliefs 
behind actors’ motivations, intentions attributed to actors may be misleading and issues of 
collective action unexamined. 
An new insight uncovered in this application, is that even though the SRA advocates that 
actors pre-judge the effect of their actions, and are reflexive upon the effectiveness of said 
actions, it fails to fully explore (beyond the lack of guarantee that the state will act in the 
best interests of capital), why strategies fail, even if deployed upon favourable terrain. For 
example, during the period of direct action that followed the second runway’s approval the 
airport operator took the strategic action to diffuse the situation by trying to create 
unfavourable public opinion towards it, deciding to badmouth the unification of local 
residents and environmental activists, pre-judging that the former would be unhappy and 
embarrassed, and hence, cease working together. However, the effect of this action was 
not what they had pre-empted, and in fact solidified the collective.  
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In critically reflecting on the SRA’s conceptualisation of the state, this application adds 
weight to Heigl’s (2011: 84) critique that it lacks a mechanism to describe and assess 
internal state dynamics. For example, what are the implications for the manifestation of the 
state when the state itself (in this case at the local level), owns the means of production 
(i.e. the airport)? Equally, what are the implications of inter-state dynamics, for example, 
Macclesfield Borough Council in opposition to Manchester City Council and Cheshire 
County Council? 
An extension on this, which also adds weight to the critiques posited by Chettiparamb 
(2007: 414) and Uitermark (2005: 141), is that the scalar implications of the SRA are 
unexplored, interestingly, a critique the ACF also suffers from. The state’s form is not simply 
reflected at one level, with an important dynamic existing between actors operating at 
different levels and the form of the state at different levels. For example, national level 
policy provided favourable structural conditions that set the strategic selectivity of the 
context that conflict was to take place on. Equally, while conflict played out at the local 
level, strategic actors at the national level (the Secretaries of State) held the ultimate 
decision.  
Conclusions  
This chapter has applied the ACF and SRA to help explain the series of events that led to the 
approval of a second runway at Manchester Airport and to explicate the mechanisms 
behind the aviation industry’s position in this process of policymaking. Both have offered 
convincing accounts of the process of policy change, however, singularly they fail to 
uncover some of the key mechanisms behind how policy changed and the distribution of 
power and influence witnessed.  
From the ACF’s perspective, two broad coalitions battled over technical information within 
a policy subsystem that brought together all those actors who wanted to influence the 
decision to develop a second runway at Manchester Airport. Policy changed incrementally 
and was the result of policy-oriented learning where local level actors, united in advocacy 
coalitions by their policy core beliefs, thrashed out the specific details of policy in the 
subsystem. However, the ACF struggled to precisely explicate coalition activity, notably, 
what it is that really glues a coalition together and in exploring issues of collective action.  
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By contrast, the value of the SRA lies in its ability to illuminate the underlying strategic 
context upon which conflict took place, one that was receptive to those strategies (and 
hence, those actors) that aligned with the economic aspirations of the North West and 
more broadly, the development of UK air capacity. Furthermore, applying the SRA drew 
attention to the strategic nature of the actions that actors take to achieve their policy goals. 
However, the SRA proved weak in conceptualising these strategies, for example, where 
they originate, and failed to adequately assess the internal dynamics of state manifestation, 
a phenomenon crucial when analysing multi-level policymaking.  
This application demonstrates that it would be ill advised to explain the series of events 
that led to the development of the second runway at Manchester Airport from just one of 
these two perspectives. To fully explain the mechanisms behind the process of policy 
change witnessed, and to explore the reasons behind the aviation industry’s privileged 
position within it, both are needed. Interestingly however, there are three key areas neither 
theory was able to adequately explain.  
First, the period of direct action that followed the runway’s approval. From the perspective 
of the ACF, it was a policy impact resulting from the second runway’s approval (a policy 
output), which, given its far-reaching impact on broader debates on the expansion of the 
UK aviation industry, appears to belittle its effect somewhat. Also underplaying its impact, 
from the perspective of the SRA, it is an effect of action that transformed the context for 
future strategic action. As the empirical evidence in Chapter Six shows, this period of direct 
action transformed the environmental movement, linking local residents and direct activists 
for the first time and pushing the aviation issue up political and environmental agendas.  
Second, neither is able to explore the long-term effect of the Section 106 agreement. In ACF 
terms, this agreement proved so crucial in recruiting Cheshire County Council into the pro-
growth coalition, while from the SRA’s perspective, it was a vital part of the airport 
operator’s strategy to assemble a powerful collective of actors and to appear 
environmentally responsible. However, both theories, with an apparent inability to look 
forward, failed to consider and explore the long last effects of such an agreement, concerns 
that were illuminated by the empirical evidence in Chapter Six.  
Finally, neither theory is able to appreciate fully the role of the media played in the series of 
events, both as a resource used by actors and as itself an advocacy coalition/a collective of 
strategic actors, operating strategically and with observable intentions.  
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The next chapter (Eight) will bring together the findings and critical insights presented here 
with those of the first case study and will assess the ability of each theory to explain policy 
change and the reasons behind the aviation industry’s position of privilege in the 
policymaking process. Furthermore, it will initiate a theoretical dialogue between the two 
theories, which will analyse and evaluate the extent to which they are complementary or 
contradictory, and if there is any scope or indeed any need for, synthesis.  
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Policy theories: comparing, contrasting and combining 
 
This chapter takes the research findings from Chapters Five and Seven, which applied the 
Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) and Strategic-Relational Approach (SRA) to explain the 
events that led to the decisions at Stansted and Manchester respectively, to the next level 
of analysis. Using the same structure as employed in Chapter Three (i.e. origins; units of 
analysis; explaining policy change; and applications), it will compare and contrast the ability 
of the ACF and SRA to explain policy change and the mechanisms behind the aviation 
industry’s position of privilege in the policymaking process, and will offer insights into the 
ACF and SRA’s future theoretical development. Furthermore, it will initiate the first 
theoretical dialogue between the two theories, analysing and evaluating the extent to 
which they are complementary or contradictory. 
Origins and key contributions 
This chapter will begin by comparing and contrasting what the empirical applications have 
uncovered about the origins and key contributions of the ACF and SRA. 
The Advocacy Coalition Framework 
With its roots in the American pluralist literature, the ACF is a synthetic theory that 
emerged from Sabatier’s desire to combine key insights from top-down and bottom-up 
approaches to policy implementation. Its aim was to create a more systems-based 
approach to the understanding of policy change; built upon a rejection of policy cycles and 
stages (Cairney, 2012; Sabatier, 1986; 1998; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999: 118; Weible 
et al., 2009: 122). The research findings presented in this thesis confirm that it has achieved 
these aims, providing a more systems-based view of the policymaking process. Explaining 
either case study from a linear, stages-based model of the policymaking process would 
have left many events and mechanisms unexplored, for example, in the Stansted case, a 
stages-based model may have ignored, or not given enough weight to, the role of external 
events in redefining the parameters of the problem. 
Sabatier considered a problem with the existing policy implementation literature was the 
four to five year time span it used, believing this was too short to draw solid conclusions 
regarding policy change, and consequently, omitted crucial features of the policy process 
Chapter Eight 
180 
 
(Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1983; Sabatier, 1986). The findings presented here concur that 
the time scale of analysis that the ACF advocates, analysing policy change over a decade or 
more, is more useful, first, in identifying the events that led to policy change, but second, in 
uncovering changes to the relatively stable parameters that may otherwise remain 
unexplored. For example, the environmental movement that emerged alongside the search 
for a third London airport. Furthermore, analysing the policy process over long periods 
provides the opportunity to observe coalition formation, notably, the conditions that 
facilitate their emergence. For example, in both case studies minority coalitions only 
emerged as a response to policy outputs. 
However, the research findings add weight to the critique put forward by Szarka (2010), 
that its propensity to look backwards means it shies away from asking questions about the 
future. For example, in the Manchester case study, the development of the Section 106 
agreement was crucial to the success of the dominant coalition. However, as Dudley (2005) 
highlights, the consequences of this agreement have had far reaching implications, and 
considering the salience of this agreement may have in fact, uncovered some of the beliefs 
of the actors promoting it. For example, did the airport operator view it as an important 
tool to mitigate the environmental impact of the second runway, or was it purely a means 
to achieving their policy core belief of runway approval? Similarly, to the ACF, the period of 
direct action after the second runway’s approval was simply a policy impact, however, as 
the empirical evidence in Chapter Six uncovered, it had long lasting effects on this area of 
policymaking.  
A motivation for the creation of the ACF was to give technical information (i.e. concerning 
the causes, magnitude and solutions of a problem) a more prominent role in the analysis. 
The research findings show that by drawing attention to the role of information within the 
policymaking process, the ACF is able to explore the mechanisms behind how actors 
construct problems and solutions. For example, in the Stansted case, the availability of 
technical information within the policy subsystem contributed to the continual redefining 
of the problem, and hence the solution. While in the Manchester case, the availability of 
technical information stimulated policy-oriented learning, a key driver of policy change. 
The Strategic-Relational Approach 
The SRA is critiqued for being no different to existing Marxist accounts (notably those of 
Poulantzas) (Barrow, 1993). Jessop is explicit that the SRA builds upon, and is a natural heir 
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to, existing Marxist accounts, but believes it marks a real step on from these accounts 
through its attempt to transcend the artificial dualism between structure and agency 
(Jessop, 2001).  
This research finds that it does signal a step on for Marxist thinking in a number of ways 
and concurs with the view that it is a sophisticated Marxist conception of policy change and 
the state (Hay, 2005; Valler and Wood, 2004). Agreeing with the conclusions that Valler and 
Wood (2004: 1851) drew, if a more structuralist perspective had been applied, the specific 
responses of actors to a changing structured context would have remained unexplored, for 
example, in the Stansted case, how BAA responded to the u-turns in, and reviews of, policy. 
Barrow (1993) criticises the SRA for being just a regurgitation of Poulantzas’ work on 
structuration, however, the research findings here demonstrate that it would be unwise to 
explain the processes of policy change witnessed in this research purely through class 
domination (as per Poulantzas). Signalling a major step on for Marxist thought, and in-line 
with the current era of politics, the research findings show that power cannot be simply 
reduced to class domination, with other powerful social forces such as public opinion and 
collectives of strategic actors crucial in policy change. However, this is not to suggest that 
class is not a powerful social force, with evidence of this in both case studies. For example, 
the local opposition groups (e.g. the North West Essex and East Hertfordshire Preservation 
Association (NWEEHPA), the Wing Area Resistance Association (WARA) and the Defenders 
of Essex) were often criticised for being of affluent middle-class origin and hence, had 
access to crucial political and financial resources.  
Although Jessop moves forward from Poulantzas in acknowledging the importance of social 
forces other than class, the SRA fails to theorise and fully explore what they are. For 
example, the SRA explains the overturning of the Roskill Commission’s recommendation 
that Maplin should be developed as the third London airport through the lack of guarantee 
that the state will always act in the interests of capital. However, the empirical evidence 
(and the insights from the ACF), show that social forces, notably, public opinion and the 
assemblage of a strong collective of actors, played a key role in creating this change, 
highlighting that state action (agency) still needed to be legitimised. 
Jessop (2001) maintains that the SRA is a development over theories of structuration (à la 
Giddens) as it views structure as a strategic accomplishment, opposed to a universal entity 
from which agents can draw upon for action, and hence, where differences in the 
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opportunities for different strategies are bit acknowledged. The research findings concur 
with Chettiparamb (2007: 415) that the SRA, through this conceptualisation, facilitates an 
examination of privilege by analytically embedding the selectivities of structures and hence, 
forcing questions to be asked such as whose interests was the Maplin decision made in? Or, 
whose interests did the u-turn of this decision serve? 
Combining theoretical perspectives 
Both the ACF and SRA are solid attempts to consolidate existing theories of policy and mark 
significant steps forward in the development of pluralist and Marxist thinking that are in 
touch with the realities of modern policymaking. Though taking different perspectives, both 
analyse the interplay between individuals and institutions, the role of ideas, and the 
political environment in which they exist. Importantly for this research, is that combined, 
through their contrasting origins they have illuminated varying aspects of policy change and 
the mechanisms behind the aviation industry’s position in policymaking. 
Through its desire to give technical information a more prominent role in the analysis, the 
ACF has shed light on the important role the provision of information has in both problem 
construction and stimulating policy change via policy-oriented learning. While the SRA, 
through its desire to transcend the dualism between structure and agency, has focused 
analytical attention on the relationship between the two, facilitating the examination of 
privilege through empirical questioning. 
Main units of analysis 
This section considers the main units of analysis employed by the ACF and SRA. In the case 
of the former; this is the policy subsystem, which contains groups of actors united by their 
beliefs in advocacy coalitions. In the case of the latter, they are strategically selective 
contexts and strategic actors. 
The Advocacy Coalition Framework 
The main unit of analysis in the ACF is the policy subsystem, within which policy core beliefs 
group actors in advocacy coalitions that hold distinct viewpoints and co-operate over time 
to achieve their policy goals (Jenkins-Smith et al., 1991; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999: 
120; Sabatier and Weible, 2007). In applying the ACF, it is deemed crucial to define the 
scope of a policy subsystem, focusing, “on the substantive and geographic scope of the 
institutions that structure interaction” (Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 193). However, the 
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research findings show that in practice, delineating the subsystem it is not quite as simple 
as this.  
The authors of the ACF acknowledge that the existence of overlapping and nested policy 
subsystems can make subsystem definition problematic (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999; 
Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 193) (to which the Manchester case added evidence and which 
is explored later in this chapter when considering issues of the ACF’s applicability). 
However, in applying the unit of the policy subsystem, the ACF fails to engage with its fluid 
and evolving nature. The research findings demonstrate, that as a problem, and hence, the 
potential solutions to a problem, change, so does the policy subsystem. For example, as the 
site for the third London airport changed, actors left and entered the policy subsystem, 
with a similar pattern observable in the aftermath of the approval of Manchester Airport’s 
second runway. 
This is not to suggest the policy subsystem is not a useful unit of analysis, with the inclusive 
nature of its definition one of the ACF’s strengths. Beyond the traditional ‘iron triangle’ of 
participants, the concept of the policy subsystem encompasses all those actors who wish to 
influence policy in a specific area. Combined with the prominent role the framework gives 
to technical information in the policymaking process, this naturally extends the analysis to 
include a wide range of actors. For example, to journalists, such as Terence Bendixson, 
academics, such as Peter Self, John Adams and Peter Hall and political commentators, such 
as David McKie. All of these actors played a key role in the policymaking process in the 
search for a third London airport, particularly in the dissemination of information, which 
contributed to problem definition and in creating public and political opinion. 
Within a given policy subsystem, the ACF assumes that actors who share a belief system will 
unite in advocacy coalitions that hold distinct viewpoints and co-operate over time to 
achieve their policy goals (Jenkins-Smith et al., 1991; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999: 120; 
Sabatier and Weible, 2007). While the ACF maintains that policy core beliefs are the ‘glue’ 
of a coalition, the research findings provide compelling evidence that this is not necessarily 
the case through the existence of coalitions of convenience, coalitions within coalitions and 
the varying nature of actor participation. Furthermore, these question the ACF’s 
assumption that beliefs are stable over time and hence, crucial in coalition formation 
(Weible et al., 2009: 122).  
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By firmly rejecting the existence of coalitions of convenience (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 
1993: 27), the ACF dismisses the possibility that actors motivated by short-term interests 
could work together to achieve said interests, a phenomena posited by both Hann (1995) 
and Kim and Roh (2008) and to which these research findings add weight. Furthermore, the 
existence of coalitions of convenience calls into question a central tenet of the ACF, that 
policy core beliefs are the ‘glue’ of coalitions and crucial in coalition formation (Weible et 
al., 2009: 122).  
Coalitions of convenience were evident in both case studies. For example, in the minority 
coalition that emerged in response to the Roskill Commission’s decision that Cublington 
should be developed as the third London airport, actors were motivated by a short-term 
interest to stop the development of Cublington. In fact, the findings uncover that only the 
local residents held their opposition to Cublington as a policy core belief. Equally, the 
minority coalition against the development of the second runway at Manchester Airport 
united actors with a short-term interest to stop the runway’s development, with many in 
this coalition holding this belief as a secondary aspect.  
Similarly, the dominant coalition in support of the second runway was a coalition of 
convenience, united by a common interest to get the runway developed. Again, while the 
airport operator held the development of a second runway as a policy core belief, it was 
not universally held at this level and as before, many actors in this coalition considered it as 
a means to achieving their other policy core beliefs (i.e. a secondary aspect). Equally, the 
coalition that emerged as a direct response to the Secretaries of State’s approval of the 
second was also one of convenience, uniting direct activists from across the UK with local 
residents, who, while holding very different policy core beliefs were united in opposing the 
second runway to achieve them. 
The research findings show that it may be a commonality of a belief, rather than the level at 
which it is held, that is more important in coalition formation, adding weight to Sotirov and 
Memmler’s (2011) conclusion that the idea that policy core beliefs determine coalitions is 
becoming increasingly nebulous. It does appear however, that in recent revisions to the 
ACF, the authors are trying to blur the distinction between policy core and secondary 
aspects, going so far as to recognise the possibility that secondary aspects may be, “the 
stickiest glue that binds coalitions together”(Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999: 134; 
Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 195).  
Chapter Eight 
185 
 
Coalitions within coalitions further complicate the internal dynamics of coalition activity, 
again a phenomenon the ACF fails to engage with and for which both case studies provide 
evidence. The local community groups that united local actors against a specific site 
illustrate this clearly; NWEEHPA and the Stansted Area Preservation Association at 
Stansted, WARA at Cublington, Defenders of Essex at Maplin and the Manchester Airport 
Joint Action Group (MAJAG) at Manchester were all coalitions that united local actors by 
their policy core beliefs (i.e. to oppose development at their locality), which were then part 
of a broader coalition. NWEEHPA and MAJAG complicate matters even further, by arguably 
being coalitions of convenience themselves, operating as umbrella organisations to 
represent local concerns. 
While the ACF maintains that the sometimes-sporadic nature of actor participation in the 
policymaking process can complicate policy subsystem definition (Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith, 1999: 137), it is only recently that authors of the ACF have acknowledged the 
possibility that this sporadic nature of actor participation could extend to within coalitions 
(Weible et al., 2009: 130). However, while Weible et al. (2009: 130) discuss the potential 
that core and periodic coalition membership has in explaining coalition instability and 
defection, the research findings here provide evidence to the contrary, that the sporadic 
nature of actor participation within a coalition may in fact be a route to coalition stability.  
For example, the dominant coalition in the Manchester case study contained a core actor, 
the airport operator, and periodic actors, such as local authorities, airlines and trades 
unions, who provided support to the policy goal but only engaged with specific issues and 
did not necessarily hold this goal at the same belief level. The coalition opposed to the 
development of Stansted at the Eyre inquiry (1981-83) shows a similar pattern. NWEEHPA 
and the local authorities took an active role on a broad range of issues (core actors), while 
British Airways, the airport operator at Manchester Airport, and national non-governmental 
organisations such as the National Trust, took a less active role and only became engaged 
on specific issues (periodic actors). Again, while core actors held their opposition to 
development as a policy core belief, periodic actors held it as a secondary aspect. 
The Strategic-Relational Approach 
For advocates of the SRA, one of the main issues with the structure-agency debate is the 
language that it has been conducted in (Hay, 2002a: 127). The SRA attempts to privilege 
neither structure nor agency by devising a new conceptual language that better reflects the 
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relational and dialectical qualities of the ongoing interaction between the two. To do this, it 
seeks to bring agency into structure with the production of a structured context (an action 
setting) and structure into agency (a situated agent) (Hay, 2002a). This is then repeated, 
bringing the situated actor into the structured context and the structured context to the 
situated actor, dissolving the dualism and creating the SRA’s units of analysis; strategic 
actors who exist within strategically selective contexts (Hay, 2002a).  
The research findings confirm Valler and Wood’s (2004) view that the close attention the 
SRA pays to the perceptions of actors makes the identification of actors’ motivations and 
intentions achievable through empirical investigation and facilitates an examination of the 
strategies that actors employ to achieve their policy goals. For example, by examining the 
strategies BAA employed (e.g. refusing to co-operate with the Roskill Commission’s work) it 
was clear their intention was to get Stansted developed as the third London airport. 
Equally, MAJAG, aware of the powerful economic force behind the airport’s continued 
growth, they took the strategy to argue that more efficient use of the existing runway could 
achieve the capacity increase that airport operator claimed the second runway would 
provide to achieve their goal of stopping the second runway’s development. 
The application of the SRA facilitates an empirical analysis of the reflexive nature of actors 
involved in the policymaking process, an element it considers crucial in the development of 
actors’ strategies; how they are modified in light of strategic knowledge and learning in 
their quest to achieve policy aims. Again confirming the view of Valler and Wood (2004), by 
drawing attention to this, the SRA immediately engages with political realities; focusing 
attention on how actors judge their past actions, and how they modify and pre-empt the 
effect of their future actions to achieve their policy goals. For example, by exploring the 
reflexive nature of MAJAG’s strategic decision to work as a collective, or uncovering how 
Colin Buchanan pre-empted the effect of his dissent from the Roskill Commission. 
The research findings add weight to Uitermark’s (2005) critique that how the SRA 
conceptualises actors strategies needs further work, as it stands, it provides no explanatory 
mechanism behind the origin of actors strategies. While analyses of action can identify 
actors’ strategies, an exploration of what motivations lay behind these actions, and how 
these may change over time, would help confirm actors’ strategies as well as providing a 
useful insight into why actors participate in the policymaking process – a crucial part of 
agency in the structure-agency relationship.  
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The SRA’s contention that actors have the ability to state explicitly, and reflect upon, their 
motivations and intentions is one-step towards this; however, is it not possible that the 
strategies that an actor employs will garner results different from what their motivations 
intended? For example, if they realise their policy goals are impossible to realise, or are 
happy to make concessions on them, it may be the case that their strategic actions reflect 
this, a solution that is just ‘not too bad’. For example, a consideration of these questions 
may have uncovered some of the underlying mechanisms behind Cheshire County Council’s 
shift from a position of opposition, beyond a strategic action on the part of the Council and 
the airport operator.  
An important aspect of the structure-agency relationship that the SRA is yet to fully engage 
with and theorise is the impact that group dynamics play, putting co-ordination down to a 
strategic decision on the part of actors. This fails to explore issues such as whether there 
are obstacles to co-ordination; how and why actors work together; how actors agree on 
strategic action; and what conditions facilitate successful coalition activity. For example, it 
shone little light on the internal conflict that created the split in MAJAG and the subsequent 
creation of MAEN (a conflict over strategic action that created a split within a collective of 
strategic actors). Furthermore, the SRA fails to theorise on the ability of actors to alter 
structural circumstances in which they exist; for example, do they all have the same ability 
to do so? If not, why? 
How the SRA’s conceptualises the state has received praise from scholars. It not giving it 
any form of innate power, the state’s power is determined by the balance of forces that 
exist within society at any one time (Taylor, 1995: 261), operating as a, “dynamic institution 
that offers unequal opportunities to different social groups to achieve their specific political 
purposes” (Ioris, 2011: 7). However, as Heigl (2011: 84) points out, there is no concept 
within the SRA to describe and assess the internal dynamics of the state resulting from the 
interaction of different political institutions of varying historical importance. A potential 
area of future refinement, this would help uncover insights into, in the Stansted case study, 
the relationship between BAA and other government departments, and in the Manchester 
case study, the implications of the state itself (in this case at the local level), owning the 
means of production (i.e. the airport).  
A question that arises as an extension of this, is what are the implications of inter-state 
dynamics when, for example, the state is in opposition with itself, a phenomenon observed 
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in both case studies. In the Stansted case, local authorities proximate to Stansted opposed 
national policy to develop the third London airport there, and in the Manchester case 
study, Macclesfield Borough Council were in opposition to Manchester City Council and 
Cheshire County Council. 
Combining theoretical insights 
The units of analysis promoted by the ACF and SRA have drawn attention to different, albeit 
complementary, aspects of the policymaking process. Reflecting the modern era of politics, 
both are inclusive in their analysis, acknowledging the broad range of actors involved, with 
no single-authoritative decision-maker.  
Agency-based, the ACF has sought to make complex situations comprehensible through its 
well-defined units of analysis: the policy subsystem and advocacy coalitions. These units 
provide a useful organising tool in visualising the actors involved in the area of policymaking 
under study, while also focusing attention on their motivations behind their involvement 
via the empirical analysis of belief systems. However, due to the existence, and influence 
of, nested and overlapping subsystems, coalitions of convenience, coalitions within 
coalitions and the sporadic nature of actor participation, it is unwise to prescribe to the 
concepts too rigidly with a need to acknowledge their fluid and evolving nature.  
By focusing attention of the strategic nature of both actors and the context upon which 
conflict takes place, the SRA has made a solid attempt to transcend the dualism between 
structure and agency. Developing the concept of strategic selectivity as an alternative to 
Poulantzas’ concept of structural selectivity is another illustration of how the SRA has 
attempted move Marxist thinking forward. The close attention it pays to the perceptions of 
actors has facilitated an examination of the strategies that actors employ to achieve their 
policy objectives. However, it proves weak in uncovering what underpins these strategies, 
in investigating the dynamics behind actor participation, and in illuminating internal and 
inter-state dynamics. 
Combined, the ACF and SRA have provided the analyst with a range of tools to explore the 
policymaking process and to uncover and illuminate the process of policy change. While the 
units of analysis posited by the ACF face the criticism that they are too rigid in application, 
they do provide a useful starting point for the analysis in contrast to the SRA, where the 
area under study remains unspecified and the units of analysis somewhat vague. However, 
the ACF needs to acknowledge the fluid nature of the policy subsystem, is not a static and 
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fixed concept, an ethos more in line with the SRA, interested in a certain area of 
policymaking within society at a given time.  
A criticism levelled at the ACF is that it largely ignores the behaviour of coalitions with little 
attention paid to the strategies that coalitions use to advance their beliefs or to the 
strategies they employ to confound opposing policies, by contrast this is where the SRA 
excels (Mintrom and Vergari, 1996; Schlager, 1995). Combining these insights has provided 
a valuable means by which to explore actors’ actions, considering coalition activity 
alongside strategic action. While beliefs may uncover the motivations behind an actor’s 
participation in the policymaking process, strategies uncover actual actions (which may 
diverge from an actor’s beliefs), in fact, the existence of coalitions of convenience implies 
an element of strategy in coalition behaviour.  
Explaining policy change 
Consideration now turns to assessing the ability of ACF and SRA to explain policy change. To 
the ACF, policy change is a result of a shift in the balance of forces within the policy 
subsystem through a change in the dominant coalition. Beliefs are the driver for political 
behaviour and there are two main sources of belief and policy change: policy-oriented 
learning and external events (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999: 147). To the SRA, policy 
change is the result of struggles between conscious and reflexive actors, which takes place 
on a terrain that by its very nature, privileges certain strategies (and hence, certain actors). 
The form of the state represents the latest incarnation of these battles and demonstrates 
balance in the policymaking process at a specific time (Hay, 2002b; 2005; McAnulla, 2002).  
The Advocacy Coalition Framework 
Some scholars have suggested that the ACF relies too heavily on external events as the 
main driver of policy change (John, 1998; Mintrom and Vergari, 1996). This research refutes 
this criticism, with the research finding evidence that external events are crucial in creating 
policy change but with change also occurring in their absence, emerging incrementally 
through policy-oriented learning.  
The ACF’s explanation of the events that led to the development of Stansted as the third 
London airport demonstrates the important role of external events. Here they played a key 
role in shaking the policy subsystem, which redistributed resources and the political agenda 
and crucially, opened up windows of opportunity for minority coalitions to exploit.  
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Importantly in this case, and an element the ACF fails to consider, is that these external 
events operated as catalysts for change in the relatively stable parameters that framed the 
problem. While the ACF acknowledges that relatively stable parameters have an impact on 
external events, it considers the relationship one-way. Furthermore, it fails to acknowledge 
the relationship external events have on one another, for example, in the search for a third 
London airport, the oil crisis, recession and talks on alternative modes of transport 
exacerbated the effect the emergence of the jumbo jet had on growth forecasts and hence, 
in creating a window of opportunity. The research findings in the Stansted case also 
highlight the important role skilful coalition members play in driving policy change, 
concurring with the comments of both Ameringer (2002) and Jordan and Greenaway 
(1998), who conclude that after an external shock, skilful coalition members are needed in 
order to exploit the opportunity. 
By contrast, the ACF’s explanation of the events that led to the approval of Manchester 
Airport’s second runway does not rely at all on external events; rather, it draws attention to 
the critical role of technical information in the policymaking process. As information 
entered the policy subsystem, actors engaged in a process of policy-oriented learning 
leading to policy change. This finding adds weight to Szarka’s (2011: 849) view that a 
strength of the ACF is that its long-term focus allows for the identification of the many 
short-term events that lead to incremental policy change. 
Internal events, a recent addition to the ACF as a route to policy change (Sabatier and 
Weible, 2007: 199), were observable in the research findings, for example, the omission of 
Stansted from the Roskill Commission’s shortlist of sites. However, beyond their proximity 
to the policy subsystem their explanatory contribution was no different to the effect of 
external events. Posing questions for future theoretical refinement, an analysis of an event 
beyond its proximity to the policy subsystem would be useful: beyond observation, what 
does this dichotomy add, if anything, to the ACF’s understanding of the drivers of policy 
change? For example, are internal events more likely to be pre-empted by those within the 
subsystem and hence, have less of a shock? Are they more likely to encourage policy-
oriented learning?  
An extension of this critique, the research has found that a question that the ACF fails to 
address adequately is how a minority coalition can effectively exploit a window of 
opportunity that arises immediately after a shake to the policy subsystem. In addition, why 
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do some events fail to provide a substantial enough window of opportunity for the minority 
coalition to exploit? As Albright (2011) comments, a more nuanced understanding of how 
different shocks shift agendas and redistribute resources among coalitions would assist in 
developing the ACF’s understanding of these causal mechanisms. 
In both case studies, resources were important to coalitions for two reasons: first, in 
forming and sustaining a coalition and second, as a means to achieving policy goals, 
facilitating privileged access to policymaking the policymaking process. Applications by 
other scholars have sought to build upon this idea (Albright, 2011; Ingold, 2011; Nohrstedt, 
2005), attempting to explain how changes in the distribution of coalition resources affects 
policy change to which the research findings here contribute. The research findings show 
that in general, better-resourced actors occupy the position of dominant coalition, and 
hence, are a favourable position compared to their counterparts.  
The authors behind the ACF have increasingly acknowledged the important role of 
resources, with the recent development of a typology a strong sign of this recognition 
(Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 201; Weible et al., 2011). However, the research findings agree 
with Sotirov and Memmler (2011) and Nohrstedt (2011) that there is scope for this 
typology to be improved via the incorporation of a hierarchy. It is clear that some resources 
are more important than others, and crucially, having more of one resource can facilitate 
the achievement of other resources, which strengthens a coalition’s ability either to 
maintain their dominant position, or to exploit a window of opportunity. For example, the 
role financial resources can play in procuring other resources and the importance of skilful 
coalition members to exploit a window of opportunity.  
In addition, the research findings illustrate the important role of public opinion, and the 
media, as important resources. The eminent role technical information is given, and the 
inclusion of journalists within the policy subsystem, demonstrates that the ACF goes 
someway to acknowledging this importance. However, an exploration of the role of the 
media beyond this would enhance the ACF, with this research finding that its role is 
threefold: in framing a problem; disseminating information; and in creating public opinion, 
the first two of which affect the relatively stable parameters that characterise a problem 
and the final, an important resource for coalitions.  
For example, in the run up to the Chelmsford inquiry conflict was media-driven at both the 
local and national levels and in its aftermath, the media played a crucial role in creating 
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public disdain for the appointment of the Peterson Committee. Equally, in the Manchester 
case, conflict in the subsystem was played out in front of the media, particularly during the 
phase of direct action, where the approval of the second runway gained a national stage 
through journalists staying in camps and Swampy appearing on Have I Got News For You.  
An oft-cited critique of the ACF is its failure to explore issues of collective action, assuming 
that there will be highly co-ordinated activity between coalition members to create policy 
change (Fenger and Klok, 2001; Kim and Roh, 2008; Schlager, 1995; Schlager and Blomquist, 
1996). In assuming collective action, the ACF treats each coalition as a single entity, which 
the research findings illustrate is somewhat misguided, with evidence showing examples 
where coalitions do, but also do not, work together to achieve their policy goals.  
For example, in the case of the former, the minority coalition involved in the campaign of 
direct action after the approval of Manchester Airport’s second runway worked collectively. 
However, the minority coalition that emerged before the public inquiry into the second 
runway showed little or no co-ordination between actors. Furthermore, by assuming 
collective action, the ACF fails to observe and explore the relationship between collective 
action and coalition stability or instability. For example, it is unable to explain the split that 
emerged within MAJAG that resulted in the formation of MAEN.  
The Strategic-Relational Approach 
Maintaining that structures are more receptive to certain forms of activity than others, and 
hence, privilege certain actors over others, the SRA views policy change as the result of 
battles between intentionally strategic actors. Fluid and inclusive, the state’s form is a 
crystallisation of these struggles, representing the balance of power within society at a 
given time. 
In the search for a third London airport, the SRA showed that structural factors inherent in 
the policymaking process placed the aviation industry, and in particular BAA, in a privileged 
position. Tightly defined structural conditions at inquiries and reviews meant that planning 
inquiries took on the characteristics of site-specific feasibility studies while the structure of 
the legal system favoured better-resourced actors. However, public opinion, a powerful 
social force, forced the state to re-open and re-examine the problem.  
In the approval of Manchester Airport’s second runway, even though actors opposed to the 
development of the second runway deployed a range of strategic actions calculated in light 
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of the terrain upon which they would be deployed, they were unable to shift the terrain in 
their favour. Again, structural factors inherent in the policymaking process placed the 
aviation industry in a privileged position. Favourable structural conditions created a 
strategically selective context that combined with a powerful pro-growth social force meant 
the terrain was stacked in favour of the runway’s development, even prior to the public 
inquiry. Furthermore, with the interests of the airport interwoven with those of the state, 
the strategies of those opposing the runway had very little chance of success. 
Akin to the criticism levelled at the ACF’s explanation of policy change, the SRA fails to fully 
engage with issues of collective action, putting co-ordination down to a strategic decision. 
Similarly, for example, it was unable to explore the internal conflict that created the split in 
MAJAG and the subsequent creation of MAEN (a conflict over strategic action that created 
a split within a collective of strategic actors). This failure means that the mechanisms 
behind how and why actors work together to achieve their policy aims and the potential 
obstacles to co-ordination remains unexamined.  
While the SRA is a step beyond Poulantzas in that it acknowledges that social forces other 
than class play a role in the policymaking process, it fails to explore what these social forces 
are. The research findings here make some suggestions for theoretical refinement in this 
area. For example, public opinion was clearly a powerful social force, fought over by actors 
with the ability to create u-turns in policy. Equally, the assemblage of a powerful collective 
of actors was a powerful social force, clearly demonstrated in the Manchester case where 
the airport operator went to great lengths to secure a pro-growth coalition, despite the 
terrain already stacked in its favour. 
Another question that emerges from the research findings considers the SRA’s ability to 
explain why strategies fail, even if their effects are pre-judged and they are deployed upon 
favourable terrain. For example, why the airport operators’ strategy to badmouth the local 
residents and direct activists during the period of direct action that followed the second 
runway’s approval fail to have the expected outcome (i.e. a breakdown of the collective). 
The research findings in both case studies show that the terrain upon which conflict was 
played out, by its very nature, favoured better-resourced actors. However, the SRA fails to 
draw attention to the importance of resources, and their role in facilitating and 
constraining actors’ abilities to formulate, and deploy, strategic actions that will have an 
effect upon the structured context. For example, the structure of the public inquiry favours 
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better-resourced actors: they can employ the better (i.e. more costly) legal team, can 
sustain lengthy presence at inquiries and can commission extensive research into technical 
issues. The findings show that another important resource was the media, again 
unexamined by the SRA. In both case studies the campaign was media driven, used 
tactically by strategic actors to try and move the terrain in their favour. 
Combining theoretical insights  
Both the ACF and SRA have illuminated, and explored, important mechanisms behind policy 
change. However, when combined, their explanatory power is enhanced.  
The ACF drew attention to the role of external events and policy-oriented learning in 
creating policy change. The former demonstrates how resources can be redistributed 
within a subsystem and windows of opportunity opened for minority coalitions to exploit. 
The latter draws attention to the important role of technical information in creating policy 
change and the potential for change to be incremental. By contrast, the SRA shines light on 
the structural conditions embedded in the policymaking process that favour certain actors 
and explores the strategies actors employ to achieve their policy goals. The SRA has also 
demonstrated that structural privilege is not enough to ensure an actors’ control over 
policy, with powerful social forces also needed, an area unsurprisingly, that the ACF, 
through its focus on agency, is able to better explore.  
However, the research findings show that there are common blind spots that neither 
theory sufficiently explores. While both acknowledge the important role resources play in 
facilitating and constraining the ability of actors to achieve their policy goals, neither 
adequately explores why some resources are more important than others are. An extension 
of this, both theories recognised the important role public opinion plays in policy change, 
however; again, neither fully explores its role.  
Equally, neither is able to fully explore issues of collective action. The ACF assumes actors 
will co-ordinate, while the SRA puts it down to a strategic decision. In the case of the ACF, 
ignoring the important dynamics of coalition activity by presuming collective action among 
coalitions potentially undermines the concept of the advocacy coalition as being anything 
more than a mapping tool. In contrast, by not reducing both sides of the conflict to a simple 
polarisation and not assuming collective action, the SRA appears more realistic. However, 
failing to explore and engage with the dynamics of collective action (and as discussed, 
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group dynamics) appears shortsighted when its aim is to analyse the recursive nature of the 
relationship between structure and agency. 
Applicability and methodological reflections 
This section now considers the applicability of the ACF and SRA to these two case studies 
and more broadly, this area of policymaking, and reflects upon their methodological 
implications.  
The Advocacy Coalition Framework 
As detailed in Chapter Three, the ACF has been vastly applied by its authors, their students 
and others in an increasing number of policy areas and geographical locations. Despite this, 
its application to the case studies in this thesis has uncovered some important insights into 
its applicability and provided evidence to support existing critiques of its methodological 
approach. 
The research findings raise questions regarding the ACF’s applicability in the UK. Both case 
studies focused on the public inquiry as the venue of decision-making, which automatically 
pushed the analysis from the national to the local level. While the ACF acknowledges that 
policymaking takes place at multiple levels (Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 189), in practice, it 
under-recognises this shift away from the national level. For example, in the search for a 
third London airport, it struggled to cope with the influx of local level actors, and the new 
conceptions of ‘the problem’ they brought with them, that entered the policy subsystem 
through the initiation of site-specific public inquiries. Equally, in explaining the approval of a 
second runway at Manchester Airport, it struggled to cope with the implications that multi-
level governance structures pose for policy subsystem definition.  
An extension of this, the ACF’s fails to explore the implications of multi-level governance 
structures for policy subsystem definition. For example, in the case of Manchester’s second 
runway, while two national level policy subsystems overlapped to create the policy 
subsystem under study, once the public inquiry took the policymaking process down to the 
local level a subsystem firmly dealing with the second runway was easily identifiable.  
Arguably, the ACF’s inability to deal with the multi-level governance structures that 
characterised the UK policymaking process is unsurprising. The venue of local planning is 
uncommon in the United States (where the ACF was conceived) and hence, has not been 
applied vastly to this type of policymaking system. If, for example, this research concerned 
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itself with policy change regarding the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, it is unlikely that there 
would be such ambiguity in defining the policy subsystem with conflict taking place among 
actors at the national and European levels. However, further empirical testing in political 
systems akin to that found in the UK, and possibly theoretical developments as a result, 
would enhance the geographical applicability of the ACF.  
The research findings provide evidence to support the existing critique that there are 
difficulties in empirically examining actors’ beliefs, particularly retrospectively, with 
particular uncertainty emerging when trying to determine the level at which a belief is held 
(Hann, 1995; Hirschi and Widmer, 2010; Jenkins-Smith, 1991; Matti and Sandström, 2011; 
Sotirov and Memmler, 2011). A critique further complicated by the existence of coalitions 
of convenience and coalitions within coalitions, where the belief system represented by the 
advocacy coalition does not necessarily reflect the belief system of individual actors. 
As Chapter One discussed, one of the research methods employed in this research was 
documentary analysis, which has been used in previous applications of the ACF. However, 
even the ACF’s authors acknowledge the potential difficulties in using documents to 
ascertain beliefs (Jenkins-Smith, 1991). This research set out to minimise the potential for 
any incorrect belief identification by triangulating documentary analysis with interview data 
and a review of the existing literature. Ascertaining beliefs retrospectively proved more 
problematic, particularly in the case study examining the search for the third London 
airport, where, due to it beginning in the 1950s, many key actors were deceased, while 
some of the interviewees were recalling events from over thirty years ago. 
A broader question that unites many of the points raised in this chapter is whether the ACF 
is an integrative theory, as Sabatier intended, or whether, through its constant 
development and revisions it has been stretched and hence, has become too complex and 
no longer parsimonious. Sabatier (2007a) believes the former, that through constant 
development and a series of revision the ACF has developed from a complex theoretical 
framework into a more logical and coherent one.  
However, the operational difficulties that have emerged from applying the ACF’s well 
defined units of analysis and its many routes to policy change, suggest that through these 
revisions the ACF has become just too unwieldy and hard to manage, with revisions no 
longer just part of the ‘productive path of science’ as Sabatier contends. This research 
provides evidence that recent additions have in fact, diluted the framework’s explanatory 
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value and/or were out of consideration, with the framework’s application remaining true to 
its core foundations (subsystems, coalitions, external events and policy-oriented learning) 
to explore the process of change.  
The Strategic-Relational Approach 
As Chapter Three examined, while the SRA is gaining increasing attention, compared to the 
ACF it has had very limited use in guiding empirical work, particularly by its author, “Jessop 
is notoriously hesitant when it comes to using his theoretical propositions in empirical 
research” (Uitermark, 2005: 141), to the point where there is a large discrepancy between 
the formal methods the SRA proposes, and Jessop’s actual analysis (Uitermark, 2005: 141). 
However, there are notable empirical examples by other scholars, as well as those engaging 
with it on a theoretical level. Therefore, its application to the case studies in this thesis, and 
the insights it has uncovered in terms of its applicability and methodological implications, 
offer a lot to the theory’s development. 
There are operational difficulties associated with the SRA’s units of analysis. While the 
ACF’s conceptualisation of the area under study, the policy subsystem, proved too rigid, the 
SRA’s failure to specify the area under study was equally as problematic. Advantageous on 
one hand as it meant the area under study could be as vast and inclusive as desired, 
operationally, it means that the SRA is initially difficult to navigate. Furthermore, the SRA 
provides little guidance on how to assess the strategies of actors, which methodologically, 
leaves it open to the analyst (Uitermark, 2005). Heigl (2011: 84) suggests a need to assess 
the strategic selectivity of every institution involved in a particular policy conflict, however, 
with an undefined area of study does this not leave the analyst with a) a daunting task and 
b) ignores individuals? 
Both case studies were of a sufficient length to facilitate an empirical analysis of the 
reflexive nature of the actors involved, an element considered crucial by the SRA and 
closely related to how actors develop their strategies. However, the reflexive nature of 
actors would be hard to identify in a shorter case of policy change, for example, if the 
decision to develop Stansted after the Chelmsford inquiry stuck. Furthermore, this time 
span allowed the observation and analysis of the process of strategic learning and strategic 
knowledge, effects of strategic action and mechanisms by which actors can alter their 
capacity to overcome the structural circumstances they may face in future conflict. For 
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example, in the search for a third London airport, how the opposition at the Eyre inquiry 
formulated their strategy in light of what they had learnt from previous conflict. 
Akin to the ACF, the SRA struggles to deal with the policymaking system in the UK, which is 
similarly unsurprising as it is yet to be empirically applied in the UK (though it has been 
theoretically applied, see Goodin et al. (2005; 2006); Jones et al. (2005); and Valler and 
Wood (2004)). Akin to the criticism levelled at the ACF, the SRA fails to fully explore its 
scalar implications, notably the nature of the relationships between actors operating at 
different scales, adding weight to the criticisms put forward by Chettiparamb (2007: 414) 
and Uitermark (2005: 141). For example, in the Stansted case, an interesting dynamic arose 
where the state at the national level (e.g. the Ministry of Civil Aviation, BAA, etc) was often 
in conflict with the state at the local level (e.g. site-specific local authorities). While in both 
case studies, even though conflict took place at the local level, strategic actors at the 
national level (the Secretaries of State) held the ultimate decision.  
Equally, this research has drawn attention is the SRA’s failure to fully consider the temporal 
dimension of its application. As Lagendijk (2007: 196) and Valler and Wood (2004: 1838) 
highlight, strategies are both path dependent and path shaping, and hence, adopting an 
SRA implies a sensitivity to history. The research has found the temporal dimension crucial 
in understanding the events that lead to policy change, strategic selectivity exists only in 
the context of specific horizons of actions of different actors (Heigl 2011: 84).  
Combining theoretical perspectives 
Both the ACF and SRA are progressive theories of the policymaking process with increasing 
numbers of scholars applying them. However, both suffer from some applicability and 
methodological weaknesses.  
Operationally, a weakness of the ACF is whether or not the policy subsystem has any basis 
in reality. The fluid nature of the policy subsystem and the sporadic nature of actor 
participation, combined with the difficulties in analysing multi-level policymaking, lead the 
analyst to ask whether in practice, there is an identifiable policy subsystem. By contrast, 
applying the SRA was easier to apply, with its focus on the immediate concerns of structural 
constraints, strategic actors and learning is a plus over a focus in abstract theorising. 
However, perhaps a result of its empirical infancy, the application of these concepts is 
somewhat vague. 
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Interestingly, both fail to fully explore the scalar implications of their application, with the 
research findings presented here providing strong evidence that both struggle to fully 
handle multi-level policymaking, both in terms of national policy conflict taking place at the 
local level and the implications of the relationships of actors across these scales. 
Conclusions 
Providing radically different lenses through which to view public policy, the ACF and SRA 
have explored conflicting accounts of the policymaking process and importantly, combining 
their insights has helped to understand and explain the modes and modalities of the 
aviation industry’s position in policymaking. A multi-theoretical approach has uncovered 
aspects of the process of policy change and the position the aviation industry occupies in it, 
that would have been unidentified had a single perspective been employed.  
The research findings demonstrate that agency-centred approaches, such as the ACF, 
underplay the crucial interrelationship between state strategies and agency, focusing on 
internal decision-making and the preferences of individual actors. By contrast, more 
structure-centred approaches, such as the SRA, struggle to explain the specific responses of 
individual actors: in understanding why they become involved in political action and group 
dynamics. Solely employing the ACF would have left the relationship between structure and 
agency unexplored, notably the effect that structural conditions played in determining the 
actions of agents. Similarly, solely employing the SRA would have left the important role of 
technical information unexplored and the beliefs that underpin actors’ strategies 
unexamined.  
The contrasting perspectives complement one another in their explanatory ability. In 
particular, the SRA’s analysis of the strategies actors employ complements the ACF’s 
exploration of coalition activity. Combined they are able to explore in-depth the strategies 
coalitions employ to achieve their policy goals. Equally, the ACF’s ability to uncover the 
beliefs that underpin actors’ participation in the policymaking process enhances the SRA’s 
exploration of actors’ strategic actions. Both have drawn attention to the crucial role that 
resources have played in facilitating the position of privilege the aviation industry enjoys. In 
finding that favourable structural conditions do not alone ensure a position of privilege, the 
SRA began to uncover the important role that social forces play, an aspect that, due to its 
agency-focus, the ACF was able to complement, exploring group dynamics and the role of 
beliefs and technical information in stimulating policy change. 
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This thesis now moves onto the final chapter (Nine), which presents the main conclusions 
of the thesis, briefly addresses the its aims and objectives and outlines future research 
directions. 
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Understanding the development of aviation policy in the UK 
 
Aviation politics remains centre stage in the UK, with the UK Government once again 
reopening the whole debate, in a pattern of events that closely resembles those that led to 
the appointment of the Roskill Commission to review UK aviation policy. Whether or not it 
will lead to further policy u-turns and reviews is yet to be seen, however, it illustrates why it 
is claimed that the aviation industry is a privileged actor in policymaking. This thesis set out 
to explore this position, seeking to analyse the aviation industry’s position in environmental 
policymaking and by answering questions well rehearsed in political science since the 
1950s, namely: who gets what, where, and how (Lasswell, 1986), to investigate the 
mechanisms behind how and why the aviation industry is able to occupy such a position. 
This final chapter will present the research findings by addressing the aim and objectives of 
the thesis, detailing its key contributions to knowledge, and outlining future research 
directions.   
Main research findings 
This thesis sought to illuminate the mechanisms behind the aviation industry’s oft-claimed 
position of privilege and to explore the obstacles to balance in long-term environmental 
policymaking by conducting a theoretically informed examination of policy change in 
relation to airport expansion. The main objectives were threefold:  
1. To generate a systematic empirical account of the main actors and events involved 
in the historical development of the aviation policy in the UK 
2. Analyse two in-depth case studies of policy decisions that have been crucial in the 
sectors long term development: the development of Stansted as the third London 
airport and the extension of Manchester Airport 
3. Apply two modern theories of the policy (namely the Advocacy Coalition 
Framework and the Strategic-Relational Approach) to understand and explain the 
modes and modalities of the aviation industry’s position in policymaking 
The first objective was addressed primarily in Chapter Two, where a systematic empirical 
account of the main actors and events involved in the historical development of the UK 
aviation policy was provided. This chapter identified the key actors involved at the 
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international, European and national scales and provided a chronological account of the 
events that shaped the development of the industry since World War Two. It identified how 
aviation policy has systematically facilitated the growth of the industry, which has 
simultaneously, created difficulties for the state to achieve balance in policy and the 
policymaking process. 
Chapters Four and Six addressed the second objective, by analysing in-depth two case 
studies that have been crucial policy decisions in the sectors long-term development with 
fresh empirical information uncovered through extensive documentary analysis and elite 
interviewing.  
Chapter Four examined the decision to approve Stansted as the third London airport. In the 
same manner as Chapter Two, it identified the key actors involved in this area of 
policymaking and provided an in-depth chronological discussion of the events that led to 
Stansted’s approval, concluding with a consideration of who got what, where and when. 
Stansted’s approval as the third London airport came in 1985, after a series of events that 
spanned over thirty years, saw multiple sites approved, involved two public inquiries and 
three in-depth reviews, and featured a constantly evolving cast of actors from the private 
and public spheres. The environmental movement emerged alongside these events; 
however, with the aviation issue largely perceived to be a local problem, this movement 
failed to really impact upon national political and environmental agendas. In the aftermath 
of World War Two, the development of the UK aviation industry was widely seen as an 
important engine of economic growth, and the development of a third London airport was 
perceived as a key instrument in this. Consequently, the interests of the aviation industry, 
in this case the British Airports Authority, were tightly aligned with those of the state (at 
the national level at least) and hence, benefitted from a privileged position in 
environmental policymaking. 
Chapter Six analysed the decision to approve a second runway at Manchester Airport. A far 
shorter case, it was framed as a straight fight between economic and environmental 
interests. Prior to the start of the public inquiry the airport operator occupied a privileged 
position, with the development of the second runway seen by the state, at both the 
national and local levels, as crucial in contributing to the UK’s (apparent) need to  increase 
air traffic capacity and in providing an economic stimulus to the North West. In addition, 
Manchester Airport was (and remains) owned by a consortium of local authorities, and 
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hence, the airport operator’s interests were directly entwined with those of the state. In 
the end, the state, operating as an independent arbiter, deemed that the economic 
benefits of the runway outweighed the environmental impact, with the development of an 
extensive Section 106 agreement demonstrating the airport operator’s commitment to 
environmental mitigation. A period of direct action followed the runway’s approval, which 
transformed future debates on the environmental impact of an ever-expanding aviation 
industry, capturing national public and political attention and pushing the aviation issue up 
political and environmental agendas.  
Chapters Three, Five, Seven and Eight addressed the final objective, to apply two modern 
theories of the policymaking process, the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) and the 
Strategic-Relational Approach (SRA) to understand and explain the modes and modalities of 
the aviation industry’s position in policymaking. Chapters Five and Seven applied the ACF 
and SRA to the two case studies empirically explored in Four and Six while Chapter Three 
provided an in-depth examination of these theories and considered, under comparable 
terms, their origins, units of analysis and how they explain policy change, before detailing 
existing applications and the critical reactions and refinements they have provoked. It 
concluded by highlighting their key similarities and differences relevant to the objectives of 
this research, notably, their attempt to consolidate existing theories of the policymaking 
process; how they conceptualise the distribution of power among actors; their mechanisms 
behind policy change; and their view of the state in balancing competing interests.  
Chapter Five examined the decision to develop Stansted as the third London airport, where 
both the ACF and SRA offered convincing accounts of the process of policy change and 
some of the mechanisms underpinning the aviation industry’s position in the policymaking 
process, however, singularly, neither proved able to fully explain the events that took place. 
Economic and political structural influences played a big a role, which the ACF was unable 
to explain, while the process proved too drawn out and chaotic for the SRA to wholly 
comprehend. However, by paying close attention to the beliefs of actors, the ACF 
uncovered the mechanisms behind how and why actors work together to achieve their 
policy goals. This helped to explore some of reasons behind how and why the aviation 
industry is able to occupy a privileged position in the policymaking process, notably, 
through the assemblage of powerful pro-growth coalition(s) that are able to retain control 
over the broad direction of policy. Complementary to these findings, the SRA shed light on 
the strategies actors used to achieve their policy aims and explored the structural factors 
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inherent in the policymaking process that privileged the actions of the aviation industry and 
those promoting its interests.  
Chapter Seven analysed the events that led to the approval of Manchester Airport’s second 
runway, where again, both the ACF and SRA provided convincing accounts of the process of 
policy change, however, as before, singularly both failed to uncover all the mechanisms 
underpinning the aviation industry’s position in the policymaking process. The ACF 
highlighted the important role of technical information and policy-oriented learning in 
creating policy change, however, as before, economic and political structural influences 
played a big role, which the ACF could not explain. By contrast, the SRA was able to 
illuminat and explore the effect of these influences, notably the underlying strategic 
context in which conflict took place, one that was receptive to those strategies (and hence, 
those actors) that aligned with the economic aspirations of the North West and more 
broadly, the development of UK air capacity. However, it also had blind spots, proving weak 
in conceptualising what underpins actors’ strategies and failing to adequately assess the 
internal dynamics of the state. 
Chapter Eight brought these research findings together, combining their insights and 
creating the first theoretical dialogue between the two perspectives. It compared and 
contrasted the ability of the ACF and SRA to explain policy change and offered insights into 
the ACF and SRA’s future theoretical development. It found that agency-centred 
approaches, such as the ACF, underplay the crucial interrelationship between state 
strategies and agency, focusing on internal decision-making and the preferences of 
individual actors while the SRA has difficulties in explaining the specific responses of 
individual actors, in understanding why they become involved in political action, and group 
dynamics. While uncovering a number of critical insights into each theory, interestingly, 
both proved to have common blind spots: a failure to fully theorise the role of the media in 
policy change or the important role of public opinion; an inability to adequately address 
their scalar implications; and a tendency to be backwards facing, all areas that are 
theoretically ripe for future refinement.  
Main contribution of thesis 
This thesis sought to contribute to the existing literature by providing fresh empirical data; 
fresh theoretical interpretation of those empirics; and new insights into broader and 
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continuing theoretical debates about the role of the state. This section highlights its main 
contributions to knowledge. 
By providing a fresh systematic account of the historical development of UK aviation policy, 
this thesis has contributed new empirical evidence to a field which Staniland (2009) has 
described as ‘strangely thin’. This thesis helps to overcome this thinness, drawing together 
the existing literature and contributing new empirical evidence. Furthermore, is has 
unearthed in-depth fresh analysis of two decisions that have been key in the sectors long-
term development, which provides a timely historical look at previous debates in the 
development of the aviation policy in the UK.  
As Chapter One highlighted, there is a significant, and growing, body of academic research 
that examines the positive and negative impacts of the aviation industry and increasingly, 
what the rhetoric of sustainable development implies for its continuing growth. This thesis 
has contributed evidence to this growing body of research, by providing a theoretically 
informed analysis of the reasons that have underpinned the obstacles to balance in long-
term policymaking in this area, notably, why the negative impacts of the aviation industry 
(i.e. the environmental) are continually, but not always easily, outweighed by the positive 
(i.e. the economic).  
This research also contributes to the significant literature that explores the role of the state, 
at both the national and local levels, in balancing these concerns. First, in analysing two 
decisions where conflict over national policy was played out at the local level via the means 
of a public inquiry, it has contributed to the emerging body of literature that examines the 
public inquiry as a space where conflict over sustainability is played out (for example, 
Cowell and Owens, 2006; Owens and Cowell, 2011; Rough, 2011). Second, it has provided 
evidence to complement the conclusions drawn by scholars such as Paterson (2000; 2007) 
and May and Hill (2006), who, in their analyses of automobile and aviation politics 
respectively, demonstrate that regardless of the environmental impact, industries occupy a 
privileged position in policy due to the dominant social paradigm of economic growth that 
is so crucial in the reproduction of the capitalist state is difficult to challenge. To both these 
areas of research, this thesis contributes a new empirical case study (i.e. the aviation 
industry), that illuminates the mechanisms behind the state’s inability to balance concerns, 
notably, the structural influences that are inherent in the policymaking process and the 
ability of powerful pro-growth actors to dominate said process. 
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This thesis has made both a theoretical and empirical contribution to the development of 
the ACF and SRA. Perhaps most importantly however; this research has initiated the first 
theoretical dialogue between the two contrasting perspectives.  
In the literature, combining the merits of theories is ‘standard advice’ (Sabatier, 2007b). 
However, what is less clear is how analysts go about doing this (Cairney, 2012). Either, it is 
assumed that they are broadly complementary, and their insights are combined to produce 
a single theory or to provide complementary perspectives (John, 1998: 18) or, that they 
provide contradictory explanations and engage in a ‘policy shootout’ to find the ‘best’ 
theory based upon the ‘basic tenets of science’ (Eller and Krutz, 2009). This thesis adds 
weight to the critiques that the latter is problematic on two counts (Cairney, 2012: 266). 
First, there is no universal understanding of the scientific method and second, policy 
change is open to interpretation, a point illustrated by Chapters Five and Seven, where both 
the ACF and SRA were able to provide equally compelling, but contrasting, accounts of 
policy change. This research has shown that a multi-theoretical approach facilitates this and 
provides evidence for the argument that there is no single ‘best’ theory.  
The ACF and SRA have provided complementary insights that illuminate equally important 
aspects of policy. It has shown that neither is exhaustive and while it may have been easier 
(operationally at least) to employ just one perspective, the insights gained would be 
inferior, for example, structural influences would have been absent from the explanations 
had the ACF been the sole theoretical perspective. It is not the contention of this thesis that 
there is any need for, or indeed any scope for, theoretical synthesis, rather, that that value 
of the two perspectives lies in their ability to provide complementary insights. 
In contributing new empirical case studies, this thesis has provided evidence that adds 
weight to existing critiques of the ACF and SRA, and has exposed new insights. These areas 
are ripe for theoretical development and offer a number of future lines of enquiry.  
For the ACF, despite what Sabatier says, with so many tweaks, it has become unwieldy and 
hence, hard/nigh on impossible to test the whole framework. Though this thesis did not set 
out to test every aspect of it, it found that many of its recent additions were simply absent 
from its explanation of events (e.g. negotiated agreements and coalition opportunity 
structures), while also uncovering flaws in its core foundations: policy subsystems, policy 
core beliefs and external events. Importantly, it has contributed to the growing body of 
applications outside of the United States, which is crucial given Sabatier’s wish it to have it 
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widely adopted and in addressing the problems of its applicability identified in this 
research. 
To the SRA, theoretically and empirically in its infancy, this research contributes an 
important empirical application and theoretical evaluation. The potential refinements 
identified demonstrate that the concepts the SRA employs need further theoretical and 
empirical development, notably, in its conceptualisation of the agency-side of the 
relationship between structure and agency. However, it is a promising theory of policy, 
whose development should be fostered accordingly through the development of a long-
term research program. 
Future research directions 
This thesis has analysed one area of policy to explore the claim that the aviation industry is 
a privileged actor in environmental policymaking, in the development of UK aviation policy, 
and more specifically, in the provision of infrastructure. However, there are a number of 
other areas of policy that there would be merit in examining to analyse further the claim 
that the industry is privileged (in spite of its increasingly recognised environmental impact). 
Staying with a UK-focus, areas of policy ripe for examination include the exclusion of 
aviation emissions from the Climate Change Act 2008; the historical monopoly that BAA, 
until recently, enjoyed; and, an area where the aviation industry was arguably not 
privileged, the 1979 agreement between BAA and West Sussex County Council that 
committed the former to not building a second runway for thirty years. Expanding the 
analysis to the European scale, there would be value in examining the aviation industry’s 
historical position in the EU ETS, notably, their delayed exclusion from it and the conditions 
surrounding their inclusion in 2012. At the international scale, there would be value in 
examining why a convention dating back to 1944 still defines the policy framework, one 
that, in spite of the industry’s increasingly recognised environmental impact, allows 
international aviation to be exempt from tax.  
Another possible line of investigation is to examine similarly contentious air transport 
issues in other countries, for example, in the emerging markets of Asia, where the industry 
is expanding at a phenomenal rate and where the role of the state in policymaking is quite 
different. The findings could potentially uncover quite different mechanisms behind the 
aviation industry’s position of privilege in policymaking and the motivations and beliefs 
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behind the actors engaged in the process. Similarly, while this thesis has adopted an 
historical perspective, cross-national (less-historical) studies would provide a different 
perspective, particularly in the comparing the effect of different policymaking systems. 
In exploring these areas, an approach similar to that used in this research could be taken, 
collecting empirical data from public records and interviews with key actors and employing 
the ACF and SRA to help explain the mode and modalities of the aviation industry’s position 
in policymaking. Familiar with these areas of policymaking and the broad landscape of 
aviation politics, it is expected that the research findings emerging from an examination of 
these areas would be broadly similar to those presented here. Specifically, that the 
combination of structural influences inherent in the policymaking process and the 
assemblage of powerful pro-growth coalitions facilitate the aviation industry’s position of 
privilege in environmental policymaking.  
Taking a step away from aviation policy, the further development of the ACF and SRA could 
be facilitated through  their application to other areas of environmental policymaking 
where it is claimed certain actors benefit from a position of privilege (e.g. the nuclear 
industry) or conversely, a position of (under)privilege (e.g. the renewables industry). 
Furthermore, applying the ACF and SRA beyond environmental policymaking could 
complement the theoretical research findings of this thesis, for example, examining the 
pharmaceutical industry’s position in healthcare policymaking. 
As well as facilitating complementary and comparative analysis with the results presented 
here, employing the ACF and SRA in a multi-theoretical study would further there 
theoretical development, adding weight and helping to address many of the critical 
refinements posited in this thesis. Extending the geographical scope of the investigation, 
would encourage further theoretical testing of the ACF and SRA, notably in their ability to 
travel, a central critique of this research. Methodologically, there is scope to quantitatively 
test the theoretical conclusions of this thesis, and of these other potential areas of research 
(e.g. through the coding of interview data), which would offer further opportunity for 
greater theoretical development.  
Final thoughts 
As the first paragraph of this chapter highlighted, aviation politics is once again centre stage 
in the UK. However, where the current situation differs from the case studies examined in 
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this thesis is that the environmental impacts of the aviation industry are even clearer, with 
climate change widely recognised as a threat to society. It is a worrying situation that in 
spite of these environmental impacts, the industry still appears to be able to control the 
broad direction of policy and act as an obstacle to balance in long-term environmental 
policymaking. Whether the newly appointed Aviation Commission will be able to settle the 
debate is anyone’s guess, however, as history has shown, what is not uncertain is that the 
aviation industry will battle to retain its privileged position in policymaking. 
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Appendix A: List of interviewees, the search for a 
third London airport 
Interviewee Date and 
time 
Location Role in case study 
Anon 09/06/10, 
1000 
Personal residence 
of Tricia Barber 
NWEEHPA Volunteer, worked with Norman 
Mead 
Barber, Tricia 09/06/10, 
1000 
Personal residence  NWEEHPA Volunteer since 1960s, worked with 
Norman Mead running the office 
Jameson, 
Robert  
17/06/10, 
1030 
Jameson & Hill 
Solicitors, Hertford 
Instructing solicitor at Eyre inquiry for 
consortium of local authorities 
Barbone, Carol 07/07/10, 
1000 
SSE Campaign 
Office, Takeley, 
Bishop’s Stortford 
Stop Stansted Expansion Campaign Director 
Forsyth, Sue 27/10/10, 
1130 
Personal residence NWEEHPA member and later campaign 
director 
Anon 04/11/10, 
1700 
  
Keene, Sir 
David 
20/01/11, 
1115 
Royal Courts of 
Justice, London 
QC for consortium of local authorities at the 
Eyre inquiry and junior counsel (with Douglas 
Frank as lead QC) for Essex County Council 
during the Blake inquiry 
Haselhurst, Sir 
Alan  
25/11/10, 
1000 
House of 
Commons, London 
MP for Saffron Walden 
Harris, Sir 
Thomas  
13/01/44, 
1430 
Via telephone Senior Civil Servant at Department of Trade, 
responsible for airport policy 
Hall, Professor 
Peter  
16/02/11, 
1100 
Bartlett School of 
Planning, UCL 
Witness for BAA at Eyre inquiry and Stansted 
commentator 
Doganis, 
Professor 
Rigas  
11/08/11, 
1100 
Rigas Doganis & 
Associates, London 
Witness for BAA at Eyre inquiry 
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Appendix B: List of interviewees, Manchester 
Airport’s second runway 
Interviewee Date and 
time 
Location Role in case study 
Keene, Sir 
David 
20/01/11, 
1115 
Royal Courts of Justice, London QC for Manchester Airport 
Waite, 
Terry 
04/08/11, 
1345 
The Bridge Project, Suffolk Patron of, and witness for, 
MAJAG  
Doganis, 
Professor 
Rigas 
11/08/11, 
1100 
Rigas Doganis & Associates, London Witness for Manchester Airport, 
specialist advisor/expert witness 
on airport planning and Head of 
Department of Air Transport, 
Cranfield University 
Thomas, 
Callum 
12/08/11, 
1000 
Café opposite the Centre for Air 
Transport and the Environment, 
Manchester Metropolitan 
University 
Head of Environment 
Department, Manchester Airport 
and witness for Manchester 
Airport 
 
Yates, Peter 16/08/11, 
1000 
Personal residence, Macclesfield Chief Planning Officer for 
Macclesfield Borough Council and 
witness for Macclesfield Borough 
Council 
Carter, Tom 17/08/11, 
1030 
Personal residence, Ludlow Witness for British Airways 
Marshall, 
Ian 
19/08/11, 
1000 
Backford Hall, near Chester, 
Cheshire West and Chester Council 
offices 
Principal Conservation Officer, 
Environmental Planning Services, 
Cheshire County Council and 
witness for Cheshire County 
Council 
Nixon, 
Peter 
23/08/11, 
1400 
Via phone Regional Director, National Trust 
for Places of Historic Interest or 
Natural beauty and witness for 
National Trust 
Bounds, 
Peter 
24/08/11, 
1015 
Marriott Hotel, Liverpool Chief Executive, Liverpool City 
Council and witness for 
Merseyside Authorities 
Shepherd, 
Jim 
25/08/11, 
1400 
Personal residence, Mobberley MAJAG supporter and former 
Director of Engineering at 
Manchester Airport 
Howden, 
Colin 
05/09/11, 
1000 
Transform Scotland office, 
Edinburgh 
Manchester Friend of the Earth 
Stringer, 
Graham 
07/09/11, 
1315 
House of Commons, London Labour MP for Manchester 
Blackley (1997-2010), Chairman 
of Manchester Airport (1996-
1997), Leader of Manchester City 
Council (1984-1996) and 
Councillor for Manchester City 
Council (1979-1998) 
Twigg, John 10/10/11, 
1630 
Via telephone Infrastructure Planning Manager, 
Manchester Airport and witness 
for Manchester Airport 
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Appendix C: Interview access letter 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dear Mr. Carter, 
I am a PhD Researcher from the School of Environmental Sciences at the University of East 
Anglia and the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research analysing the role of privileged 
actors in environmental policymaking: a case study of the aviation industry in the UK. 
One of the case studies I am looking at is the decision to approve a second runway at 
Manchester Airport.  Due to your role in the case as a witness at the inquiry for BA plc, and 
your knowledge and expertise in this general area, it would be really great to talk to you.  
I am hoping to begin interviews from the week commencing 25 July 2011 through until the 
end of September 2011, please suggest a time and place which is convenient with you. 
I have enclosed an overview of my research providing you with further details, your 
contribution would be really valuable to my research.   
I look forward to talking to you soon, 
Yours Sincerely, 
Lauren Roffey 
Lauren Roffey 
PhD Researcher 
School of Environmental Sciences  
University of East Anglia 
Norwich  
NR4 7TJ 
 
+44(0)1603 591343 
+44(0)7983 459588 
 
l.roffey@uea.ac.uk 
14 July 2011 
 
 
MSP Solutions Ltd. 
66 Blackborough Road 
Reigate 
Surrey 
RH2 7BX, UK 
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Appendix D: Interview crib sheet 
 
Exploratory conversation around a general topic. 
1) Introduction 
a. Introduce yourself 
b. Introduce research and answer any questions (use overview form) 
c. Explain nature of interview (consent form) 
2) Questions that are not too challenging 
a. Your role in the inquiry 
b. Your relationship with others in the process 
3) More central/sensitive areas 
a. Ideas of privilege/fairness 
b. balance 
c. Air of inevitability 
d. Ideas of national interest? Who benefits and who feels the costs? 
e. Relationship between government and aviation industry 
f. Economic vs. environmental 
g. Why do you think policy reversals? 
h. Why do you think it took so long to come to a decision? 
i. What inhibited the policymaking process? 
j. What do you think of the relative power the industry has compared to 
other actors in the process? 
k. Future of Stansted? Was the end actually the end? 
4) Tying up 
a. Any questions? 
b. Any points you would like to tell me which we have not covered? 
c. Any exchange of material? 
d. Can I contact you again as my research progresses? 
e. Any other potential interviewees? 
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Appendix E: Interview consent form 
I can confirm I have read and understood information about the project. The purpose 
and intent of the interview has been explained to me. 
 
I understand my participation is voluntary and I can withdraw from the interview at 
any point, without providing any justification. 
 
To maintain confidentiality please select one of the following options: 
I give permission for my name to be used where what I have said as part of this study 
can be used in all research outputs so that anything I have contributed can be 
recognised. 
I do not wish my name to be used, however I am happy to be cited as:                                                                                               
               I do not wish my name to be used. 
 
I confirm that the information gained may be used in internal and external 
publications, reports and presentations; however my name will not be used unless I 
gave permission above. 
 
I agree that if there is any information I would like to keep completely off the record I 
will indicate this clearly. 
 
Any questions that I have asked about the purpose and nature of this interview have 
been answered to my satisfaction. 
 
I voluntarily agree to take participate in the research project.  This will include being 
interviewed and recorded (audio). 
I agree to assign the copyright I hold to any materials related to this project to Lauren 
Roffey. 
 
.......................................................... ................................................................... 
Name of participant (PRINT)  Signature and date 
.......................................................... ................................................................... 
Researcher (PRINT)   Signature and date 
 
